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The first large-scale thermonuclear deto-
nation—the 10.4-megaton IVY MIKE test
of 1 November 1952, at the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission Pacific Proving
Grounds on Eniwetok Atoll in the Mar-
shall Islands. The test was designed to
confirm, at the megaton level, the effec-
tiveness of the newly discovered
“Teller-Ulam” radiation “trigger,” an
advance that made fusion explosions
practicable. The explosion was unexpect-
edly powerful, five hundred times more so
than the fission-technology FAT MAN of
1945. It left a crater 164 feet deep and
6,240 feet across where the islet upon
which the device rested had been, and it
wrecked the unmanned observation
equipment on nearby islets. On islands
miles away, where scientists had intended
to examine birds and trees, etc., to mea-
sure biological effects, all animal and veg-
etable life was simply destroyed. Warships
over thirty miles out to sea endured sear-
ing heat. The mushroom cloud rose some
forty thousand feet and spread out over a
hundred miles.
IVY MIKE was not a “bomb” but a test-bed;
the Soviet Union made the same break-
through the next year. Successive tests
were devoted to developing serviceable
thermonuclear weapons, or “hydrogen
bombs,” ultimately producing the vast ar-
senals that are the subject of one of this is-
sue’s themes—reductions in nuclear
weapons. On page 13 begins an exchange
of views between Admiral Stansfield
Turner, USN (Ret.), a former president of
the Naval War College, and two members
of the College’s research faculty.
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Vice Admiral Cebrowski commanded Fighter Squadron
41 and Carrier Air Wing 8, both embarked in USS
Nimitz (CVN 68). He later commanded the assault
ship USS Guam (LPH 9) and, during Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the aircraft carrier
USS Midway (CV 41). Following promotion to flag
rank he became Commander, Carrier Group 6 and
Commander, USS America Battle Group. In addition
to combat deployments to Vietnam and the Persian
Gulf, he has deployed in support of United Nations
operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. He has served
with the U.S. Air Force; the staff of Commander in
Chief, Atlantic Fleet; the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations, on four occasions; with the Joint Staff
(as J6); and as Director, Navy Space, Information War-
fare, and Command and Control (N6). Vice Admiral
Cebrowski became the forty-seventh President of the
Naval War College in July 1998.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
The Navy has made considerable progress in transformation: it is
increasingly network-centric; its offensive firepower is more dis-
persed and more accurate; and its power can be projected much
farther inland. But these advances represent past decisions.
Transformation is the continuing process of crafting a new future,
one that will find expression in new “tangibles,” used in new ways.
“CHALLENGE THE ASSUMPTIONS!” That is the oft-repeated exhortation ofthe Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, to his admirals. From
the perspective of a war college or a research laboratory, both under the aegis of
academic and intellectual freedom, the task sounds easy. It is far more difficult in
execution—yet it is a requirement for organizations under stress.
Before exploring the process and consequences of challenging assumptions,
one should ask “Why?” What is the imperative? If the Chief of Naval Operations
were comfortable with the current assumptions, if he were confident that they
could produce what is required for the emerging national security environment,
and if the budget environment were both predictable and adequate, there would
be no compelling need to challenge the assumptions of an organization with a
long history of sustained superior performance. But none of this is true. The evi-
dence that the Navy cannot continue on its present course and still secure the in-
terest of the nation over the long term is overwhelming. Analysts predict a
procurement “train wreck,” not just for the Navy but for all the services. The
growth of operating costs has been both large and unpredicted*—and personnel
costs are likely to grow even if the economy should slow. It is little wonder that
the Chief of Naval Operations asks his admirals to challenge the assumptions.
* For example, in the case of aircraft repair parts: 19.8 percent growth in fiscal 1998, 12.4 percent in
1999, 11.7 percent in 2000, and 14.6 percent so far in 2001.
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TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE
In deciding which assumptions to challenge, one finds two broad categories. The
least interesting assumptions involve neither significant contention nor signifi-
cant money (consequently, that group almost always is selected for review). The
second category represents both contention and money. Clearly, it is this second
group in which we should be interested. Within it we find a further division into
assumptions that can yield new ways of gaining efficiencies at the margin, and
those that involve transformational change. The rest of this discussion will focus
on the latter category.
Three common examples of assumptions at the highest level are:
• The national security environment will remain essentially unchanged
through 2010 or even longer.
• The defense budget will be flat or increase only modestly through that
period.
• The trend toward a networked joint force will continue or quicken.
We need to be exceptionally careful in our assumptions, for if they are not true
our strategy will fail. The first and second assumptions should be challenged.
The problem with the first is that it defies both history and current observations.
The problem with the second is that if the budget falls, the Navy will become
prohibitively expensive; and if the budget notably rises, we will miss opportuni-
ties, due to our insufficient attention to research and development, concept in-
novation, training, and acquisition capabilities. Put another way, the second
assumption may cause us to “think poor,” and it stems from the first. Because the
third assumption is fully under our control, it can be made to come true.
For a helpful way to think about assumptions, consider the relationship be-
tween science and technology. Science explores man’s relationship with the rest
of creation. Technology, on the other hand, relates human actions to objectives.
In the processes of science and technology, two things happen: observations are
explained, and “things” are invented. The outcome is that the new explanations
and the new things interact, creating new realities. This point gives insight into
the process of challenging assumptions. A new concept flows from a new under-
standing of relationships, and it yields rules pointing to the creation of new tan-
gible things. Attempting continued creation of things in response to older and
increasingly discredited explanations of observations results in disharmony and
waste, the stress and inefficiency of living a contradiction. Even when the cre-
ation of such things yields marginal improvements in performance, the im-
provements are only in relation to discredited theories and not the new realities.
Since man can never fully observe or explain all of creation, this process is
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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continuous. It is only really noticed when truly large assumptions are chal-
lenged, as when Copernicus articulated a new relationship between man’s habi-
tat and the rest of the universe.
A modern-day example emerges from information science, best observed in
the prevailing marketplace: large numbers of people with high degrees of shared
awareness, responding to shifts in basic rule sets in ways not yet fully under-
stood, constitute the modern market. The result is activity that takes us to a fu-
ture where human behavior is less deterministic and more emergent, less
focused on the physical and more on the cognitive, and where value is derived
more from relationships than from things. For the military, the question is
whether we can turn away from methods and processes that rely on building
rigid paths to a predetermined future, and turn instead toward a view that is less
deterministic and less focused on the physical.
This new understanding of mankind’s relationship with information points
us to technology choices. As we move from the industrial age to the information
age, the intangibles of war will increasingly dominate outcomes. We are witness-
ing the “demassification” of the tools of war, with concomitant increases in
speed; further, precision will be measured increasingly by reliability and
predictability in coupling military operations to political objectives. The trend
toward “demassification” is already apparent in the ascendance of precision
strike, an information-age concept that relies on knowledgeable targeting and
accurate weapons guidance rather than the mere counting of aircraft sorties and
bomb tonnages dropped—industrial-age metrics. Also, the rapid targeting used
both in DESERT STORM and over Serbia and Kosovo reduced the required mass.
Since sources of power are increasingly associated with information, agility, and
communications, categories of systems and procedures can be identified for re-
duction or outright elimination—those that depend on mass, reduce speed, or
inhibit shared awareness.
With these examples as guides, we can explore the three avenues of
transformational change available to military forces, the Navy in particular.
These involve the questions of how to operate the Navy, how to size the Navy,
and how to shape the Navy.
Is it possible to change how the Navy operates—or more broadly, how the
Navy is used—without changing its size or shape? The principal feature of U.S.
naval operations is the sustained projection of American sovereignty, frequently
referred to as “forward presence.” About this we need to ask, would we want to
do less of it in order to save money to be spent elsewhere? Research by Professors
Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd Hayes at the Naval War College points to the im-
portance of forward presence, while acknowledging the difficulty of expressing
its value by a meaningful quantified metric. In other words, we know that to do
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
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less is almost certainly bad, possibly disproportionately so—but it is difficult to
say by exactly how much. Research by the College’s Professor Tom Barnett on
economic and energy development in Asia implies a similar conclusion. Also,
the joint combatant commanders clearly want more rather than less naval for-
ward presence. But even if all of these views were wrong, a reduction in forward
operations of the fleet would not yield meaningful savings unless portions of the
forces themselves were eliminated.
One question, then, is whether presence levels can be maintained or increased
with a smaller force level by changing the way the Navy operates. Indeed, there
are proofs that the answer is yes—naval forces homeported in Japan, and the
Blue/Gold crews of nuclear ballistic-missile submarines, for instance—but since
presence forces are also warfighting forces, it is not clear that a smaller force
would be prudent. There are ample indications that it would not be. Over the
192 crises of the past thirty years studied by the Center for Naval Analyses, naval
forces on their normal deployments dealt with the vast majority. The most nota-
ble exception was Operation DESERT STORM, in which additional U.S. naval
forces surged from their home ports.
The Navy’s mode of operation, its size, and its shape are interdependent. At
the very least, an increase in one draws funds from the others, probably with un-
intended consequences. The result is that a change in one assumption that we
might challenge has effects that cascade into other areas.
For instance, a navy does not hold its shape as its size is decreased: navies do
not “scale” well in a downward direction. One need only look at the current U.S.
fleet, in which there are virtually no small ships. The dominating cost-benefit
rule has been to maximize combat power per dollar in a force of specific size.
The result has been upward pressure on unit size and capability, downward pres-
sure on the number of ships, and a general deserting of low-end missions. The
result is that the fewer remaining ships have difficulty meeting forward-presence
requirements. As low-end training opportunities are lost or underutilized, crews
become overspecialized, aggravating the phenomenon that on multimission
ships more mission capability is put at risk. The result is that the fleet tends to-
ward tactical instability, by which I mean vulnerability of a force to an adversary
that is disproportionately smaller in size and cost, and less sophisticated. A large,
costly, multimission U.S. warship that neglects training in one or more warfare
areas, such as antisubmarine warfare, may be defeated by a small, inexpensive, sin-
gle-purpose foe, such as a conventional submarine.
The key assumption we really should challenge is that in a time of rising costs
and flat budgets, the Navy must operate less, or reduce its size, or forsake capa-
bilities appropriate for the information age—or all of the above. We should be
asking instead, “Can we maintain or even increase forward presence, hold or
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increase current size, and shape fleet capabilities for the information age, all
within the expected budget?” My hypothesis is that by “shaping the force,” mak-
ing the appropriate choices in information-age technology, organization, doc-
trine, and business processes, the size, the operating levels, and the capabilities
of the U.S. Navy all can increase.
The boldness of this hypothesis is acknowledged, but there are illustrations
that indicate its merit in significant cases. One could replace some of our current
and projected amphibious ships with an expansion of the U.S. Army’s Theater
Logistics Vehicle, employing a variant of the Royal Australian Navy’s Jervis Bay.
This force would substitute speed for mass while delivering more Marines to the
objective, at high speed and low cost. Combat power delivered per unit of over-
head could be reduced by an order of magnitude. Of course, this would necessi-
tate a change in our concept of amphibious and logistics operations. A similar
type of ship could be used for advance-force and special operations. Global 2000
and a limited-objective experiment with Amphibious Squadron 5 have pointed
to the promise of this approach. A second example is found in a Naval Postgrad-
uate School concept called SEA LANCE, in which the numbers of ships are sharply
increased, their weapon load increases, and the crew size decreases—all within
existing costs.
There are other examples. They all challenge doctrine, organization, and
technologies that have been undergoing evolution and enhancement since World
War II or before. Clearly it is time to look at the new ideas objectively and make
the hard choices. But what are the rules by which these choices are to be made?
NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS
Over the past two years the Navy Warfare Development Command, with the aid
of the Naval War College War Gaming Department, has examined and refined a
Capstone Concept for the future Navy. The Capstone Concept articulates the
U.S. Navy’s transformation path to network-centric operations. It applies the
defining tenets of joint and naval warfare to network-centric warfighting and
establishes a vision of the new capabilities we must achieve. It underscores, in all
its aspects, the increasing importance of information as a source of power. Informa-
tion protection, knowledge management, and networked sensor employment
are vitally important to future warfighters. The Navy must be able to fight for
and win the information and knowledge advantage early in any crisis or conflict.
Centered on warfighting capabilities and human and organizational behavior,
and enabled by evolving technology, network-centric operations can be broadly
described as the process of deriving maximum military effect through the rapid
and robust networking of diverse, well informed, and geographically dispersed
forces. Network-centric operations primarily focus on the operational and tactical
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levels of warfare, but they have significant impact across the spectrum of military
operations, from diplomatic support and humanitarian assistance to strategic
warfare. Network-centric operations represent an emerging theory of war that
will harness the power of technological advances to dominate operational tempo
and achieve warfighting aims at all levels of military operations. Four major sup-
porting concepts—“pillars”—underpin this new theory.
To gain the information and knowledge advantage, the future joint force will
fight first for knowledge superiority, building our own awareness while degrad-
ing the enemy’s. Commanders have always valued a decisive information advan-
tage over an adversary. “Surprise,” one of the great principles of war, is one
generalized example; the breaking of the Japanese code before the battle at Mid-
way is a more specific application. But the power of information in the emerging
character of war has elevated the concept of “information superiority” to pri-
macy. Awareness will be gained through multitiered expeditionary sensor grids
incorporating autonomous vehicles, robotics, and microtechnology; through
officers educated in the history, politics, economics, and cultures of potential
adversaries; and through “red cell” networks of regional experts responding di-
rectly to operational commanders.
Assured access results from the Navy’s ability to destroy or neutralize “area
denial” systems, sophisticated and overlapping threats designed to keep U.S.
power-projection forces from reaching positions from which they can be effective.
The Navy must be able rapidly to establish control of the battlespace—on, over,
and below the sea; over the land; and in space and cyberspace—to the degree
needed to accomplish any mission, at any level of conflict. The emphasis here is on
coping with the changing shape and technical character of the “no-man’s-land.”
Effects-based operations shift primary reliance from attrition to a warfighting
philosophy that relates physical effects more directly to desired political outcomes.
This venerable principle will be manifested by naval forces using combinations of
speed and maneuver to influence and degrade an adversary’s decision processes.
Toward this end, knowledge superiority enables a new era of effects-based opera-
tions that can capitalize on early war-termination opportunities that would oth-
erwise be lost. An adversary of modest means requires a prodigious will to
undertake the fight. We should expect our forces to shift accordingly from means
to will.
The forward sea-based units of the Navy–Marine Corps team are our nation’s
most efficient, responsive, and sustainable “enabling” forces. Naval forces will
continue to exploit the advantages of operating from an essentially borderless
domain. Two converging trends are making sea-basing important in joint oper-
ations. First, land forces are relying more heavily on sea-based forces for in-
creased agility, support, and survivability. Second, Navy sensors, strike assets,
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:31 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
access capabilities, and command capacities can be projected farther inland. For-
ward-deployed naval forces can shape the battlespace—by establishing a tiered
sensor network; by putting their scalable, interoperable command and control
networks at the disposal of joint and coalition forces; and by taking early offensive
and defensive actions.
The tenets and pillars of network-centric operations are essential to fielding a
Navy–Marine Corps team capable of performing the wide range of future mis-
sions necessary to maintain U.S. maritime supremacy. But the Capstone Concept
is exactly that, a concept. It is more like science than technology, in that it indi-
cates a critical change in our relationship with our environment. It points to spe-
cific requirements—the sensors, networks, weapons, platforms, and most of all,
the people who will populate new generations of forces and execute the emerg-
ing doctrine. While the intangibles increasingly dominate outcomes, new tools
are required to effect the transition to the new theory of war; as a 1998 RAND
Corporation study concludes, a transformation requires not only challenges to
the way competencies are pursued but also changes in the “tangibles.” The Navy
has made considerable progress in transformation: it is increasingly network-
centric; its offensive firepower is more dispersed and more accurate; and its power
can be projected much farther inland. But these advances represent past decisions.
Transformation is the continuing process of crafting a new future, one that will
find expression in new “tangibles,” used in new ways.
If, rather than accepting limiting assumptions, we insist that we can maintain
or even increase forward presence, hold or increase force size, and shape fleet
capabilities for the information age, many of today’s assumptions will have to be
discarded. We have only begun to take up the charge of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to “Challenge the assumptions!”
ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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THE DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
For over thirty years the United States, Russia, and others have been at-tempting to limit, control, and reduce the nuclear weapons in the world.
These efforts have resulted in a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties, and
the number of these weapons has been reduced markedly. As a result, we tend to
believe we are making good progress. That is the case relative to where we were.
In the absolute, however, we are doing very poorly. There are still more than
thirty thousand nuclear weapons in the world; we have just seen proliferation of
these weapons to India and Pakistan; the risks of even further proliferation seem
high; and the nuclear treaty process is in limbo. Without both a new sense of ur-
gency and a more imaginative approach to controlling nuclear weapons, we risk
letting the world become one of proliferation to irresponsible nations and
groups that could easily be tempted to employ those weapons in anger for the
first time since 1945. If the two nuclear superpowers continue to need tens of
thousands of nuclear warheads, as both profess to, other nations of the world
will say they need them as well.
The genesis of the problem can be summarized in the numbers of U.S. nu-
clear weapons on three particular dates. Immediately after the attack on Naga-
saki on 9 August 1945, the United States possessed no nuclear weapons; it had at
that point expended the only two it had built. The nation did not know quite
what to do about that situation; it even proposed to the United Nations that a
way be found to prohibit the new weapons. Joseph Stalin would not even con-
sider the idea; in 1949—by which time the United States had about two hundred
nuclear weapons—the first Soviet test detonation was conducted. That began a
race, a spiral that produced a peak on the American side in 1969, at some 32,500
nuclear warheads.
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That had to have been an irrational process. How could Americans possibly
have thought they could use 32,500 nuclear warheads? After all, there were less
than two hundred cities with populations of more than a hundred thousand in
the Soviet Union.
But to put the enormity of these weapons into even sharper perspective: all
Americans had seen post-attack pictures of Hiroshima; they knew that some
140,000 people had died there. The twelve-kiloton Hiroshima weapon had had a
blast effect alone equivalent to some twenty-five million pounds of TNT—that’s
million. It also had, of course, other effects—radiation, heat intense enough to
cause fires, and electromagnetic pulse. Further, a nuclear attack on a city causes
severe societal disruption: communications that had passed through Hiroshima
no longer did, affecting many other cities; products from Hiroshima’s factories
never went anywhere, affecting other factories around the country.
However, the matter needs to be put in context; not all the nuclear weapons
that the United States has built since then have been the size of the Hiroshima
bomb (see table 1). The smallest type was an artillery shell, but even that was a
hundred times as powerful in blast effect as a modern large (two-thousand-pound)
conventional bomb. Re-
cently the Senate Armed
Services Committee talked
of developing a rather small
nuclear device that might
be useable in circumstances
in which the nation would
not think of using a huge
weapon; the smallest one it
considered would have five
thousand times the blast
effect of a two-thousand-pound bomb. Today, the standard weapon in the U.S.
arsenal that could quickly be aimed at Russia (both sides having “detargeted”
their ballistic missiles in January 1994) is 250,000 times as powerful as a
two-thousand-pound bomb. The standard Russian weapon is the equivalent of
over a billion pounds of TNT—over six hundred thousand times the power of a
two-thousand-pound bomb.
CONVENTIONAL THEOREMS, SPECIOUS REASONING
How in the world did this nation ever get to 32,500? The primary reason is that
the United States has always treated nuclear weapons as though they were simply
larger conventional weapons. More specifically, the basic mistake was to apply







0.1 artillery 200,000 100X
5 Senate proposal 10,000,000 5,000X
12 Hiroshima 25,000,000 12,500X
250 U.S. ICBM 500 million 250,000X
550 Soviet ICBM 1.2 billion 605,000X
TABLE 1
LETHALITY INDICATORS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Plus: radiation, heat/fires, EMP, societal disruption
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certain theorems of conventional warfare to nuclear warfare, producing four
misleading concepts:
• The importance of a rough parity in numbers of weapons
• The possibility of deterring an opponent from initiating nuclear war by
threatening some specific set of targets
• A “window of vulnerability” for both sides
• The stated willingness, even today, of the United States to initiate nuclear
war.
Numbers
In conventional warfare, numbers are important. No one wants to have fewer
tanks, infantry, or airplanes than an opponent—a valid enough proposition. In
nuclear warfare, however, where weapons have blast effects equivalent to hun-
dreds of millions of pounds of TNT, it ought to be obvious that the point of di-
minishing returns sets in quickly.
The author once had the opportunity to ask Robert McNamara, who was sec-
retary of defense from 1961 to 1968, how the United States accumulated over
thirty-two thousand nuclear weapons. The U.S. government, he explained,
would periodically receive intelligence reports that the Soviets were starting new
nuclear-weapons programs, apparently with the aim of either catching up with
or exceeding the American arsenal; each time, the United States would build new
systems of its own to counter them. The Soviets, in turn, would learn that the
Americans were building new weapons; they would start new programs to coun-
ter them—and on we went, spiraling upward.
Target Sets
McNamara tried to arrest this spiral by limiting the strategic arsenal to the size
necessary to destroy a given percentage of the Soviet industrial capacity and
population in order to deter the Soviet Union from starting a nuclear war. The
percentages he chose were indicative of how far astray strategic thinking had
gone; they were absolutely enormous, something like 40 percent of the Soviet
Union’s industrial capacity and 25 percent of its population, between six and
seven thousand targets in all. It boggles the imagination to think that in the
1960s the United States believed that it needed a destructive capacity of such size
to deter the Soviet Union. Both nations had bought into a specious reasoning ac-
cording to which the important thing was parity in numbers of weapons, an as-
sumption resulting in an ultimate inventory between them of some seventy
thousand nuclear weapons.
Even so, by 1969 it was obvious that something was badly wrong. American
political leaders were loath simply to reduce numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons,
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probably for fear of appearing weak vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Instead, by the
1970s, they had started the nation on a path of nuclear arms control agreements.
At the same time, U.S. strategic
planners began to shift away from
industrial capacity and popula-
tion to military targets, selecting
those they thought vital to deterrence and assigning forces to attack them in
what was known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP.
My first encounter with the enormity of all of this came in the early 1970s, as
commander of a carrier task group in the Mediterranean. I had had no experi-
ence whatsoever with strategic nuclear matters, but I now had command of a
force that possessed strategic nuclear weapons. I sent for a pilot of an A-6 In-
truder, the primary U.S. carrier-based attack aircraft of the time, and his bom-
bardier/navigator. “Bring me,” I told them, “your target folder and tell me what
you do if I’m ordered to order you to release your nuclear weapon in accordance
with the SIOP.” The two young men came into my cabin, opened their target
folder, and said, “Here is our target, Admiral.” I noticed first of all that it was in
Bulgaria. Bulgaria? I couldn’t say so to these people who might have to risk their
lives to carry out this plan, but in a major nuclear war, with thousands of war-
heads going off all around the world, why were we going to worry about
Bulgaria?
The target was a railroad bridge across a river. The folder had a photograph of
it, but all I could see was railroad tracks coming down to the north side of the
river, and more tracks going away from the south side. “Unfortunately, Admiral,”
the bombardier explained, “the bridge is too small to be seen in this photo.” I
came away with the conviction that if we had sufficient nuclear weapons to hit
an invisible bridge in Bulgaria, we were overstocked. Yet today the United States
still has six thousand nuclear warheads aimed at Russia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
say two thousand is about as low as they can go. These are such enormous weap-
ons that it is amazing people still think in such terms.
Deterrence
How should we calculate what it takes to deter? First of all, deterrence is in the
eyes of beholders—what they think is going to happen. If they are dealing with
the very survival of their societies, they have to assume the worst. The worst
would be the other side hitting cities, destroying the society and its population.
In that case, it makes no difference what is put in the target set. Strategic plan-
ners theorize, even agonize, over targeting, but it does not matter: the other side
necessarily assumes that its cities will be targeted.
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The question, then, is, how many Russian cities does the United States have to
threaten in order to deter the Russians? To make a rough calculation, let us put
the question the other way around: how many cities in the United States does
Russia have to threaten to deter
us? Imagine the president of the
United States appearing on televi-
sion to tell the American people,
“There is no longer a threat of
major nuclear war. I have knocked out the entire Russian nuclear capabil-
ity—and all I lost was New York City and two hundred thousand people.” If
there was ever a time when Americans might have thought that would be a suit-
able exchange, would they today, with Russia in the straits in which it now finds
itself, politically, economically, and militarily? No. The United States is deterred
by the prospect of even a single nuclear detonation on its soil.
Yet our nation has continued with this specious line of reasoning—that it
must be able to destroy some given (large) number of targets. Does it really take
six thousand warheads, or even two thousand, to deter Russia? No. It probably
takes the same number as it does to deter the United States—one. But let us play
it safe. Call it five or ten, or some such number—still, it will not be in the hun-
dreds or thousands. The point is to make Russian “beholders” feel certain that if
they start a nuclear war with the United States they will suffer five or ten nuclear
detonations on their cities in return.
To “size”a nuclear arsenal, though, one also has to ask how large a force would
be needed if one ever had to retaliate. It is difficult even to imagine what would
happen—if a nuclear war begins, everyone has already lost. It will not make any
difference whether we ultimately do more damage to our opponent, the aggres-
sor, than has been done to us; the damage to our own country will have been so
great that we will have lost, too.
Still, we can bound the problem, at least on the upper side. A group at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology did a study in 1987 hypothesizing 239 So-
viet nuclear detonations on the liquid-energy supplies of this country—the port
terminals, oil storage facilities, pipelines, and so forth. It found that two years
later, 60 percent of the U.S. population would have died of starvation, because
food could not be shipped. At the end of six years, gross domestic product would
have been only 40 percent of what it had been before the war. Roughly two hun-
dred warheads, then, is probably more than enough retaliation to set any society
back to what we may call its point of nonrecovery, at which it can never again be
what it had been.
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Windows of Vulnerability
The idea of possessing only two hundred warheads, however, is very difficult to
sell; many strategic planners have strong objections. The first is the familiar idea
of the “window of vulnerability”—that a first strike by either side could totally
disable the nuclear capability of the other side. This has always been a canard.
For over thirty years, ballistic-missile submarines, SSBNs, capable of launching
thousands of nuclear warheads, have been at sea, where they are virtually invul-
nerable. Even beyond that insurance is the phenomenon that Clausewitz called
“friction”—in warfare, nothing ever succeeds completely. Even if there were
nothing but land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a side that
tried to knock them all out would be lucky to destroy 90 percent.
The United States once had a thousand ICBMs; a 90 percent effective strike
would still leave a hundred deliverable weapons. An attack that was 99 percent
effective—and no one in the military would ever imagine achieving 99 percent
success in any kind of an attack—would leave ten ICBMs intact, which with
three or more warheads each would be enough to deter, if we accept that deter-
rence at low numbers is valid.
First Use
There is still another objection to the United States limiting itself to very low
numbers of nuclear weapons—that it may want nuclear weapons with which to
initiate nuclear war. In 1952, the United States declared that it would employ nu-
clear weapons to defend its Western European allies against a conventional at-
tack, if necessary. This was called “extended deterrence.” It was never a military
strategy but a budgetary one: it was a way to excuse the Europeans from building
large enough conventional forces to defend themselves. The Western Europeans
did not want a nuclear war on their rather limited geography, so they spoke of an
“umbrella,” a nuclear umbrella, over it. By this they meant that if the Soviets in-
vaded and conventional fighting in the area protected by the umbrella went
badly, the United States would launch nuclear weapons—its own weapons, fir-
ing them over that umbrella, against the Soviet Union. Thus all the nuclear dev-
astation would be in the United States or the USSR, outside the umbrella. The
Americans looked at it rather differently. “If the war goes badly inside this um-
brella,” an American would have said, “and if the Europeans want us to, we’ll
launch tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. Of
course, there may be retaliation, but all the nuclear devastation will be inside Eu-
rope, inside the umbrella.”
Today, fortunately, defending Western Europe is no longer a problem. Ac-
cordingly, U.S. strategic planners have conjured up new contingencies in which
the United States might wish to initiate nuclear war:
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• To preclude the revival of a Soviet-type threat to Europe
• To respond to the use of biological weapons against U.S. forces
• To destroy underground headquarters, weapons, or weapon storage
• To repel a cross-Straits invasion of Taiwan by a force of massed Chinese
junks
• To repel a massive Chinese ground attack on South Korea
• To respond to, and thus deter, any sort of heinous act against the United
States.
There is no question that in every one of these instances—one might think of
others—a nuclear response would be more efficacious militarily than a conven-
tional one. But to consult Clausewitz again, war must have a political objective,
and it must not be waged in a way that defeats its political objective. This is hard
for people of the World War II generation to accept, having been raised in an era
of unconditional surrender. And subsequently we learned the wrong lesson
from Vietnam—that the military should never again let politicians pick targets,
as Lyndon Johnson did in that war. But who picked the targets in Kosovo in
1999? The political implications of targeting in Kosovo were so clear that any
military objections were very muted.
How is it, then, that planners today argue that the United States might use nu-
clear weapons in these six cases simply because they would be more effective
militarily? This is sloppy thinking—it overlooks the fact that political objections
will prevail. First, in all these instances (with the possible exception of conta-
gious biological weapons), a nuclear response would be considered dispropor-
tionate. Second, it has been over a half-century since nuclear weapons were used;
the uncertainties involved in unleashing them again would seem too great.
Third, it is not melodramatic to point out that at the extreme, the survival of hu-
mankind would be at risk. That a president of the United States would take the
moral responsibility of opening this Pandora’s box, not knowing where events
could lead, is beyond belief. Finally, and fortunately, alternatives are becoming
available—in the form of precision guided munitions (PGMs), as well as such
devices as remote-targeting systems that make PGMs easier to use.
If planners insist that the nation might willingly use nuclear weapons in sce-
narios like those above, precision conventional capabilities specifically tailored
to deal with them will not be developed. Take the cross-Straits invasion of Tai-
wan, for instance; to land a force of the size that would be needed, the People’s
Republic of China might have to send waves of wooden-hulled junks. It is very
difficult to sink a junk; to stop such an invasion, a specialized munition that
would go through a wooden hull and kill everyone inside would be very handy.
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But such a thing cannot be conjured up at the last minute. It has to be thought
about in advance, beginning with the understanding that the incremental military
advantage of using nuclear over precision guided weapons in such a case would
not be worth the political cost.
GETTING TO TWO HUNDRED: STRATEGIC ESCROW
The United States, then, does not need a reserve of nuclear weapons to take the
offensive; and something in the neighborhood of two hundred nuclear war-
heads will do for deterrence and retaliation. How would we safely get down to a
nuclear arsenal of something like two hundred warheads? Today, the most imag-
inative approach is to finish the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START II), which takes each side down to 3,500 nuclear warheads (see table 2),
and then perhaps negotiate another agreement that will reduce warheads to two
thousand, or lower.
There are problems here. START II is stymied. The Russian Duma has passed
and ratified it, but with caveats concerning American national-missile-defense
developments. There is not
much chance that the U.S.
Senate (which ratified the
treaty in an earlier form in
1996) will accede to such
reservations. Even if ratified
in the same form by all par-
ties, START II is too slow; if
it went into effect today, the
reduction to 3,500 would
be completed only in 2007.
Too much can happen between now and then, as the Russian scene changes, and
as the Iraqs, Irans, and North Koreas of the world aspire to nuclear capabilities.
In any case, the 3,500 figure, which is so often invoked, is phony. The treaty
covers only nuclear warheads actually mounted on delivery vehicles. The United
States has said that in addition to the 3,500 permitted by the treaty it would also
keep 3,500 spares, which of course could be mounted on multiple-warhead ve-
hicles, and it has indicated that it will keep 3,000 tactical weapons, which are not
covered by the treaty at all. That makes a total of 10,000. Proportionally, if a
START III treaty reduced “covered” U.S. warheads to two thousand, the nation
would in fact possess five thousand. These reductions, whatever numbers we
choose, do nothing significant to reduce the threat to this country. If five hun-
dred nuclear weapons were launched against us, we would be just as dead as if
two or three thousand had been.
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1949 c. 200 First Soviet test
1969 32,500 Peak
1989 6,000 START I target
1993 3,500 START II target




Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:33 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
What can be done that would be more effective? One approach is called “stra-
tegic escrow.” The president would begin by directing the U.S. Strategic Com-
mand to take a thousand warheads off its ICBMs and put them in storage not
less than three hundred miles away. The president would invite the Russians to
send observers—not controllers—to count what goes into storage and remain
to see what goes out. Ideally, the Russians would reciprocate; in fact, they would
have to. Most reports—including
from Russian sources, borne out
by a statement by President Vladi-
mir Putin—indicate that the Rus-
sians today are nearly down to a
thousand usable intercontinental nuclear warheads. This is because since the
collapse of the Soviet Union they have not been refurbishing and replacing
them. It is in our interest in fact to get the size of the U.S. arsenal down to that of
the Russians because a growing disparity in numbers of usable warheads could
make the Russians feel so insecure that they might place their remaining nuclear
weapons on hair-trigger alert. Given American initiatives and Russian reciproca-
tion in a program of strategic escrow, in a matter of four to five years both sides
could be down to something like a thousand deliverable, ready warheads.
At that point, an arrangement would have to be negotiated with the other six
nuclear powers to create a “condominium” by which each of the eight states
would ultimately keep no more than two hundred warheads, all of them in es-
crow—none of them ready to fire, all of them subject to international verifica-
tion. Further, they would agree to work together to prevent the proliferation of
these weapons to other nations, including sharing intelligence information. Un-
der the condominium regime, there would be no nuclear weapons in the world
immediately ready to fire. The international observers at the storage sites would
warn if any one of the eight nuclear powers prepared weapons for use. At the
same time, any of the eight could bring weapons into readiness as a threat
against any other nation that acquired a nuclear capability and began threaten-
ing others with it.
The nuclear nations would move into this condominium state in a gradual
way, undergoing quite intrusive United Nations inspections. These nations
would not need to expose themselves to a surprise, disabling attack, even if some
other nation sequestered a few hundred warheads during a transitional period.
But then, squirreling away, say, two hundred nuclear warheads ready for use is
not a simple proposition; it means somehow hiding the same number of ICBMs
or other delivery vehicles, in addition to warheads. A nation considering doing
so would still face friction; even a two-to-one advantage does not guarantee total
protection.
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This process could produce a very stable world. If a Saddam Hussein acquired
a nuclear warhead and started threatening to use it, the nuclear nations would
simply bring warheads back from escrow. By acceding to the condominium the
nuclear powers would be telling each other, and the world, that though they
were not agreeing to abolish nuclear weapons, because it is impractical at this
point (though a condominium would be an achievable milestone on the path to
that desirable goal), they were accepting zero reliance on these weapons, zero
readiness for their immediate use, and zero chance of delivering a surprise at-
tack. A condominium will not lessen the lust of rogue leaders for nuclear weap-
ons, but it should temper the willingness of others to aid and abet their attempts
to obtain them. For instance, such a dramatic move on the part of the United
States and Russia would pressure third parties to put their economic interests af-
ter global security as well, by not selling materials of use in a nuclear program to
rogue states. Presently, our country, with its hoard of excess weapons, does not
appear serious about preventing proliferation and therefore does not get the co-
operation we need.
Of course, a Saddam Hussein may still use a weapon if he has one, but he will
have to take into account the hundreds of weapons poised out of his reach, able
to eliminate his country if their owners so decided. That is not a guarantee that
he will not deliver a nuclear attack, but it is as good as probably can be done.
If there is a reasonable alternative to a strategic escrow/condominium ar-
rangement, it certainly is not traditional arms-limitation agreements. The START
treaties are moribund; the United States has antagonized not only Russia and
China but a number of its allies, and it has no national missile defense program;
the United States has also expressly rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
These actions have killed the momentum of nuclear arms control and brought
U.S. leadership in this area into serious question.
A VERY DIFFERENT WORLD
There is an urgent need to move away from where we are. Why? We see a number
of ominous signs. Plainly, no one can tell where Russia will be in five or ten years.
So far, apparently no Russian weapons or fissile materials have leaked out, but
observers are worried; there could be much greater cause for worry if conditions
deteriorate further in Russia. In South Asia there is an unprecedented inflamma-
tory situation—two nuclear powers, Pakistan and India, who from time to time
go to war with each other. As for the Middle East, since December 1998 there
have been no UN inspectors in Iraq. When inspectors first went there in 1991,
they estimated that Iraq was only months away from a nuclear capability. How
far away can Iraq be now? Finally, there is evidence that Iran and North Korea
have been moving toward nuclear weapons as well.
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What these developments portend is a world in which nuclear weapons pro-
liferate into the hands of someone who will actually use them. Given Iraq’s in-
tense rivalry with Iran and animosity to Israel, proliferation to Saddam Hussein
would mean the possibility of at least occasional use of nuclear weapons. This
would produce a very different world than the one we now live in. The attack
might not be on the United States, but it would change all the relationships
between humans and between nations: all dealings between them would be
clouded by the risk that a breakdown in relations could lead to nuclear devastation.
The world badly needs some imaginative approach like a condominium of the
nuclear powers under strategic escrow. It will not get one without rejecting the
propositions of conventional warfare that in decades past were transposed into
the nuclear era. In short, it is mandatory that the specious reasoning that has un-
derlain nuclear policies for over fifty years be corrected. The United States must
lead the world in this direction to forestall an era of occasional use of nuclear
weapons. After all, it was the United States that introduced these weapons. Be-
yond that, it is the only nation today with the stature, power, and wisdom to
manage a new nuclear-weapons regime.
One hopes that at war colleges today professors are teaching, and students are
learning, not simply contemporary facts but how to reason and analyze through
problems like this one better than the generations before have done. The United
States must deal with the nuclear problem in a much more rational way than it
has. If it is to do that, military officers, whether or not their duties take them into
this arcane field directly, must keep intellectually involved in this issue; the col-
lective impact of their thinking, speaking, and opinions will have an effect in the
future. The nation needs to be brought to understand that nuclear weapons are
generically different from conventional weapons. They are too powerful to be
used for anything but deterrence or—God help us—retaliation.
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WHAT DETERS? STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS
Roger W. Barnett
In the turbulent years following the great Allied victory in World War II, thepolicy agenda for U.S. leaders overflowed. Demobilizing millions of service-
men and shifting the economy to a peacetime footing were among the vital orders
of the day. Yet the Cold War was dawning, and the military services—including
the newly constituted U.S. Air Force—were maneuvering for position. An en-
tirely new strategy had to be crafted in the wake of victory and for what was to be
called the “atomic age.” Scientists, military leaders, academics, civilian analysts,
and politicians lined up to offer their theories about the proper place of atomic
weapons in the new strategies being proposed. Everyone was sailing into un-
charted waters, without benefit of stars or reliable compasses.
One could argue today that with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear
strategy American leaders got it right, or mostly right. After all, there was no
nuclear war, and after a bitter struggle the nation’s major competitor, the Soviet
Union, disappeared from the scene. No doubt some excesses resulted from the
competition between the superpowers, but they can be understood, even
excused, when one reflects on the deep hostility that existed between the two
systems. Secrecy and suspicion about intentions inflamed the relationship and
motivated the competitors to seek security in large arsenals of weapons, espe-
cially nuclear weapons.
Now, in the post–Cold War world, American leaders find themselves looking
again for navigational aids to guide them to safe
waters. In “The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the
Twenty-first Century,” Admiral Stansfield Turner has
offered a chart and some sailing directions. Briefly,
“The Dilemma” argues that:
Dr. Roger W. Barnett holds the Jerry O. Tuttle Military
Chair of Information Operations at the Naval War Col-
lege. From 1969 to 1971 he was a member of the U.S. dele-
gation to the Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviet Union.
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Nuclear weapons are extraordinarily powerful, qualitatively different from
conventional explosives;
An arms race caused the Soviet Union and the United States to acquire
unnecessarily large inventories of nuclear weapons;
In any conceivable contingency, however effective nuclear weapons would
be militarily, their use would be too risky;
No attempt at a first strike could ever destroy enough enemy weapons to
prevent retaliation, the results of which would be unacceptable, since the
United States is deterred from a nuclear attack by the prospect of even a
single nuclear detonation on its soil, and other states are undoubtedly
deterred by the same considerations;
There are too many nuclear weapons in the world—reductions in U.S. and
Russian nuclear arsenals promised by START II to 3,500 warheads are not
deep enough and are too slow in any case;
“Strategic escrow”—removing ICBM warheads and storing them not less
than three hundred miles from their launchers—should be initiated
unilaterally by the United States, an action that in this view the Russians
would be obliged to reciprocate;
In four to five years Russia and the United States would have only about a
thousand warheads in strategic escrow;
The other six nuclear powers would then be invited to join a condominium
in which each would place in escrow all of its nuclear weapons, no more
than two hundred per country, under an international inspection regime;
The result would be a very stable world, in which the probability of
surprise nuclear attack would be zero, nuclear proliferation would be
discouraged, and momentum toward arms control would be restored.
The pivotal concept in this scheme is “existential deterrence.” The approach
and the term were coined almost twenty years ago by McGeorge Bundy, who ar-
gued that so long as one maintained the ability to deliver a nuclear retaliatory re-
sponse to an attack, deterrence would succeed.1 The mere existence of a response,
which would inevitably cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor’s home-
land, would deter nuclear attack. The proposition was attractive: it implied that
deterrence was stable and that it could be ensured by small nuclear forces.
The enormous power of nuclear weapons, setting them qualitatively apart
from other weapons, made existential deterrence possible. The vast uncertain-
ties of system reliabilities, accuracy, survivability, and strategies such as “launch
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on warning” shored up convictions on all sides that at least one retaliatory
weapon would detonate on the aggressor’s soil. No prospective attacking nation
could believe that its nuclear-armed adversary could be totally disarmed as the
result of a first strike; some small number of retaliatory weapons would reach
their targets—and the prospect of horrendous consequences would suffice to
deter.
In his review (entitled “I Exist, Therefore I Deter”) of Bundy’s argument,
Lawrence Freedman called the argument “immensely seductive,” in that “forces
are to be judged by essentially neg-
ative criteria: they should not be
vulnerable, provocative, disruptive
of arms control, or prone to acci-
dental detonation. So long as these
criteria are met it does not matter
what is procured, where and in what numbers it is deployed, and against what
it is targeted.”2 But are such criteria—and the argument that is founded on
them—valid?
If, indeed, nuclear-armed adversaries believe that a single nuclear detonation on
their territory would negate any possible strategic objectives they might have,
the logic of existential deterrence is persuasive. Bundy’s “Existential Deterrence”
and the central theme of “The Dilemma,” however, contain five severe, even de-
bilitating flaws: if its key assumption is wrong, this brand of deterrence could fail
catastrophically; the possibility of the United States extending deterrence to its
friends, allies, and those at risk of nuclear coercion would be nullified; the pros-
pects of the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. and allied forces
would increase; it not only weakens nuclear deterrence but encourages the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons; and if increased national security is the objective of
the scheme, the proposal, by focusing on weapons—one of the means of war-
fare—addresses the wrong issue.
First, then, the question must be asked: What if the key assumption is incor-
rect? While the prospect of “five or ten” nuclear explosions on its territory might
well suffice to deter the United States, what if adversaries have different percep-
tions and dissimilar thresholds of pain?
The central premise of “The Dilemma” is rooted in unabashed mirror-imaging:
“I believe A; you are a rational person, so you must also believe A. The logic is so
strong that I require no evidence on which to base my conclusion.” This is a curi-
ous approach from the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It
claims that in order to infer the intentions of others, one need look no farther
than one’s own. If that were true, why would the United States need the CIA, or
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rence can fail. It would be the height of irre-
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for that matter, any intelligence agency? If one can mirror-image in this, the
most vital of circumstances, with national survival at stake, why not in all lesser
cases?
The historical record indicates that belligerent states have often been able to
absorb great amounts of punishment. The premise of existential deterrence is
that attacks with nuclear weapons will be deterred confidently by the prospect of
a small retaliatory response. But how does that square with the ability of Ger-
many and Japan to fight on through devastating aerial bombardment in the Sec-
ond World War? States have withstood levels of destruction approaching those
claimed to underwrite mutual assured destruction, which “The Dilemma” cites
as “something like 40 percent of the Soviet Union’s industrial capacity and 25
percent of its population.” Indeed, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, the
fledgling Soviet Union lost “34 per cent of her population, 32 per cent of her ag-
ricultural land, 54 per cent of her industry, and 89 per cent of her coal mines.”3 In
a more recent example, “UNICEF indicates that at least 300,000 Iraqi children
have died from illness, hunger, and disease as a result of the sanctions imposed
after the Gulf War. . . . [O]ther sources go as high as 1.5 million Iraqis.”4 This car-
nage has resulted from Saddam Hussein’s intransigence in refusing to comply
with UN Security Council resolutions; it is totally avoidable. Given these re-
ports, can one have high confidence that the prospect of a small number of nu-
clear detonations on Iraqi soil would be sufficient to deter Saddam, or others like
him, from a nuclear attack? Do the statements of Muammar Qadhafi—“If we had
possessed . . . missiles that could reach New York—we would have hit at the same
moment [of the 1986 U.S. raid on Libya]. Consequently, we should build this
force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack” —indicate
that he would be deterred?5 Does North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles to deliver them argue that Kim Jong-il would be deterred
from using them by the prospect of a nuclear detonation on North Korean soil?
We cannot possibly know the answer to these questions. We know that poten-
tial adversaries are pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range delivery means.
We know also that nuclear deterrence has not failed—but that does not mean it
cannot. It might be true that “I Exist, Therefore I Deter”; but it might not. The
risks are of the greatest magnitude, however, and so are the possible conse-
quences. Existential deterrence is a prime example of a very risky and dangerous
approach to nuclear deterrence—for if it fails, it fails catastrophically.
One can agree that the detonation of a few nuclear weapons on American soil
would be the greatest disaster this country has ever experienced without taking
the leap of faith that one’s adversaries or potential adversaries would have the
same attitude. With no confirming evidence, believers in existential deterrence
project their beliefs and fears on others, reaching the conclusion that all must
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reason similarly. One is free to wonder, though, why the large risks involved
should be deliberately assumed.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, at the high point of the superpower nu-
clear arsenals, the United States measured “how much was enough” by the rub-
ber ruler of “assured destruction.” The assured-destruction criterion was
that nuclear forces had to be large
and robust enough to hold a spec-
ified, significant fraction of Soviet
population and industry at risk in
a retaliatory strike—that is, after
having absorbed a Soviet first strike.6 Yet the point continued to be reinforced
that the enemy’s prospect of certain loss had to be high if deterrence was to be reliable.
Moreover, deterrence is strengthened by availability. Would a prospective
robber be more likely deterred by a gun pointed at him or by one upstairs in a
dresser drawer? As Sir Michael Quinlan counsels, “Weapons deter by the possi-
bility of their use, and by no other route.”7
Small numbers invite malefactors to find ways to nullify them. In the case of
nuclear escrow, the small number of warheads would be in known locations,
because they would have to be monitored. It does not take a great amount of
imagination to think of ways to nullify small numbers of unusable warheads at
known locations, and the payoff from doing so would be very high; the tempta-
tion to acquire the capability to negate the escrowed weapons (or their owners’
ability to unite them with their delivery vehicles) could be irresistible.
In the final analysis, “a hundred weapons are not far more acceptable politi-
cally, more virtuous morally, safer, more stable in security terms, or even neces-
sarily many times less expensive than, say, a thousand.”8 The difference between
the approach taken by “The Dilemma” and one arguing that deterrent weapons
must be usable and numerous is that the former is based on an assumption that
deterrence cannot fail, and the latter on an assumption that it can. The prudent
course is clearly not the one suggested by “The Dilemma.”
The second key criticism of an embrace of existential deterrence is that it con-
tains no provision for extending deterrence. Since the middle of the twentieth
century the United States has provided a nuclear shield to its allies. Nato and the
Pacific allies (South Korea, Australia, and Japan, for example) have been the
clear beneficiaries of this policy. Further—and in direct contradiction of the
claim of “The Dilemma” that extended deterrence was “never a military strategy
but a budgetary one”—the United States provided the ultimate earnest of its
commitment to its allies: U.S. service members stationed forward. Unless one is
prepared cynically to insist that the U.S. fighting forces, hundreds of thousands
strong, stationed in allied countries were merely sacrificial tokens rather than
2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
To relinquish all weapons of mass destruction
would be to declare “open season” for their use
against the U.S. military.
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:36 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
couplings to the American strategic nuclear capability, one must consider that
extended deterrence was a genuine commitment on the part of the United States
to the defense of its allies.9 In the arrangement espoused by “The Dilemma,”
where nuclear arsenals would be held in escrow and could be used only in retali-
ation for a direct attack on one’s home territory, extended deterrence could not
function.
The third criticism asserts that if all nuclear weapons are placed in escrow, ad-
versaries will be strongly tempted to use not only nuclear weapons but chemical,
biological, or perhaps radiological weapons against U.S. forces in case of con-
flict. Given that American conventional forces are superior to all others in the
world and that the nation appears to intend to preserve that superiority in the
future, those who would engage U.S. forces militarily will be obliged to seek le-
verage in asymmetric ways, to level the battlespace. One such asymmetric
method would be to employ varieties of weapons of mass destruction. With nu-
clear weapons in escrow and unusable except in the most severe exigencies, and
having already foresworn possession or use of chemical and biological weapons,
the United States would have only conventional weapons with which to respond
to such attacks. Because the single data point on the subject—the restraint of
Saddam Hussein in not using chemical weapons in DESERT STORM—suggests
the value of nuclear weapons in deterring attacks by weapons of mass destruc-
tion, to relinquish all weapons of mass destruction would be to declare “open
season” for their use against the U.S. military.10
In the fourth place, the argument of “The Dilemma” stands both the evidence
and the logic of proliferation on its head. The claim is that “if the two nuclear
superpowers continue to need tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, other
nations of the world will say they need them as well.” There is, however, no
evidence to support such an assertion. When the Israeli Air Force attacked Iraq’s
Osirak reactor in 1981, it was not because Iraq was attempting to obtain nuclear
weapons to match those of the superpowers. Nuclear proliferation to India,
Pakistan, South Africa, and presumably to Israel cannot be attributed to that
cause either.
What the evidence shows instead is that “other nations” argue vigorously not
for large nuclear arsenals of their own but for the nuclear states to effect reduc-
tions in their stockpiles. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
entreats all states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to pursue nu-
clear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.” In compliance with this obligation,
the United States reduced its inventory of nuclear weapons by more than half
during the 1990s.
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If a potential acquirer of nuclear weapons scans the strategic horizon and
sees super-states, with arsenals of nuclear weapons numbering in the thousands,
offering security assurances to those who refrain from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction, the aspirant may well be discouraged from developing or ob-
taining its own weapons. If, on
the other hand, the numbers in-
volved are in the hundreds, the
ante to join the nuclear club is
low, and even parity is achiev-
able. If, moreover, the means of retaliation are locked up in escrow rather than
immediately available, an adversary might look very differently on the value of
acquiring nuclear weapons. In such an instance an opportunity—and therefore
the temptation—to change the strategic balance decisively would have been cre-
ated where none existed before. Thus, logic would indicate that rather than
dampen proliferation, the proposed reductions in nuclear arsenals to very low
levels would stimulate proliferation. Indeed, low levels of warheads could trig-
ger clandestine programs and cheating, because of both the ease in attaining
competitive numbers and the anticipated leverage that would be attained. Un-
like legitimate weapons held openly in escrow, illegitimate covert weapons
would be usable.
Moreover, since escrow deliberately retards retaliation, an aggressor might
reason that either the condominium would significantly delay, if not prevent,
the removal of weapons from escrow, or indeed, that retaliation could be fore-
stalled altogether. If Russia and China had all their weapons in escrow, for exam-
ple, would they consent to allow the United States to remove some or all of its
weapons for use? Could they be certain that the United States was not scheming
to coerce them with the now-usable weapons? Would they not insist on remov-
ing their own weapons also, thereby precipitating a most deadly crisis? Even if
consent were forthcoming, an adversary might believe that the time it would
take the United States to bring the weapons to usable condition might offer time
for negotiation—that it could negotiate something less than a nuclear retalia-
tory response. Given these considerations and the absence of extended deter-
rence noted earlier, proliferation would look a lot more attractive than it does
currently, or would even under any official approach toward the ultimate size
and disposition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Fifth and finally, “The Dilemma,” like many arms control proposals, is fo-
cused sharply on nuclear weapons. It laments the facts that nuclear weapons are
so powerful and that there are so many of them in the world. Acknowledging
that impressive strides have been taken to reduce nuclear arsenals, “The Dilemma”
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nevertheless conveys impatience at the tempo of reductions and offers a scheme
to render them more safe while reducing their numbers dramatically.
It emphasizes—and demonizes—the weapons. It renders nuclear yields, for
example, in terms not of kilotons, which is the convention, but of pounds of
TNT equivalent. The twelve-kiloton Hiroshima bomb is presented as having
yielded twenty-five million pounds of TNT equivalent. A similar rhetorical de-
vice is used to make numbers of weapons appear shocking. The figure of 32,500
“nuclear warheads” in the year 1969 is juxtaposed against “less than two hun-
dred cities with populations of more than a hundred thousand in the Soviet
Union.” But clearly the majority of those warheads were not designed for use
against Soviet cities, nor could they have been so employed—atomic mines,
antisubmarine and antiair weapons, and artillery shells come to mind.
Ultimately, however, as Colin Gray reminds us, it is not weapons but who
owns them that matters: “Clear military advantage on the side of order is a force
for peace. . . . For an extreme example, an Iraqi ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile] force would not be the same as the U.S. ICBM force, no matter how sim-
ilar the two forces might be in their technical characteristics and standard prac-
tices of operation.”11 To which point George Will adds: “Arms control as its
believers envision it—agreements making the world safer by limiting technol-
ogy—rests on the notion that the threat to peace is technological, not political,
that the threat is the nature of particular weapons, not of particular regimes.”12
Winston Churchill appreciated the point also; he “unhesitatingly endorsed the
Western monopoly of the atomic bomb, emphasizing his opposition to entrust-
ing U.S. and British knowledge of its secrets to the UN. ‘It would be criminal
madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world,’ he warned.
No country had slept less well because the secrets of the bomb were held in
American hands, but this would not have been the case had ‘some Communist
or neo-Fascist state monopolised for the time being these dread agencies.’”13
The focus on nuclear weapons, the means, devalues the more important ques-
tions: the objectives for which conflict is waged—the ends; and how conflicts are
conducted—the ways. Nuclear weapons are not the enemy. By making them the
enemy, the United States weakens itself vis-à-vis its real and prospective adversaries.
Ultimately, then, “The Dilemma” counsels an approach based on weakness,
not strength. Responsible U.S. leaders have been very consistent on the point.
President John F. Kennedy warned in his 1961 inaugural address, “We dare not
tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt
can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”14 His caution
was echoed forty years later in the remarks of Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld at his initial news briefing: “A strong military does not guarantee peace
and stability in the world, but we know that the opposite is true—that weakness is
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provocative, that it does invite and entice people into doing things they would
otherwise avoid, and our task is to see that we fashion deterrence to fit in this
new national security environment.”15 In sharp contrast, “The Dilemma” asks
that the United States: forgo its strategy of deterrence based on the expectation
of prompt, severe retaliation; abandon its policy of extended deterrence; and in-
stead accept high risks, even in effect tempting the use of weapons of mass de-
struction against its military, or even its homeland.
Still, despite the weakness and risk that must be assumed in moving toward a
nuclear posture advocated in “The Dilemma,” one can agree that the detonation
of a single nuclear warhead on American soil would be a catastrophe of the
greatest magnitude. For a variety
of reasons, that is a possibility to-
day, and its probability is increas-
ing with the passage of time. Even
with large, ready nuclear forces,
deterrence can fail. It would be the height of irresponsibility to believe, and to
act on the belief, that deterrence cannot fail.
The detonation of a single nuclear warhead on U.S. soil would constitute an
event from which the United States might never recover. The loss of confidence
by the citizenry in the ability of the U.S. Department of Defense to protect them
would be incalculable. The bond of trust that, at the most elementary level, the
people will be kept secure would be sundered. What subsequent action could re-
dress such a betrayal? A retaliatory attack that murdered thousands of innocents
in the country of the aggressor might be delivered, to deter additional attacks
from the original perpetrator or others watching the drama unfold. Even that,
however, would be both unsatisfying and of highly questionable morality.
If the detonation of a single weapon on American territory, then, is truly
unacceptable, the appropriate strategic response is not to shrink the U.S. nuclear
arsenal and place it in unusable escrow. A better risk-reducing solution is to con-
struct defenses against nuclear attack.
Today, arms control is preventing the United States both from reducing its
strategic nuclear arsenal to levels that it would prefer (the START process) and
from obtaining effective defenses (the ABM Treaty). In each instance, arms
control gives Russia a veto on decisions of greatest import to U.S. security. An
approach preferable to that presented in “The Dilemma” might be to withdraw
from the START II Treaty and the ABM Treaty—bilateral treaties with the Soviet
Union, a country that no longer exists. This could be done without abrogating
either treaty; withdrawal is provided for in both instruments, and to take advan-
tage of those clauses is to abide by the treaties’ provisions. In any case, arms con-
trol exists to control adversarial competition in weaponry. Russia and the United
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States today are not adversaries. President George W. Bush put it straightfor-
wardly in 2000, as a candidate: “Russia itself is no longer our enemy. The cold
war logic that led to the creation of massive stockpiles on both sides is now out-
dated. Our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of ter-
ror.”16 Therefore, arms control between the two countries is unnecessary and
irrelevant. Each should be free to pursue its own strategic agenda.
The United States does not owe Russia, China, or any other country an unop-
posed opportunity to kill its citizens. Arguments claiming that missile defenses
“threaten” the deterrents of other states must be rebutted in plain language: such
defenses threaten only the ability of others to kill U.S. citizens in large numbers
by means of ballistic missile attack. An argument that missile defenses
threaten the deterrent capabilities of other states must be accompanied by
some sense of what actions by the United States those deterrents are seeking to
forestall. In other words, why does China or Russia require the unchallenged
ability to exterminate American citizens in their homes? Why should the United
States specifically grant such a capability? As Henry Kissinger has argued, “De-
liberate vulnerability, when technology is available to avoid it, cannot be a stra-
tegic objective, cannot be a political objective, and cannot be a moral objective
of any American president.”17
A perfect “Astrodome” defense—an impermeable “roof ”—is unnecessary. It
is at the same time the wrong policy objective and the straw-man target of crit-
ics. Instead, by significantly complicating the strategic calculus, defenses offer
important benefits regardless of how well they might actually perform. This is true
because any adversary contemplating attacking in the face of missile defenses is
obliged to believe they will work, and work well. The credibility of American de-
fenses would be underwritten by the military and technological power of the
United States. What prospective attacker would consider a defensive system
built by the United States and confidently tell itself, “The U.S. defense is junk,
our warheads will penetrate it”?
The U.S. strategic approach should be to reduce its inventory of strategic of-
fensive weapons to levels that would ensure a strong, secure strategic reserve
against any prospective threat, and to construct a national missile defense on a
priority basis. The missile defense would seek to limit damage in the event of the
failure of deterrence and to protect the United States actively against nuclear
blackmail, as well as against accidental or unauthorized attack. President Bush
addressed both sides of the equation in a speech on 1 May 2001: “We need a new
framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different
threats of today’s world. . . . I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent
with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our na-
tional security needs.”18
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In summary, rather than take the high-risk course that leads to extremely
deep reductions and nuclear escrow, the United States would be far better off to
maintain a secure, capable strategic reserve and construct missile defenses to
protect its people. The nation needs a “shield of dreams,” as Senator Joseph
Biden has derisively called it.19 With a defense in place against ballistic missile at-
tack, no challenger would be tempted to attack. Shield of dreams? That’s right:
“Build it and they won’t come.”
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THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
Unreasonable Exuberance?
Andrew L. Ross
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreason-
able one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore
all progress depends on the unreasonable man.
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW
Thinking about the unthinkable just ain’t what it used to be. Such is the ColdWarrior’s lament (that, and not having the Soviet Union to kick around
anymore—after all, Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, and today’s other assorted “states
of concern” are poor replacements for the old bad bear). The Strategic Arms
Reductions Talks (START) process is slowly but thus far surely shrinking the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nuclear-capable bombers have been taken off day-to-day
alert. Land-based and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles have
been “detargeted.” Nuclear modernization has been abandoned in favor of
“stockpile stewardship.” Throw-weight (payload) and circular-error-probable
(accuracy) calculations, and nuclear net assessments more generally, have virtu-
ally fallen by the wayside. Nuclear duty assignments, which the armed forces
once restricted to active-duty personnel, have been
opened to members of the reserves and the National
Guard. Now a retired four-star admiral, writing not
in the pages of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
but in the Naval War College Review, proposes that
the United States needs neither the 3,000–3,500 nu-
clear warheads allowed under START II nor even the
2,000–2,500 warheads envisioned under a prospec-
tive START III, but only two hundred. There is more:
those two hundred warheads, along with the two
hundred nuclear warheads retained by each of the
other seven members of a nuclear “condominium,”
Dr. Ross is a professor in the Strategic Research Depart-
ment of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval
Warfare Studies. His work on grand strategy, defense
planning, regional security, arms control, weapons prolif-
eration, the international arms market, and defense in-
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three editions of Strategy and Force Planning (1995,
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War College’s project on “Military Transformation and
the Defense Industry after Next.” The author would like to
thank Peter J. Dombrowski and Kenneth Watman for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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would be placed in “strategic escrow,” subject to international monitoring and
verification. Implementation of the escrow scheme would, as intended, amount
to the near abolition of nuclear weapons—to the further dismay, no doubt, of
the ghost of General Curtis LeMay, who led the Strategic Air Command in its
glory days.
For Herman Kahn and other classical purveyors of nuclear theology, “think-
ing about the unthinkable” meant thinking about nuclear war.1 Given the cata-
strophic consequences of nuclear war, how could they have avoided thinking
about it? Not to think clearly, rigorously, and systematically about how to de-
ter—and, if necessary, to fight and win—a nuclear war would have been irre-
sponsible. Nuclear weapons and the prospect of their use, however remote,
demanded the attention of defense planners.
Today, ironically, advocates of deep nuclear cuts and even nuclear disarma-
ment can also lay claim to Kahn’s infamous phrase. Thinking about dramatically
reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons constitutes thinking about the un-
thinkable no less certainly than does thinking about fighting and winning
nuclear wars—and it is no less bold. Given the potentially catastrophic conse-
quences of nuclear war, how can we not think about slashing the world’s nuclear
arsenals and perhaps even eventually eliminating them? Not to think clearly,
rigorously, and systematically about whether to reduce and even eradicate nu-
clear weapons would be irresponsible. Serious nuclear arms control (that is, well
beyond START I, II, and III) and nuclear disarmament, however remote their
prospects, now demand the attention of defense planners.
Here and elsewhere, Admiral Stansfield Turner has sided with those who have
challenged the conventional, and original, meaning of “the unthinkable.”2 In-
deed, by endorsing nuclear disarmament as a “desirable goal,” he joins a small
number of prominent retired officers—most notably General Lee Butler (the
first commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command), General John R.
Galvin, General Charles A. Horner, and General Andrew J. Goodpaster—who
have “come out of the closet” to reveal themselves as nuclear abolitionists.3
The admiral’s essay will be greeted coolly by those who have not yet revisited
the meaning of thinking about the unthinkable. His proposal to slash the U.S.
nuclear arsenal to two hundred warheads and place them, along with the war-
heads of the other nuclear powers, in strategic escrow until nuclear abolition is
practical will encounter serious resistance—when it is not simply dismissed or
ignored. The nuclear force–structure implications of the admiral’s implicit as-
sertion that usable strategic forces are composed of conventional rather than
nuclear weapons are sure to be contested by the nuclear priesthood. Too few de-
fense planners share the admiral’s quite explicit concern about the dangers in-
herent in the “conventionalization” of nuclear weapons—the notion that they
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can be used in war as if they were merely more effective conventional weapons.
Even fewer will applaud him for taking the Senate to task for failing to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or for his championing of an Anti–Ballistic Mis-
sile (ABM) Treaty under assault by misguided advocates of national missile de-
fense. “Radical” is one of the more polite terms that will be used to characterize
Admiral Turner’s proposal.
The admiral’s proposed course of action raises questions and poses certain
risks. It would not be difficult to deconstruct his proposal, contest and parse its
assumptions, and dwell at length
on its difficulties and risks. Why,
for instance, has he settled upon
two hundred warheads? Why not
one hundred, or five hundred?
Will the Russian response to a
unilateral American drawdown indeed be governed by reciprocity? How would
the other nuclear states be persuaded to deposit their warheads in an interna-
tionally monitored strategic escrow and establish a condominium of nuclear
powers? Will the rest of the world have confidence in international monitoring
of that nuclear escrow of the UN Security Council’s five permanent members?
Can we expect nonnuclear powers to welcome a nuclear condominium? Would
such a condominium serve only to institutionalize further the divide between
nuclear haves and have-nots? How will its members hedge against a breakdown
of the envisioned regime? Might seemingly prudent hedges in fact contribute to
the regime’s breakdown? How will the conflicting principles underlying a realist
major-power condominium and a liberal international nuclear-monitoring re-
gime be reconciled? Are there other, perhaps more practical, alternatives for
achieving the admiral’s objectives?
Such questions deserve more attention. Details—about the dynamics of a re-
ciprocal nuclear drawdown; the standard operating procedures for a strategic
escrow; the establishment, maintenance, and management of an eight-power
nuclear condominium—matter. Yet the details of the process Admiral Turner
seeks to set in motion should not be allowed to obscure the grand purpose of the
process and its significance. He is on the right track. The stockpiles of nuclear
weapons accumulated during the second half of the twentieth century, particu-
larly by the United States and the former Soviet Union, should be dramatically
reduced, though not yet eliminated. The strategic value of nuclear weapons and
their impact on international security affairs should be minimized. The call for
nuclear marginalization should be heeded.4
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DEEP REDUCTIONS
For the United States, the costs and risks of dismantling the bulk of its nuclear
arsenal are minimal. The significance of nuclear weapons for the United States
today should not be exaggerated. When the rest of the world looks to the United
States for leadership, it does so because of the full panoply of resources the coun-
try can bring to bear and its continuing commitment to an open, liberal world
order—not because of any specific regard for its nuclear prowess. Nuclear weap-
ons are the linchpin neither of the U.S. position in the world nor of its security.
America’s preeminence, its status as a “full-service” superpower with global dip-
lomatic, economic, and military reach, is not dependent on the size of its nuclear
arsenal. The foundation of U.S. preeminence is a wide array of tangible and in-
tangible (“hard” and “soft”) power resources:5 the world’s benchmark econ-
omy—a strong, dynamic engine that outperforms all others and to which all
seek access; incomparable scientific and technological capabilities; a system of
higher education that is the envy of the world; a growing information, and
knowledge, edge;6 the fundamental soundness of America’s ideas, values, politi-
cal and economic liberalism, and culture—and their nearly universal appeal,
making them the standard against which all others are judged; and finally, but
not least, an overwhelming conventional military superiority. Unilaterally re-
ducing the nuclear arsenal of the United States to a thousand warheads and pur-
suing limited further reciprocal reductions would do little, if anything, to
diminish the nation’s preponderance. Further, it would enhance the credibility
of the U.S. nonproliferation posture.7
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were accorded a central role in U.S.
strategy. In those years they were thought to provide an effective counter to not
only the nuclear capabilities of a rival superpower but the apparent quantitative
conventional superiority of that rival and its allies. The perceived asymmetrical
deterrent and warfighting value of nuclear weapons contributed significantly to
the nuclear buildup rued by Admiral Turner. Notably, extended deterrence,
though not necessarily fundamental deterrence, relied on the idea that the
United States might use nuclear weapons first—even against conventional ag-
gression. The intended message was: These are weapons, like any other, to be
used.
Less is expected of nuclear weapons today. Their role is far less central, if not
yet peripheral. The appropriately residual role for nuclear weapons in U.S. strat-
egy is deterrence of nuclear use.8 That is not a terribly demanding task; it re-
quires primarily that the United States retain a nuclear retaliatory capability that
is secure, credible, and essentially countervalue (i.e., aimed at social and eco-
nomic targets—especially cities—rather than military forces). Such a capability
need not be as large as it is today. The balance of terror, to the extent it still exists,
R O S S 3 9
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:38 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
43
Naval War College: Full Spring 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
is not terribly delicate. Whatever the historical merits of the warfighting ca-
pabilities sought by the nuclear-utility theorists (NUTs) responsible for the
conventionalization of nuclear
weapons rightly denounced by Ad-
miral Turner, there is little require-
ment for such capabilities today.
The minimal requirements pos-
tulated by an assured-destruction
posture can be easily met by a thousand-warhead force.9 There is nothing that
can be deterred with START III’s proposed 2,000–2,500 warheads that cannot be
deterred with one thousand.
As long as nuclear weapons remain in the U.S. inventory, their existential con-
tribution to the deterrence of conventional and biological or chemical warfare
challenges cannot be ruled out. But there is no longer reason to raise explicitly
the specter of a nuclear response to conventional aggression. Whatever the de-
terrent merits of the threat of nuclear escalation in the past, the conventional
challenges existing today do not warrant a nuclear response—and only inexcus-
able complacency by the United States would necessitate one in the future.
Similarly, despite the alleged advantages of a posture of calculated strategic
ambiguity, the threat of overwhelming conventional retaliation should prove an
effective deterrent to the use of biological and chemical weapons. Deterring
attacks by these two kinds of weapons of mass destruction does not necessitate
threats to retaliate with the only kind the United States has not foresworn.
Explicitly leaving the door open for a nuclear response to the use of biological or
chemical weapons places a higher value than necessary on nuclear weapons.
That is the wrong message to convey to nuclear aspirants and others around
the world.
Instead, limitations on the strategic and military utility of nuclear weapons
should be emphasized.10 After all, the flexible strategic power that can actually be
employed to advance and protect American interests resides less in the nation’s
nuclear arsenal than in its overwhelming conventional military superiority. The
impressive U.S. reconnaissance-strike complex—primarily C4ISR*, precision
guided munitions, and defense-suppression systems—on display during DESERT
STORM and ALLIED FORCE is no less strategic, and demonstrably more usable,
than the U.S. nuclear arsenal.11 Continuing improvements in the precision
and lethality of conventional systems promise to erode further the nuclear
stranglehold on things “strategic.” The force-structure implications of this
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The details of the process Admiral Turner seeks
to set in motion should not be allowed to
obscure the grand purpose and its significance.
He is on the right track.
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transformation were recently captured in the title of an insightful article by
Andrew F. Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak: “Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes.”12
NUCLEAR-FREE VISIONS
In an implicit affirmation of the limited utility of nuclear weapons, joint and
service visions of what is commonly referred to as, variously, the “military after
next” and the “revolution (or less radically, transformation) in military affairs”
are strikingly nuclear-free.13 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their Joint Vision
2020, the key to the “full-spectrum dominance”that is to be provided by “dominant
maneuver,” “precision engagement,” “focused logistics,” and “full-dimensional
protection” is information, not nuclear, superiority.14 The technologies upon
which the transformation foreseen by U.S. Army statements and concepts like
Army Vision 2010, “Force XXI,” and the “Army after Next” depend include
the likes of global cellular communications, smart pagers, manned and unman-
ned sensors, digitization, artificial intelligence, data compression, stealth, “bril-
liant” munitions, ceramics and
other advanced materials, micro-
and nanoelectronics, electromag-
netic firing systems, robotics, and
directed energy—virtually every-
thing and anything but nuclear
technology. Similarly, the twenty-first-century aerospace force posited by the
U.S. Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board would be built upon breakthroughs
in unmanned combat and reconnaissance aerial vehicles (UCAVs and UAVs);
high-power, short-wavelength lasers; active and infrared stealth; distributed
satellite constellations; automated, reusable space launch vehicles; human-machine
interactions; high-power radio-frequency-attack cruise missiles; and informa-
tion munitions.15
Figuring prominently in the Navy’s vision of network-centric warfare (NCW)
is an expeditionary grid of networked space, air, sea (surface and subsurface),
and ground sensors, weapons, and platforms. This network is to be popu-
lated by the likes of “micro” and “nano” sensors; unmanned aerial and under-
water vehicles (UAVs and UUVs) and UCAVs; and modular surface and
subsurface vessels with, perhaps, virtual command posts. There are to be smart
ships, all-electric ships, and fast ships. “Nuclear” appears to be absent from the
NCW lexicon.16
Similarly, the nine broad technology areas identified by the National Re-
search Council’s Naval Studies Board as forming the naval technology base for
the period 2000 to 2035—computation, information and communications,
sensors, automation, human performance, materials, power and propulsion,
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environments, and enterprise processes—are nuclear-free. The board’s list of
“exciting new technologies” also omits nuclear technology. Its examination of
weapons requirements includes nuclear weapons, but it explores alternatives to
nuclear weapons as well.17
Neither joint nor specifically Army, Air Force, or Navy visions feature nuclear
capabilities. Instead, it is C4ISR that is technologically critical to military
transformation, and at the heart of C4ISR lie information and communications
technologies, both hardware and software. For military visionaries, nuclear
technology is no longer where the action is. The technological future lies in
digitization, intelligent software, and rapid data fusion and display; information
architecture, networks, networks of networks, and systems of systems; band-
width, and computational processing power and speed; sensors; information and
cyber operations; distributed, or virtual, command posts; and self-synchronization
and autonomic systems. Keeping the U.S. military edge requires little exertion
on the nuclear front.18 The nuclear age, it would seem, is being superseded by the
information age (and perhaps also the “nuclear umbrella” by an “information
umbrella”). The centrality of atomic fission and fusion is giving way to the col-
lection, processing, fusion, and dissemination of information. Moore’s Law and
Metcalfe’s Law rule.19
AN UNREASONABLE EXUBERANCE FOR NEAR ABOLITION?
Of course, exuberant military visionaries and proponents of a revolution, or
transformation, in military affairs recognize that nuclear technology will always
be with us. It is, after all, now over fifty years old. They have (intentionally or
not) demoted nuclear technology, taken it off its pedestal, but they have not
abolished it. Nuclear abolition may well be, despite its allure, not only impracti-
cal but undesirable. Dropping to two hundred warheads by 2006, as proposed by
sober critics like Admiral Turner (in his table 2), is problematical as well.
Halving the force envisioned under a START III to a thousand warheads, even
unilaterally, as a prelude to additional limited and reciprocal reductions, is not.20
Relative numbers of nuclear warheads are indeed of little consequence at the
levels attained by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
and maintained by the United States and Russia since. The smaller the arsenals,
however, the more that numbers of warheads are likely to matter. At a thousand
warheads apiece, the United States and Russia would still be essentially immune
to “breakout”—deployment of additional weapons—by the other. Nuclear break-
out could be significant politically, but not militarily. Further, the United States
could be confident of retaining a credible deterrent even if it reduced its arsenal
to a thousand before Russia dropped to that level.
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Immunity to breakout would seriously deteriorate at levels substantially
below a thousand. Abolition would make the world not only a bit too safe for
conventional war but highly vul-
nerable and sensitive to the covert
deployment of nuclear weapons.
At zero, nuclear breakout would
be enormously consequential, not
only politically but militarily. The
perpetrator would gain an absolute, and usable, military advantage. Given the
potential payoff and the likely uncertainties about the intentions and behavior
of others, the temptation to break out and build even a small nuclear arsenal
would be difficult to resist. This security dilemma would be operative as well at
the way station of two hundred warheads, even assuming strategic escrow. At two
hundred weapons, unlike the situation at a thousand, absolute advantage would
be within reach—or, perhaps more importantly, perceived as being within reach.21
Reduction to two hundred warheads would have the additional disadvantage
of lowering the bar for other actual and potential nuclear states. It is not entirely
clear why the United States, or Russia for that matter, should accept parity with
China, Britain, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan. Also, the potential of achieving
parity with the current members of the nuclear club may only further whet the
appetites of nuclear aspirants around the world. The contribution that deep cuts
in existing nuclear arsenals would make to the cause of nonproliferation should
be exploited, but the restraining influence of abolition or near abolition on nu-
clear ambitions should not be exaggerated.
UNTHINKABLE AND UNREASONABLE?
The contemporary version of the unthinkable—nuclear abolition or near aboli-
tion—should be contemplated no less warily than the original. Deep cuts are
indeed warranted; an American nuclear arsenal of a thousand warheads would
yield the most important advantages of a two-hundred-warhead force without
its disturbing disadvantages. But deep cuts are not enough. They should be
accompanied by a serious arms control agenda in Washington that: reverses the
Senate’s misguided rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; unambigu-
ously supports the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; calls for continued cooper-
ation to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons and to ensure, through
such vehicles as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the safety of Rus-
sian nuclear weapons and fissile materials; formalizes moratoria on the produc-
tion of fissile materials; offers a no-first-use pledge—either an unqualified
no-nuclear-first-use pledge or a no first use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) pledge; maintains space as a sanctuary with respect not only to WMD,
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as provided for by the Outer Space Treaty, but to all weapons; urges a broadening
and deepening of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and declares that the
United States will not unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty. This agenda would
contribute to both Admiral Turner’s objectives and the security component of
an open, liberal international order.
The United States cannot seriously expect others to embrace restraint, nu-
clear or otherwise, if it fails to do so itself. Defense planners are necessarily at-
tuned to the risks that may accompany restraint. Yet at times, to borrow a
marketing slogan employed by a prominent insurance and financial services
group, “The greatest risk is not taking one.”22 Indeed, the risks of not imple-
menting deep nuclear cuts and embracing calculated restraint are greater than
the risks of doing so.
While the argument for deep nuclear cuts is compelling, defense planners will
not rush to embrace Admiral Turner’s nuclear-escrow scheme. They can still,
however, benefit from the counsel of this most “unreasonable” and thoughtful
of men. Such is the source of progress.
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WAR GAMING IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Theory and Purpose
Paul Bracken and Martin Shubik
Over twenty years ago, a study was carried out under the sponsorship of theDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency and in collaboration with
the General Accounting Office to survey and critique the models, simulations,
and war games then in use by the Department of Defense.1 From some points of
view, twenty years ago means ancient history; changes in communication tech-
nology and computers since then can be measured
only in terms of orders of magnitudes. The new world
of the networked battlefield, super-accurate weapons,
and the information technology (IT) revolution, with its
instant communication and seamless feedback, seems
as far away from the mud of trench warfare in Flanders
field as World War I was from the battle of Agincourt.
The present era in society, business, and warfare
has been called “the information age,” and with good
reason, given the extraordinary influence that the
exponential advances in information technology and
the increasing accuracy and lethality of weaponry
have had on these institutions. But human beings
and their biological data-processing, interpreting,
and decision-making abilities have not changed at the
rates of these impressive technologies. Indeed, they
have not changed at all. Neither has the new technol-
ogy changed the purposes of, or the principles behind,
war gaming. It has added new problems, however,
and it has made even more difficult the resolution of
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enduring problems that were critical twenty years ago. Notwithstanding the in-
disputable benefits of many forms of gaming, formal model building, and simu-
lations, it appears that these sciences—as was the case with operations research,
the behavioral sciences, and artificial intelligence (and now “complexity the-
ory”)—were heavily oversold and their promise rashly overestimated in the
1960s and 1970s.
From their introduction by William McCarty Little in 1886, only manual war
games were played at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, until
1958, when the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator was built, heralding a new
era in war gaming by tying it to the computer. Others were to develop this link to
ever greater degrees. The expansion of new gaming centers at the Air War Col-
lege, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, National Defense University,
and at the Joint Forces Command (until October 1999 the U.S. Atlantic Com-
mand), along with the growth of for-profit consulting companies, helped to
spread computer-based gaming and led to advances in war gaming and military
operations research. These developments were not an unmixed blessing, however.
Along with the greater ability to handle complexity and administrative detail
came a potential for loss of “transparency”—awareness by players of a game’s
underlying assumptions—and a temptation to add “realistic features” to games,
because it was so technologically easy to do so, without thinking much about
whether the additions added to or detracted from the games’ underlying pur-
poses. The push for added complexity rarely came from the people who thought
games were a good way to test concepts or plans. Rather, it originated mainly
from the technical community of analysts and gamers. There is now a divide be-
tween an increasingly specialized community of gamers and modelers on the
one hand, and policy makers on the other; this divide is greater today than it was
in the 1970s. Gamers have to market their capabilities the way any business does.
There is nothing wrong with this, per se. But experience indicates that this mar-
keting, and much of gaming’s development over the past twenty years, has been
aimed at other gamers rather than the policy-making community. It has been
aimed even less at casting light on new challenges to U.S. security management,
challenges that barely existed twenty years ago.
Why has this happened? The reasons are, first, that with computer-driven
games it becomes easy to hide layer upon layer of complexity behind user inter-
faces that few people understand; and second, that the impact on the policy pro-
cess of program “modules” that are opaque to players is not considered. There is
much to commend simplicity, in light of the inherent limitation of human data
processing, especially when dealing with decision makers. With manual war
games, it was not feasible to add “bells, whistles, and gongs”; careful thought was
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required in designing every single move in the sparse abstraction that consti-
tuted a game.
Over the last twenty years, however, models, simulations, and games have
merged with each other. The boundaries separating them are no longer clear,
making overall assessment far more difficult. Modeling has become more com-
plex, but thinking has not. The
very unreality of manual games
made them real, in the sense that
it forced attention to key ques-
tions. That is why simple board
games, like the Kriegspiel, were adopted by European general staffs in the nine-
teenth century. Playing them sharpened everyone’s tactical and strategic sense.
As Karl von Mueffling, the chief of the General Staff of the Prussian army, de-
clared in 1824, at the very start of war gaming, “It’s not a game at all, it’s a train-
ing for war; I shall recommend it most emphatically to the whole army.” Asked
what games they like to play and what strategists they read, today’s Chinese gen-
erals give an illuminating answer: they play Go and read Sun Tzu, because be-
neath their surface simplicity, the generals tell us, “there is great complexity.”2
The advances in gaming since its inception have been large, whether we con-
sider table games at the platoon level, tactical exercises, theater games, or political-
military games up to the level of global war. But despite the greater complexity and
technology, many old problems remain, and have even been magnified. The fascina-
tion with analytics and the attractiveness of trying to quantify phenomena we do
not know how to describe accurately, let alone measure, suppresses many phenom-
ena that may be of the essence in the darkness, turmoil, and confusion of real war.
CNN pictures of “smart” missiles homing in on targets hardly convey the factors of
morale, bravery, improvisation, trust, and the many others that weave a great armed
force together.
As yet, computers do not provide wisdom. Seasoned, nonpartisan referees
like Frank McHugh, military historians with the skills of a Harvey DeWeerd, and
operational analysts of the quality of an Edward Paxon of RAND—all names
that are likely unknown to the current war-gaming community—were once able
to provide experiential depth that is still needed but is now harder to obtain than
ever. A striking feature of the current gaming environment in contrast to that of
two and three decades ago is the absence of generalists with an overview of both
gaming technology and the decision-making process by which things actually
get done. This is not just carping about the good old days: such generalist out-
looks are now being applied to, and revolutionizing, a different field. Informa-
tion technology is transforming business processes precisely because “e-business”
has emphasized the I in IT—the information, not the technology. Managers who
B R A C K E N & S H U B I K 4 9
The gold lies in human thought—assisted by
modern communication and computers, not
distracted by them.
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:41 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
53
Naval War College: Full Spring 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
understand corporate decision processes and market requirements have gotten
their hands around corporate IT systems and wrestled them away from the tech-
nicians. The ongoing transformation of American business proves that this can
be done and what it can achieve. A similar process in war gaming should begin.
THEORY AND WAR GAMING
The three decades after the great contributions of technology and analysis to
winning World War II—contributions symbolized by the atom bomb, opera-
tions research, and cryptography—were heady, optimistic years for the applica-
tion of computers to national defense. The driving idea was that a machine, the
computer, would scale upward the analyses then being invented in the diverse
fields of artificial intelligence, operations research, game theory, simulation, and
formal organizational theory. The brave, new, modern world had dawned.
Whole new organizations were built, because the “old” ones did not get the
message. Think tanks like the RAND Corporation and the Hudson Institute en-
tered their golden ages. The first Monte Carlo (probabilistic) simulations made
their appearance, and bigger and better digital models were immediately planned.
The optimism was such that the Systems Development Corporation was spun
off by RAND to perform simulations of unprecedented scale. The Office of Na-
val Research was “Lady Bountiful” to students of relevant theory. The Advanced
Research Projects Agency supported consultants and researchers in manage-
ment science and decision theory. The spirit of the times was that all problems
would fall to analysis or simulation within the next decade.
The work of the mathematician John von Neumann on the representation of
the anatomy of games by “game trees” and that of Claude Shannon on informa-
tion theory provided for the first time a notation for, and understanding of,
microstructure information flows, as well as a scientific method for investigat-
ing the basis of decision making. Herbert Simon predicted that the world chess
championship would soon fall to a computer. The faculty at Carnegie Tech
would provide business with scientific means for management. Robert McNamara
was to do the same, first at the Ford Motor Company, then at the Department of
Defense.
The progress made in those days, and afterward, was real and impressive, but the
Cerebus paradox was soon encountered: every time a problem was solved, several
more unsolved problems sprang up to replace it. The statement that various key
problems in the decision sciences or in artificial intelligence would be solved “next
year”turned out to involve, in effect, a DO LOOP where NEXT = NEXT + 1. A prediction
in 1970 from Marvin Minsky, a pioneer in artificial intelligence, shows the point:
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In from three to eight years, we will have a machine with the general intelligence of
an average human being. I mean a machine that will be able to read Shakespeare,
grease a car, play office politics, tell a joke, have a fight. At that point, the machine
will begin to educate itself with fantastic speed. In a few months, it will be at genius
level, and a few months after that, its power will be incalculable.3
Our perspective, nevertheless, is not pessimistic. On the contrary, the tools
that prompted such predictions had given means to attack a vast array of basic
and previously unapproachable problems. The early successes and the quantum
leaps taken created a Camelot-like
feeling of invincibility. A funda-
mental understanding of human
behavior was presumed to be just
around the corner. However, the
early attempts to simulate check-
ers and chess, or to attach artificial arms and eyes to computers and tell them to
pick up building blocks and put them on top of other ones, showed that far
deeper and more subtle problems were involved than had been thought.
The same thing happened in war gaming and game theory. Far from solving
all problems of human interactions, the knowledge yielded by game theory
helped to demonstrate that simplistic concepts of optimal strategies and rational
behavior were highly limited in application. In the new game models there was
no morale; leadership had no meaning; passion and anger could not be por-
trayed. The simplification of the individual to a mechanistic decision maker
stripped these away, and with it virtually all of the qualities that a good war col-
lege tries to instill.
Nuclear war games, for example, were built around grand optimization
across the major commands responsible for these weapons, becoming giant linear-
programming routines for building “optimal” nuclear strike plans. The very
names of the models—such as the “Arsenal Exchange Model”—suggested mu-
tual silo-emptyings, the launching of thousands of missiles to destroy the other
side’s forces. Models were built of sufficient scale to manage such exchanges, but
too much was left out that was important. The behavior of the isolated com-
manders with thousands of megatons under their control;4 the reaction of Nato
allies to having World War III fought through the suburban sprawl of Europe; and
whether the Polish army should be counted in the “Red” or “Blue” order of bat-
tle—all these issues were conveniently left out of models and games. These “gaps,”
however, happened to be the points of greatest concern to decision makers.
Formal game-theoretic analysis has an important cautionary lesson to teach
here. A simple analysis of any multistage game of even moderate complexity
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(chess will do) shows us that even in so simple a case, human data-processing ca-
pacities and perceptions rule out unrestricted proliferation of information. The
human being is a sophisticated but limited-capacity processor of information
and can deal with voluminous input only if it is aggregated, or “chunked.” The
human is a social animal, for whom “know who” counts as much as, if not more
than, “know how.”
Another limitation concerns communication, the complexity of which is il-
lustrated by an age-old military problem, the command and control of a multi-
national army—that is, an army composed of many national or ethnic parts.
(This problem is becoming important once again, with coalition wars on the
rise.) In 1918, officers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire barked orders first in
German and then in four other languages in quick succession if they wished to
convey to their troops what they had in mind.5 With differences in language
come differences in cultural perceptions and in shared knowledge and customs,
and considerable potential for misinterpretation. New technologies speed the
transmission of symbols and facilitate computation, but they hardly influence
the interpretation of meaning, the discernment of patterns, or the drawing of
inferences from complex, noisy contextual data.
In terms of the future of war gaming, developments in theory bring the mes-
sage that the major improvements are needed less in technology, in “newer toys
for bigger boys,” than in persuasively written scenarios, assessments of why play-
ers did what they did, and postgame debriefings of what was actually learned.
The gold lies in human thought—assisted by modern communication and com-
puters, not distracted by them. An emerging appreciation of the complexity of
human behavior has humbled the decision sciences, and it has simultaneously
made them more useful, as their practitioners gain better and more realistic feel-
ings for the scope and limits of their crafts.
ENDURING ISSUES
That there are new challenges in war gaming does not mean that all of the old
challenges have been met. On the contrary, the long-standing problems of
thinking through a game’s purpose and drawing lessons from it are handled no
better today than thirty years ago. In some cases, this failing is made worse by the
inappropriate application of new gaming technology and by failure to under-
stand its proper uses.
One aspect of failure to think through fundamental purposes is an inability
to make the basic distinction between the explicit game being played and the im-
plicit one. The explicit game is the official event, the one presented in the brief-
ing book and described in the orientation lecture that precedes game play.
Should a new weapon system be upgraded? Will North Korea fire its weapons of
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mass destruction? Illuminating such questions is an explicit purpose of war
games. But very often, equally or even more important implicit games are being
played at the same time. This is the game that cannot be mentioned in the offi-
cial briefing, the one that asks questions that are too sensitive to pose explicitly
but that savvy players recognize are the really important ones—fundamental is-
sues of strategy and cost.
In the late 1930s, Joseph Stalin had his generals game the defense of the Soviet
Union against German attack. Stalin ordered the conditions of defense precisely:
massed troops on the border in a linear defense. The more perceptive Soviet gen-
erals knew that such a defense would mean disaster in the event of German
attack, an intuition that turned
out to be correct. They also knew
what defying Stalin by playing an-
other strategy in the official game
would mean. They played the lin-
ear defense in the official game, because they had no choice; however, they also
held after-hours conversations about the consequences of following the official
plan, and they staged informal, verbal games based on the official one but relax-
ing the political constraints. This is a common phenomenon known as “shadow
gaming.”6 The most interesting questions are frequently not officially reflected
in the game but are nonetheless implicitly understood and become part of the
tacit knowledge that players take away. Yet there is almost no analytical attention
given to the shadow game, even to its identification of issues.
Tacit knowledge often concerns what players thought they were doing and
what players would have done if the game had taken another path. It is almost
never mined for its full value. This is a problem that has been made worse by the
nature of many decision-support systems (DSSs) used in games. In practice,
most DSSs focus on explicit prospective choices without going back and retrac-
ing alternative courses of action. They overlook retrospective choices and the
sensitivity of later decisions to earlier ones.
Most DSSs also stick with official rules past the point where this makes sense.
Consider the target-identification problem. When a war goes badly, confusion
increases, and objectives slip out of reach, the rules governing the identification
of permissible targets begin to change. Fire discipline erodes. In a highly con-
strained war like the air campaign against Serbia, there are three things on the
battlefield: friends, foes, and neutrals. But as the Vietnam War showed, once
matters start to deteriorate, the boundaries between these distinct categories
begin to blur, especially between neutrals and friends or foes. This is a very im-
portant issue, because that particular distinction not only forms the basis of
much current strategy—victory with minimal collateral damage—but has led
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militaries to acquire very expensive surveillance and targeting systems, and
highly accurate weapons. The ways in which these systems could fail in circum-
stances in which victory seems attainable only with considerable collateral dam-
age depend on different paths taken in a game. But these contingencies are almost
never analyzed, and they are not captured by extant DSSs, whose rules stay fixed
throughout a game.
In the corporate world of e-business, however, the distinction between ex-
plicit and tacit knowledge is central to knowledge management.7 Capturing and
codifying tacit knowledge is a high priority in corporate America, because it is a
major source of competitive advantage.8 Yet although they now use similar tech-
nologies (Groupware, Expert Systems, Neural Nets), war games achieve little
payoff compared to what is taking place in business.
NEW CHALLENGES
If over the last twenty to thirty years both principles and purposes in gaming
have remained the same, technology has of course changed, and so have many
problems (in part because of the change in technology), problems that require
new kinds of analysis in which gaming could be of great use. The greatest of these
new challenges are: the revolution in military affairs; weapons of mass destruction;
multipolarity, and the rise of Asian military power; the issue of the nation-state as
the central actor in international affairs; information warfare; and international
financial linkages and financial warfare.
Whether or not one accepts the argument that the United States is now at the
beginning of a revolution in military affairs (RMA), it seems clear that techno-
logical enhancements in the form of precision strike weapons, information war-
fare, and systems of unparalleled interconnectedness mark a change in the nature
of warfare, a change that is fundamental. It is important to assess the conse-
quences of this change at several levels: strategic, operational, organizational, and
technical.
The current art of war gaming is not up to the job. Partly this is because the
problems are inherently difficult; but it is also because of an absence of profes-
sionals trained or willing to cross over into different intellectual fields. Broadly
speaking, strategists and policy experts do little or no analysis whatever; they
simply posit sweeping portraits of the future, basing them on the changing na-
ture of war or the structure of the international system. On the other hand, tech-
nical people with specialized training in software and war gaming are seduced
into emphasizing the use of these tools rather than focusing their attention on
the real problems of a revolution in military affairs.
In practice, games that try to analyze an American RMA tend to leave out too
much, such as the highly plausible response on the part of other countries of
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simply accelerating their adoption of weapons of mass destruction. A case can
be made that this is now taking place, without anyone acknowledging it. The
high-profile use of high-tech U.S. forces against Iraq, Serbia, and others is
producing in many countries a
sense that they cannot possibly
compete on these terms; rather
than giving up and accepting
American power, they search for a
“poor man’s RMA” in biological
and nuclear weapons. This is not to argue for a low-tech American approach.
But it is striking that the “poor man’s” counter to high technology has not been
seriously gamed, as to either its system-transforming effects or its operational
ones. Fortunately, and notwithstanding the near misses of the Aum Shinri Kyo
in Japan in 1995 and the Iraqi weapons programs in 1991, no use of biological or
nuclear weapons has taken place. But the potentials are enormous and horren-
dous, and our experiential base is negligible.
The rise of Asian military power, as reflected in the adaptation of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction in a connected belt of countries ex-
tending from Israel to North Korea, is a related development that cries out for
broader gaming and analysis. For five hundred years the West has militarily
dominated Asia by gaining control of bases on the continent’s maritime rim and
by exploiting a technological advantage. It was a classic competition between the
strategies of Halford Mackinder and Alfred Mahan—the former an advocate of
continental land power, the latter the father of American maritime supremacy.9
Military geography itself is almost extinct as a subject area in the United States,
replaced by a myth of the “death of distance” and an assumption that a United
States able to keep its technological lead will also be able to sustain indefinitely a
five-hundred-year status quo in Asia.10
There is little evidence of gaming of the competition between continental
and maritime strategies. Missiles armed with mass-destruction warheads un-
dermine the Western Mahanian strategy. Bases on which U.S. military power re-
lies, and perhaps even the capital ships that enforce presence, are exposed to
unprecedented dangers. Should the United States protect these forward bases
with theater-ballistic-missile defenses? Will the cost of staying forward in Asia
go up sharply as a result? These are questions that either have not been examined
at all or have been looked at only in the narrow tactical context of the kill proba-
bilities of interceptor missiles.
One of the great contributions of game theory has been to the study of the
two-person game. In the Cold War, the development of the two-person,
zero-sum game fit in naturally with worst-case scenarios and evaluations of
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“Red” capabilities; in addition, the literature on two-person, non-zero-sum
games brought to light many paradoxes in the estimation of threats and the role
of communication. All of this work and the gaming carried out in parallel with it
applied nicely to a bipolar world of the United States versus the Soviet Union.
Although there were many allies involved, the “Blue bloc versus the Red bloc”
supplied a good first-order approximation. Since the dissolution of the Soviet
empire and the growth of the Asia-Pacific powers, this easy simplification into
two-person games has become impossible. The multipolar world is far more
difficult to study, from every point of view. Such problems as nuclear stability
become far more complex when formally extended from two players to a multi-
polar world. The complications in analytics are computational and combinatoric.
The complications in global strategy are more conceptual and judgmental, in-
volving the guessing of, say, likely North Korean reactions or the future behavior
of the Israelis or Palestinians.
As for the nation-state, we are all its creatures, and Americans in particular
take it as an axiom that their nation is the “great melting pot.” There are Ameri-
cans of many races, colors, and creeds. But the nation’s very self-image depends
on trying to perfect the imperfect, the unfortunate reality of prejudice against
various minorities. We cannot, therefore, dismiss the influence of communica-
tions on the “global village.” With the growth of the Internet and international
enterprise, the concept of the “inhabitant of the global village,” of the citizen of
the world, takes on new meaning. This is a matter not only of rhetoric and ideol-
ogy but of basic social structure.
Today, a computer-literate immigrant to the United States never really leaves
home. The very term “immigrant” confuses place with space. A computer pro-
grammer in Palo Alto (a place) who recently migrated from India may be in con-
tinuous touch with his family in Bangalore or with his former employers in the
defense ministry in New Delhi (a space). The Dutch president of a U.S.-German
conglomerate newly merged with a French-Italian-Japanese holding company
may stress his loyalties to his international stockholders, but when one can no
longer tell where the lines are, it is difficult to decide what side one is on. In a
multi-allegiance world, an Iraqi dictator finds little difficulty in buying oil pipe-
lines that look surprisingly like three-hundred-foot gun barrels, designed by an
engineer holding a Canadian passport but whose national identity is more akin
to that of Werner von Braun than that of a citizen of a single country.
World financial markets have been interlinking at breakneck speed. In many
aspects of finance there is in essence a world market. A transaction in Japan can
be felt in New York as though it occurred locally. There has been some concern
that this interlinkage opens the door for a new form of economic warfare in-
volving the destabilizing of markets and the deliberate creation of panics. The
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evidence is not clear. Recent studies raise questions concerning the difficulties of
destabilizing markets, notwithstanding popular fiction by Tom Clancy (Debt of
Honor) and other writers.11 Games that have brought in actual “inside play-
ers”—representatives of leading Wall Street banks and brokerages—seem to
show that it is difficult to spread such disruption in the massively redundant
marketplace.12 Financial warfare games also show, in an unintended way, how
financial priorities overtake foreign policy goals—a subject in need of much
more careful analysis.
The new implications of information warfare involve misinformation and
deception more than they evoke images of seamlessly functioning operations
rooms with hundreds of well dressed and unflappable control personnel facing
consoles and multimedia wall-display screens reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove. In
a day when television can make nonexistent billboards (with advertisements for
sponsors) seem to appear in Times Square during television coverage on New
Year’s Eve, the old adage that “the camera does not lie” no longer offers the com-
fort it did in the days when film-doctoring was an expensive and difficult art.
Paradoxically, the growth of information technology is more and more in the fa-
vor of disinformation technology, thanks to naive users who concentrate more
on the technological wonder of the information displayed than on the context of
who generated it and what it means.13
The theatrical aspects of military action have been grist for postmodern
scholars—a literature that is unknown to the gaming community.14 Yet the close
connection between visual stimulation (and manipulation) and games is well
understood by Las Vegas casino operators, successful politicians, and designers
of commercial video games (such as “Rainbow 6” and “Civilization”). Man is
a visual animal. The imminent availability of broadband technology and
Internet2® means that on-demand video will be as thoroughly taken for granted
in the future as telephones were in the 1950s.15 This undoubtedly has many
important implications for war gaming.
DANGERS PERCEIVED AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
The explosive growth of communication in the information age, whether in mil-
itary or corporate organizations, has created a pressing need to game the bu-
reaucratic process in its assorted pathological behaviors, jurisdictional turf
battles, time delays, miscommunications, autogenerated mistakes, and propen-
sities for random estimates, disinformation, and information vandalism.
U.S. government “estimates” of likely Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter
attrition in the 1999 war in Kosovo illustrate this need better than any fictional
scenario ever could. In that campaign a major innovation was real-time
teleconferencing, by which field commanders collectively estimated that there
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would be five losses per hundred sorties for the Apache were it committed to
combat against Serb military forces in Kosovo. At the Pentagon, this estimate
was somehow turned into a 6-to-15 percent attrition rate; whether this growth
occurred through miscommunication or reassessment using different analytical
tools is not known. This higher
number was used to brief the Na-
tional Command Authorities
(that is, the president and secre-
tary of defense) on whether to
employ the Apaches. At the White
House the figure was again either
miscommunicated or somehow recalibrated; one senior official thought he was
told to anticipate a 50 percent attrition rate. Given the political sensitivity to ca-
sualties in this operation, it was not hard to guess where this would lead. The
Army had already moved twenty-four Apaches to Albania—along with fourteen
M-1 tanks, two Bradley fighting vehicles, twenty trucks, and thirty-seven trans-
port helicopters to support them—using 550 sorties of the C-17 cargo aircraft,
as well as sea lift. In all, the Army had sent 6,200 troops and twenty-six thousand
tons of equipment to support the Apache deployment. But when senior political
leaders saw the attrition estimates (5 percent? 15 percent? 50 percent?), this im-
mense effort went for naught. The combat mission for the Apaches was killed
outright; they never flew in battle.
Strategic-bureaucracy games with a minimum of three or four teams playing
the roles of different departments, with communication between them imper-
fect, the noise level high, and autogeneration of mistakes likely, might make a
convincing case that these problems must be rectified. There are solutions. The
QVC Home Shopping Network, Goldman Sachs, and other firms operate process-
ing systems that integrate and stabilize their bureaucratic behavior, at least for
mission-critical tasks. What they have done is carefully examine information, not
just technology, and connect business knowledge with technical expertise.
Defense organizations, of course, face a hazard that most corporations do
not—threats to security. The concern is less with the adequacy of 128-bit en-
cryption systems than with “moles,” secretly working for opposing players. In
the information age, moles can have devastating effects, because these agents
work to reveal the keys to technical systems that take many years to field and that
are increasingly at the heart of American competitive advantage over other
countries. Consider the consequences of a Klaus Fuchs, Aldrich Ames, Jonathan
Pollard, or a Ronald Pelton. Pelton, a National Security Agency technician, gave
away the capabilities and coverage gaps of a multibillion-dollar U.S. surveillance
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program. Inclusion of moles should be a consideration in future war game
design.
There is also a need for a class of games that go beyond the traditional politico-
military crisis exercise. There should be a renewed emphasis on “path
games”—in which strategic decisions are made sequentially over an extended
time frame, in an attempt to illuminate long-range consequences—in a collabo-
rative effort among the war colleges, the Defense Department, and the academic
community. These games should stress ten-to-twenty-year branching scenarios.
At a time when the United States is the sole superpower, there is a dangerous
tendency to focus only on short-term crises, overlooking the complicated and
varied ways that the nation’s preeminence could be challenged. It is one thing to
look at missile defenses to protect South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan against attack;
the twenty-year implications of deploying theater-missile-defense systems to
Asia and the Middle East are a very different matter. Such issues have not been
examined even in terms of obvious measures, like the economic damage-
exchange ratio of a protracted missile-antimissile competition. It would be
extremely interesting in particular to run, on theater missile deployments in
Asia, a twenty-year path game that included a Pelton-like mole on the “Blue”
team, someone who could reveal the technical performance characteristics and
vulnerabilities of the deployed antimissile system to an opposing player.
War gaming has had a distinguished past and should have an important and dis-
tinguished future. This future depends on conceiving computer games and
strategy as complements to one another. There is an unfortunate tendency to
conceive of them instead as substitutes. Successful IT companies do not make
this fundamental mistake. Nearly all of them have obliged information technol-
ogy to support the businesses, rather than the other way around.
Improvements in computing and simulation make “soft gaming,” such as the
politico-military exercise, more important than ever. Because supporting infor-
mation—the distance between Saigon and Seattle, or the population within a
ten-mile radius of the center of Seoul—can now be obtained almost instantly,
more time should be spent examining the nuances of scenarios, and more re-
sources should be aimed at exploiting the assistance that military history, politi-
cal science, and social psychology can offer.
There will always be enough money for highly computerized tactical games
and simulations in the budgets of the proponents of various weapons systems.
Unfortunately, the more strategic the problem, the harder it is to obtain funding
to examine it. Is that because the outcomes of such studies do not look like the
crisp, quantified “deliverables” of technical consultants?
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WAR-GAMING NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Captain Robert C. Rubel, U.S. Navy
The familiar techniques of war gaming will be insufficient for scenarios in-volving network-centric warfare. NCW, as it is known—with its focus on
speed, downstream effects, and information flow—will require of gamers more
than simply additional computational power or communications bandwidth,
although these will certainly be needed. Gamers will need a new framework in
which to apply these tools.
In 1886, Lieutenant William McCarty Little introduced war gaming to the
Naval War College. The concept found immediate acceptance; faculty and stu-
dents recognized that the war game was well suited to analyzing the characteris-
tics of naval warfare of the time. Gaming has since been applied to all manner of
warfare, in a variety of ways. As warfare has become more sophisticated,
multidimensional, and joint, the challenges of gam-
ing it have increased. Even the application of com-
puter technology has not been effective for all
purposes, especially in games that involve large forces.
We are now facing, in network-centric warfare, a new
form of conflict that will challenge gamers even more
severely. In this article we will attempt to develop a
framework to help us identify techniques necessary
for gaming network-centric warfare.1
A characteristic of warfare that has made it
amenable in the past to simulation through gaming is
its inherently structured nature. Troops operate in
formations; so do ships and aircraft. Groupings of
units or formations generally operate according to
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doctrine, in some specified relationship to one another. As a result, war-game
designers have been able to govern and model the movements of forces and to
project the results of combat with the enemy by relatively simple rules. A sce-
nario that confines itself solely to surface ships, ground forces, or aircraft gener-
ates possible interactions and outcomes that are few enough in number for a
“playable” game—one with rules sufficiently simple to allow it to be played in a
reasonable period of time and at acceptable effort and expense. However, as the
numbers and types of playing “pieces” grow and the flexibility of their employ-
ment doctrine increases, the difficulties of gaming by sets of rules swell almost
exponentially. Today, despite the impressive increases in computing power,
operational-level games involving the full range of forces (which includes space
assets), even in traditional hierarchical command arrangements, must generally
be controlled and adjudicated not by rules or algorithms but by the professional
judgment of human umpires.2
The current state of affairs in war gaming, then, is not totally satisfactory.
Still, it is possible to design and execute games that have a reasonable degree of
validity. By validity we mean a correspondence with reality sufficient to allow
useful insights to be drawn from the game’s results. Validity is achieved through
careful design of the scenario and control techniques, and recruitment of players
and umpires with appropriate credentials. Of course, computer models are criti-
cal, but they are usually employed “off-line”—that is, specialized models are
used to support the judgment of the human umpires who ultimately decide the
aggregated outcomes of complex and extensive engagements.
A BASIC GAMING FRAMEWORK
War gaming can be classified in many different ways. One common distinction
is between educational (or training) games and research games. In educational
games, the objective is to acquaint players with warfare situations and exercise
their decision-making skills. Designers of educational games may stretch the
bounds of probability somewhat in scenarios, as may control cells in move-
outcome assessments, in order to ensure that players are confronted with the
decision-making situations desired by the game’s sponsor—the command or
entity (not necessarily the war-gaming center where it is conducted) that created
the game requirement and set its objectives. Research games, in contrast, are de-
signed to generate insights into military problems; designers and controllers at-
tempt to inject as much realism as possible, given the inherent limitations of the
medium.
Network-centric warfare would be gamed primarily for research purposes;
however, of course, research games frequently have instructional value, and the
proposals advanced here would apply to educational and training games as well.
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War games are also classified by the way they deal with time. Some proceed in
stages, known as “moves.” In each of these steps, players (or groups of players)
privately assess a situation as they perceive it—on the basis of “intelligence” pro-
vided by the control cell, and within the scenario framework—and then report
to the controllers their intentions
(force movements, dispositions,
and fighting orders) for the next
specified period of time. The con-
trol cell’s umpires, receiving in-
puts from all player cells, analyze
their interactions to identify likely combat engagements and assess their out-
comes. Generally, moves cover short periods of time for tactical-level games and
much longer increments for operational and strategic-level ones. In contrast to
such stepwise exercises are operational games, which involve “moving game
clocks” and present players with continuously changing situations to which they
must respond. The “clocks” in such games, which are almost always computer
based, typically run at four or six times normal speed. Operational games tend
to be limited to the tactical level, due to the necessarily limited spans of time they
can accommodate.
Network-centric games virtually demand moving game clocks because of the
criticality of time dynamics. In other words, one of the primary benefits of
NCW is that the side employing it can generate rates of change that are unman-
ageable for the other side’s command and control system. Because of this, a
timestep-move convention would be unsuitable. A moving game clock would be
sufficient for tactical-level play. However, analysts believe that NCW will pro-
duce an intermixing, or compression, of the levels of war.3 If so, it will be neces-
sary to accommodate both short and long-term phenomena in NCW-based war
games. One possibility would be composite operational and move-step games,
in which “time” advances at different speeds in various portions of the game. To
meet tactical-level objectives, designers would set aside periods in which players
would operate against a moving game clock, alternating with move-step phases
embracing much longer increments of game time. At the start of each successive
operational-play session, umpires would assess the war’s progress to that point
and produce a new situation for players to confront. There are probably other
ways of dealing with the problem of time in network-centric games, but it is
clear that traditional methods will not suffice.
In order to explore fully the needs of network-centric war gaming, however,
we must go beyond traditional classification methods. The underlying structure
of war games suggests a set of categories that illuminate the way in which NCW
relates to traditional gaming. All war games, whether they involve fighting sail
R U B E L 6 3
Until a tactical network of units, each of
them exercising a great degree of autonomy,
can be simulated, it will be impossible to game
network-centric war adequately.
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:45 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
67
Naval War College: Full Spring 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
or network-centric fleets, soldiers, and satellites, share a certain hierarchical
organization. We will refer to the levels of this structure as “dimensions”
(figure 1), in order to avoid confusion with the “levels of war”—tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic—which themselves form a different gaming framework.
At the bottom of the pyramid is the most fundamental dimension of gaming.
If blocks representing ships are laid out, perhaps on a chart table or a grid floor,
players can move them around and see directly their relationships to one an-
other at various points.
Similarly, the U.S. Army
rout ine ly conduc ts
“rock drills,” in which
markers (as simple as
bits of stone) represent-
ing platoons or tanks are
used to orchestrate ma-
neuvers. Even complex
operations, including
their logistical flows, can
be simulated in essen-
tially this way, using ei-
ther physical markers or computer symbols. Many games need to go no farther.
This first dimension is an extremely important aspect even of more ambitious
games; the analytical or instructional usefulness of outcomes at higher dimen-
sions of a game depends on how realistically forces are played. If tactics are used
that would be impossible to execute in the real world, assessments of interac-
tions with the enemy will be invalid.
The next dimension is assessment of outcomes, the determination of what
would have happened in a confrontation of forces. Whether based upon a roll of
the dice, the “crunching” of complex algorithms by a computer, or the judgment
of human umpires, the outcomes form the basis for judgments of how effec-
tively players orchestrated their forces, and for the input to be provided them for
subsequent decisions. Many games stop at this dimension; such exercises are
generally analytical and are meant to draw insights into the suitability of certain
tactics or the efficacy of new equipment. Here again, fidelity to real-world phe-
nomena is necessary in order to prevent distortions at the dimension of player
decisions. Skewed assessments can lead to faulty analysis and to decisions that
yield no useful insights.
The topmost dimension is the analysis of player decisions. Frequently the fo-
cus of educational gaming, the purpose of such analysis is to help players per-
ceive objectively their own reactions to warfare situations. It must be emphasized,
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however, that many analyses focus on aspects other than player decisions. For in-
stance, a game intended to explore the logistics of amphibious operations might
require players to develop possible courses of action; the factors affecting these
courses of action might well be of more concern in terms of game objectives
than specific plans produced. In order to simulate the “fog of war,” players in ed-
ucational games are typically provided not the actual, precise, and complete out-
come assessments—the “ground truth,” about which more below—but only
those elements (or indications of them) that might realistically be observable.
Research games do not often deal with this dimension, because of its indetermi-
nate and unpredictable nature; a notable exception is the Navy’s Global War
Game series.
NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Having established a baseline understanding of war gaming, we must do the
same for network-centric warfare. Stripped of the jargon and mysticism that has
grown up around it, NCW can be simply described as the style of warfare that is
possible when individual combat units are robustly connected by information.
When this is achieved, many familiar constraints disappear, and units become
able to interact in many more productive ways than are possible under tradi-
tional systems of command and control. In fact, the potential flexibility is so
great that centralized orchestration or management, however lightly exercised,
becomes a limitation. When units know what is going on and are confident that
others do as well—that is, when they have shared awareness—they can them-
selves avoid wasting efforts on enemy units that other friendly forces are engag-
ing, or even shooting at each other. They can also render mutual support
without higher-echelon coordination, fixed physical relationships to each other,
or restrictive doctrine. The net effect of this new flexibility is a “swarming” war-
fare style that demands a fundamentally different approach to command and
control than has been practiced up until now.4
Current U.S. practice employs layers of staffs to coordinate the efforts of
command echelons below them. Plans and orders originating from a senior
commander produce a series of staffing cycles in which successively junior echelons
distill the orders of the next higher echelons into more focused orders for their
own subordinate commanders. This cascade of planning and order writing can
produce delay and confusion. In a network-centric environment, fighting organi-
zations will be much “flatter,” because the need for intermediary coordinating lay-
ers will be obviated. However, the exact nature of future command and control
requirements, should new and radical policies and techniques be adopted, cannot
be determined without resorting to some form of gaming and simulation.
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The principal requirements for achieving network-centric warfare are a network
and shared awareness. By a network we mean linkage of all units and echelons of
a force with all others. But merely wiring together a collection of units does not
guarantee that NCW or its benefits will result; network-centric warfare is a be-
havioral, tactical, bottom-up phenomenon. The network cannot be achieved ei-
ther merely by tuning everyone’s radios to the same frequency, because voice
channels alone cannot deliver the required diversity and volume of information.
Nor is e-mail sufficient. We are talking about significant bandwidth, enough for
simultaneous transmission of voice, video, data, and any other necessary me-
dium of communication. All this is necessary because shared awareness is a ro-
bust phenomenon—comprehensive, responsive, adaptable, and survivable—or
it does not exist at all.5
Shared awareness entails more than the possession of large amounts of infor-
mation; in fact, flooding the network with information will guarantee that
shared awareness does not occur. Some undertakings require complex graphics
and a sophisticated stream of diverse media; in others, only a few words are nec-
essary. In any case, the delivery of information is not enough; it must be ab-
sorbed and interpreted by the people within the units. Shared awareness, it can
be seen, is a concept still in need of refinement by the naval warfare community.
For our purposes, it is a condition in which every element of a force has suffi-
cient grasp of its own situation and that of other friendly forces to synchronize
its actions with them without detailed orders from next-higher echelons, which
themselves would limit their exercise of command and control to the promulga-
tion of broad “commander’s intent.”
So understood, shared awareness via networks powers network-centric war-
fare. In turn, the “swarming” style of warfare thus enabled will generate higher
operational tempos than ever before. Because of the psychological effects of
shock and paralysis that such speed promises to inflict, it may become possible
to produce higher-order, even strategic, effects very quickly. It is for this reason
that many writers have envisioned the weakening of the boundaries between the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.6 This compression would be fur-
thered by information operations, which would themselves be enhanced by net-
working. All of this has important implications for gaming.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
Traditional war gaming employs markers, maps, and rules as substitutes for real
warfare. What should gamers use to represent the network-centric environ-
ment? It seems clear that the only way to game network-centric warfare, as is the
case for actually waging network-centric warfare, is to create a network of play-
ers with shared awareness. But what kind of network is needed? One of the
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principal values of gaming is that it allows its practitioners to simulate warfare
“on the cheap”; field exercises using real troops and ships are prohibitively
expensive, especially for educational and research purposes. How are gamers to
replicate a network without gen-
erating a real one? The interre-
lated issues of shared awareness
and robust networking confound
our current attempts to game
network-centric warfare. Over-
laying specially designed local-area networks onto traditional command struc-
tures does not constitute a satisfactory simulation of the NCW environment.
Until a tactical network of units, each of them exercising a great degree of auton-
omy, can be simulated, it will be impossible to game network-centric warfare
adequately.
One promising line of development is agent-based models. These programs,
fairly simple in concept but demanding considerable computer power, consist of
a number of individual “agents,” virtual entities whose actions are governed by
rule sets.7 However, merely dictating rule sets is insufficient for exploring net-
work-centric warfare. Units in the net must be able to generate information for
headquarters, and anomalous behavior on the part of a few units will be neces-
sary in order to create realism for the players in the command center.
Absent a suitable model to simulate a network, an actual one will be required.
To achieve that, distributed gaming will be necessary. The technology that dis-
tributes the gaming might be one that units would use in actual operations. If so,
the control cell would need to generate “synthetic” forces, both “Blue” and “Red”
(friendly and opposition), that would create a realistic combat environment in
units’ display systems. All of this implies a much closer relationship between
war-gaming centers and operational units than currently exists.
Still, a network is of no use unless players can effectively use the information
it is capable of moving around. It is simply not sufficient to dump information
into player cells; commanders and staffs would be quickly overwhelmed. There-
fore, a prerequisite to the achievement of network-centric gaming is the devel-
opment of techniques for creating shared awareness among the players. This
may seem a chicken-or-egg dilemma: which should come first? However, it ap-
pears from the Navy’s experience in the latest games of its Global series that
shared-awareness technology can be employed and techniques “incubated” in
the context of traditional command and control structures; thereafter, they can
be applied to the new network paradigm. Then, and only then, can we embark
on the process of effectively gaming network-centric warfare.
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A Modified Gaming Framework
With the principles of NCW gaming in mind, we can alter (figure 2) the gam-
ing structure by adding two new dimensions, producing a framework in which
the higher and more challenging dimensions rely as before upon the execution
of the more basic levels. This reliance has important implications as we proceed
with the development of network-centric warfare gaming.
First, as we have seen,
gamers cannot ignore fa-
miliar skills and functions
as they strive for more ex-
otic applications. Errors
or omissions in lower di-
mensions would call into
question any insights de-
rived or phenomena ob-
served in the higher ones.
That is not to say that ab-
solute fidelity is required
in all aspects; the attempt
would probably result in a
game that was unplayable
or too expensive. However, it does mean that designers must pay attention to the
lower dimensions and find ways to simulate properly, or fix, the variables that
reside there.
The alert reader may object that the two new dimensions do not belong on
top of the pyramid—that they should be considered rather as parts of the lowest
dimension. This objection has considerable validity, on several counts. First, it is
clear that the process of getting shared awareness and networking right is akin to
orchestrating the tactical doctrine of forces. Second, one might well argue that it
is the analysis of human decisions that is the most difficult and complex prob-
lem in gaming. Notwithstanding, the new dimensions are here placed atop the
pyramid to highlight the extensions of gaming logic that are needed to game
network-centric warfare effectively.
The dimension of player decisions becomes very interesting in network-
centric gaming. Since shared awareness is probably sensitive to competence of
command, sponsors will have to be especially careful about whom they invite as
players in NCW games. A reflexive application by a senior player of a traditional,
centralized command style would probably end any hope of generating true
shared-awareness behavior in a game. Moreover, players “taken off the street,”
with no training in or understanding of shared-awareness theory, techniques,
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and requirements will likely distort findings from games that seek to explore the
various phenomena encountered.
If all this is true, several implications emerge. First, it may be necessary to
change command and control doctrine before NCW can be gamed, in order to
train the officers who will be the players. In other words, game designers must
work closely with command and control experts to synchronize player capabili-
ties with game demands. Second, if NCW gaming achieves any degree of valid-
ity—that is, correspondence to a future warfare environment—the education
and training needed by commanders for network-centric warfare is likely to be
somewhat different than is necessary today.
Third, development of NCW gaming must proceed step by step up the frame-
work. In other words, gamers should not begin the process by lashing together a
network; they need first to game shared awareness alone, in the context of cur-
rent scenarios and equipment. After collecting insights and perfecting their
techniques, they can move with confidence to true network gaming.
Fourth, the development of network-centric warfare war games will bring a
fundamental change to the gaming environment. Traditional games, whether
played on map boards or computers, are conducted by moving playing pieces
around in geographical arenas; the pieces’ movements and interactions are gov-
erned by rules, perhaps quite complex. In network-centric gaming, while tradi-
tional geographic displays will be used, the most important “map board” will be
the human mental picture. This is not to say that a commander’s situational
awareness has not always been critical—it has. But it will now be especially diffi-
cult for players to keep track of what is happening in the game, because events
will orient themselves around the flows of information between networked
players. While game pieces (force symbols) will continue to be necessary, the
arena that counts in the network-centric game will be virtual, and there are as
yet no adequate rules for the movement of information in that topography. At a
minimum, gamers must recognize the fundamental shift of venue and consider
how it affects design, play, and analysis. For instance, whereas previously gamers
would use tactical experts as umpires and analysts, in NCW gaming they may
want to involve psychologists or other social scientists, as well as perhaps physi-
ologists and physicians.
Gaming Effects
Closely paralleling the development of network-centric warfare is a movement
tending to shift thinking about military operations away from input-based mea-
sures (such as sorties flown, ground gained, or targets destroyed) and toward an
output-oriented focus on the ultimate effects of military actions—that which,
from the commander’s perspective, has been caused to happen, or prevented. A
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classic, if limited, World War II example of this distinction arises from the
cruiser-destroyer engagement near Guadalcanal on 8–9 August 1942: in “input-
measure” terms, the result was the disaster (for the U.S.-Australian force) known
as the battle of Savo Island. But because the Japanese commander, Admiral
Gunichi Mikawa, focused only on the “input” measure of allied warships sunk,
the tactically victorious Japanese cruisers and destroyers departed without hav-
ing attacked the vulnerable U.S. invasion shipping, which had been their ulti-
mate objective.
The desired development of effects-based measures of effectiveness will bring
with it a further fusion of the three traditional levels of war. This is characteristic
of the emerging nature of warfare
in the information age and has
been predicted by many writers. It
is a difficult idea to get hold of,
and almost impossible if one re-
mains tied to conventional intel-
lectual frameworks. Once again, in terms of war gaming, simply superimposing
effects-based planning onto the traditional gaming approach will not be suffi-
cient; the whole approach to planning and assessment has to change.
Presently, the same rule sets that govern the movement and engagements of
“pieces” determine the consequent attrition. The strategic effects of this attri-
tion are then extrapolated—that is, if a certain percentage of an enemy force is
destroyed or a particular category of targets is hit, certain repercussions upon
enemy decision makers are assumed to follow. Detailed exploration of the link-
ages between battlefield events and political decisions has not been a regular fea-
ture of operational-level games. Combat—the use of force itself—has been the
centerpiece, and its political and moral effects usually presumed. All traditional
gaming models and methods are designed according to this approach.
Some work, however, has been done on effects. The Joint Warfare Analysis
Center conducts detailed and sophisticated analyses of how various types of ef-
fects can be generated through bombing and other military action. To date, most
of its work has focused on what may be termed “definitive effects,” those whose
mechanisms are physical—such as neutralizing an electrical generation grid or
disrupting a rail transportation system. Such an effect can presumably be more
easily predicted than can those that lie in the realm of belief and reason. The lat-
ter, whether catalytic or coercive, involve inducing enemy commanders or polit-
ical leaders to make decisions one wants them to make. The complexities and
difficulties of precipitating congenial decisions by hostile parties are self-evident.
However, well-designed games might at least be able to generate useful insights
into the problem.
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To that end, a fundamental reorientation of the gaming process is required.
Gamers must center their analyses, rules, and gaming contexts on the minds of
the decision makers whom military actions are designed to influence. Models
and methods must be capable of rationally depicting, assessing, and synthesiz-
ing the effects of a wide variety of events on these decision makers. In this con-
text, the use of force is only one of an array of factors that must be considered if
war games are to reflect in a valid way the influence of combat outcomes on an
enemy’s strategic decisions.
One way to shift gaming to an effects-centered approach is to focus on spe-
cific desired enemy decisions, to have players begin by analyzing the full range of
factors, including (but not only) military ones, that might induce them. Such an
approach would tend to keep players from ascribing a priori utility to various
kinds of military actions. A sensitivity analysis might be able to identify certain
types of military outcomes that would be most influential. The game proper
would explore the prospects for generating those outcomes.8
Gaming Red
In addition to the taxonomy we have already laid out, war games can be classi-
fied as one-sided or two-sided. In one-sided games, the players are all “BLUE,” or
friendly; game controllers play “RED” (the enemy). One-sided games are fre-
quently used when the sole concern is the orchestration dimension. In higher di-
mensions, one-sided games are most often associated with educational games;
RED’s actions are chosen to produce the desired decision-making situations for
the players. In two-sided games, by contrast, there are both RED and BLUE play-
ers, and the opposition is free to act as it wishes; the control cell limits itself to as-
sessing outcomes and briefing “intelligence” on them to both sides.
It might seem that if a network-centric game focused upon effects is pre-
ceded, as described above, by an analysis of factors bearing upon enemy deci-
sions, the game itself could be one-sided, in effect a high-tech orchestration
exercise. This is not the case. Network-centric warfare theory envisions that
rapid operations (rapid, that is, in comparison with the enemy’s ability to react)
will preclude (“lock out”) certain RED military options and cause the kind of
decisionmaking paralysis that French commanders displayed in 1940 in the face
of the German blitzkrieg. One-sided gaming could not determine if BLUE net-
work-centric operations induced such effects. Therefore, much network-centric
gaming will have to be two-sided.
In present two-sided games, RED cells typically “play” orders of battle that re-
flect fairly accurately those of actual states being simulated. Organizations spe-
cializing in acting as the opposition in war games (like the Office of Naval
Intelligence Detachment at the Naval War College) even employ enemy doctrine,
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insofar as it is understood. In network-centric gaming, however, the real key will
be the accurate simulation of the enemy’s command and control. Whether
one-sided or two-sided, war games in which RED either is given artificially good
situational awareness or is allowed face-to-face communication between all its
command echelons will generate distorted outcomes. NCW game designers
must ascribe networked capabilities only to player cells that would actually pos-
sess them; the RED side must be designed with realistic command and control
mechanisms. Only then will players and sponsor be able to perceive the effects of
rapid, network-centric operations on enemy decision making.
Ground Truth
Virtually all war games require some mechanism for keeping track of what
forces actually exist (friendly, enemy, allied, and neutral), what their condition
and capabilities are, where they are, what they are doing, and what they intend to
do. Ground truth is, in effect, the sum of the scenario and the moves as privately
submitted to controllers and mediated by umpires. Players usually are not al-
lowed perfect knowledge and must rely on their own interpretations of the
“observables” supplied to them; controllers or umpires, however, need ground
truth so that they can accurately adjudicate combat results. In war games that
deal solely with forces and physical geography, maintaining ground truth is a
relatively simple matter; the control cells know both sides’ strategies and orders,
decide themselves the outcomes of engagements, and maintain a master map
and status board with the true positions, movements, etc., of all forces.
In network-centric gaming, however, the focus shifts from geographic to
mental terrain, and from ground, sea, and air maneuver to communications and
psychology. In such a realm the very concept of ground truth, let alone plotting
it, becomes problematic. It might be possible to play an NCW operational game
(against a running clock) without keeping ground truth, but it would be almost
impossible to analyze the play after the fact. At the very least it will be necessary,
therefore, to find ways to capture each side’s relative awareness and knowledge at
key points. Observers might take notes in command centers, or software solu-
tions may be found. In any case, the whole concept of ground truth will have to
be reevaluated.
It is not going to be possible to game network-centric warfare by simply
superimposing information technology onto traditional gaming techniques.
Network-centric warfare represents in war gaming, as it does in warfare itself, a
new frontier, one that will require new theory, new techniques, and new technol-
ogy. It will also require new kinds of training for players, controllers, and
designers.
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This is not to say that traditional gaming techniques are made obsolete by the
new warfare paradigm. The basic principles of game design remain largely in-
tact. Games will still consist of players, pieces, and rules, and they must, as be-
fore, be playable at acceptable outlays of effort, time, and money. Nonetheless,
game designers will not be successful in gaming network-centric warfare with-
out adopting new approaches. It is of critical importance that they do succeed,
because gaming will be vital to the adoption of this new warfare style among
commanders. It will be in war games that they best learn to wage network-
centric warfare and to abandon certain ingrained elements of operational and
tactical art, such as fixed formations and cascading staff cycles. War gaming will be
fundamental in so developing future commanders’ confidence that they do not
retain old methods past their usefulness, simply out of lack of trust in the new.
N O T E S
1. For background on war gaming, see Peter
Perla’s excellent The Art of Wargaming
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
For the purposes of this article, we can define
a war game as a simulation of real warfare
events based on: a scenario, or story, that
provides the context for game moves; a play-
ing board (either physical or electronic) that
provides an environment in which the pieces
can move; playing pieces (again, either physi-
cal or electronic) that represent forces; a set
of rules that govern how the pieces move and
interact with each other; a procedure for de-
termining the outcome of battles; and finally
(and most importantly), players.
2. The operational level is one of three levels of
war commonly acknowledged by military of-
ficers. The lowest level, involving individual
units up to divisions and battle groups, is tac-
tical; tactics are mostly concerned with the
actions of forces in contact with the enemy.
The highest level is strategy, where the plan of
war is linked to national political objectives.
The operational level exists between the two.
There, theater and joint task force command-
ers devise campaign and operations plans that
maneuver forces so as to engage under the
most advantageous circumstances, and to
link the effects of their tactical actions to the
attainment of strategic objectives.
3. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Freder-
ick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare:
Developing and Leveraging Information Supe-
riority (Washington, D.C.: C4ISR Cooperative
Research Program, Department of Defense,
1999), p. 69; see the program site on the
World Wide Web: http://www.dodccrp.org.
4. For more depth on the “swarming” style of
warfare, see John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). This
publication is available on the World Wide
Web: http://www.rand.org/publications/
DB/DB311.
5. “Shared battlespace awareness emerges when
all relevant elements of the warfighting eco-
system are provided with access to the COP
[common operational picture].” Alberts,
Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare.
This is the seminal book on the subject.
6. The phenomenon of compression of the lev-
els of war has been widely discussed in the lit-
erature. For one of the first examinations of
it, see Douglas A. MacGregor, “Future Battle:
The Merging Levels of War,” Parameters,
Winter 1992–93, pp. 33–47.
7. An example of an agent-based model is
SWARM, developed by researchers at the
Santa Fe Institute. Agent-based models have
been found useful in researching complex
phenomena. See the Santa Fe Institute
Website, http://www.santafe.edu, and the
SWARM Website, http://www.swarm.org.
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8. One computer-based tool that shows promise
in facilitating this type of analysis is the “In-
fluence Net.” It is based on Bayesian infer-
ence, a mathematical technique that calculates
the relative influence of one set of factors
upon another. The model is applied to partic-
ular decisions to be gamed (for instance, an
Iraqi decision on whether or not to use chem-
ical weapons). Game designers would, with
the help of a virtual web of outside experts,
populate the model with the encyclopedic
data necessary for its proper functioning.
During the game, certain cells would play
combat events in a traditional manner; the
outcomes would be supplied to a wider net of
players who are each responding to the others’
inputs. The output of the model would indi-
cate the proclivities of the targeted decision
maker at the end of the move. For a basic
description of influence nets see
http://www.inet.saic.com/inet-public/.
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The focus of the twenty-second Global Game, played at the U.S. Naval WarCollege in the summer of 2000, was to explore ways to implement network-
centric operations.1 Since its inception in 1978, the annual Global Game in
Newport, Rhode Island, has been among the preeminent analytic resources of
the U.S. national security community. Throughout its history it has represented
“an opportunity to investigate ideas and concepts that may vary from current
strategy or policy wisdom.”2 From its inception, the game series has confronted
defining issues: the first five years constituted a “test bed or crucible for an
emerging maritime strategy,” a strategy that was to be the U.S. Navy’s fundamen-
tal concept of global warfare until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.3
Global 2000, conducted by some six hundred invited players and guests, plus
gaming staff, in the College’s new McCarty Little Hall from 14 to 25 August
2000, grappled with an issue—network-centric warfare—no less crucial to the
Navy’s future than was power projection in 1978–83, and it focused upon an
“emerg ing” do cument l ike ly to shap e the
twenty-first-century Navy as fundamentally as did
the Maritime Strategy the fleet of the 1980s and
nineties—the Capstone Concept for the Navy after
Next, being prepared by the Navy Warfare Develop-
ment Command, Newport, Rhode Island. This arti-
cle will examine the observations that emerged from
that exercise, the directions further research should
take to assess those observations, and some more
general issues that arose concerning the gaming of
futuristic operational concepts and combat systems.
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ment of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval
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Ohio State University, having earned a J.D. degree from
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CONCEPTS AND PURPOSES
“Network-centric operations” are military activities undertaken by forces that
are thoroughly interconnected, or netted. Such interconnection permits com-
plete and rapid sharing of information, plans, and assessments. Given a fully
functioning network, what one part of the force “knows” about the adversary or
battlespace, the entire force knows; what one part “sees,” all parts see; and what
one part “thinks” is available to the whole force. This is not simply a matter of ef-
ficiency and convenience: the anticipated payoffs include greatly accelerated and
rapidly adaptable military operations, indeed to such an extent as to render an
adversary effectively paralyzed, “locked out” of the battle. Today, however,
theater-level analysis of network-centric operations is at a rudimentary stage.
Much has been written characterizing these operations, in a variety of aspects,
but relatively little empirical data has been produced with which to test these
predictions.
Global 2000 was intended to help meet that need. For this purpose it was
necessary to permit as full an exploration of network-centric operations as
possible. Therefore, the game design deliberately excluded almost entirely the
political constraints that in the “real world” would almost certainly not allow
network-centric operations to take their own course unchecked. This lack of
constraint is clearly unrealistic, but it was a necessary “laboratory condition” if
the game was to help players and analysts understand the full array of phenom-
ena associated with network-centric operations. For example, the game-control
cell permitted network-centric operations to set their own pace—which was as
rapid as possible—even though in a more realistic framework a “national com-
mand authority” cell would have slowed the pace of events. Further, in Global
2000 the National Command Authority permitted BLUE—in effect, the United
States and its allies—to strike a broader range of targets than likely would have
been authorized. Most important, the game controllers permitted BLUE to be-
have much more aggressively than would have been the case in the “real world.”
These features of Global 2000 were deliberate and necessary artificialities, and
they in no way reflect current U.S. policy or expectations of future intentions.
Global 2000 sought to address (but surely not completely) two primary ques-
tions. Will network-centric military operations in fact speed military opera-
tions, as predicted? If so, how will commanders and their staffs manage this
increased tempo, and how will they employ the information network connect-
ing the force elements?
The game also explored the “pillars,” or “subconcepts,” of network-centric
operations, as described in the draft Capstone Concept: information/knowl-
edge advantage, assured access, effects-based operations, and sea basing. In-
formation/knowledge advantage is a prerequisite for effective network-centric
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operations—achieving, defending, and using a superior capability to collect in-
formation and draw operational inferences from it. This advantage lies at the
heart of the benefits expected from network-centric operations; for this reason,
adversaries can be expected to attack it and to defend their own information.
That raised a further question to be explored by Global 2000: Will the value of
information produce a “fight for information” in future military campaigns,
and if so, what can be said about the conduct of that fight?
Assured access refers to the ability to operate in any ocean area or airspace,
when necessary, at an acceptable cost. The concept does not imply that the
U.S. Navy must be able to place high-value combat assets anywhere, at any time.
Rather, it means that the Navy
must be able to conduct its mis-
sions wherever it needs to at a given
time. The Global 2000 scenario
required BLUE to gain assured ac-
cess to a heavily contested, con-
fined body of water near an adversary; as a result, the gamers were able to
explore a further specific question: What concepts of operations and platforms
would be most useful for assured access?
Effects-based operations, of whatever size, are planned and executed so as to
produce, if indirectly, particular desirable reactions. Such enemy reactions may
range from sending forces in certain directions to shutting down segments of air
defense systems, even to suing for peace. The purpose of conceiving military op-
erations in terms of their desired effects is to deemphasize preoccupation with
massive physical destruction of the adversary. Inducing desired effects may in-
volve the integration of several tools, such as information operations, deception,
movement, and timing, in addition to attacks upon targets. Even for physical
destruction itself, effects-based planning calls for careful choices of precise
targets in order to induce particular responses. This often requires painstaking
analysis of an adversary’s values, culture, processes, and politics, so as to hit the
points, of all kinds, that will have the desired effect, and no others. The related
question explored by Global 2000 was: Will effects-based operations produce
military campaigns noticeably different from those conducted along more tra-
ditional lines? If not, does the concept contribute materially to advancing U.S.
thinking about warfighting in general, and network-centric operations in partic-
ular?
Sea basing is a concept by which military expeditions would be conducted
from the sea rather than from land bases in a theater. It recognizes that in the fu-
ture land bases may be either denied politically or vulnerable to attack, es-
pecially by missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The concept argues that
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the United States must reduce its expeditionary “footprint” on land, particu-
larly that of ground forces and logistical support, by basing as many military
functions at sea as possible. Global 2000 was designed to explore sea basing in
general, and in particular a hypothetical large and very fast logistics ship known
as the “Theater Support Logistics Vessel.” The question on sea basing examined
in Global 2000 was: How and to what extent would ships with the characteristics
of the hypothetical Theater Support Logistics Vessel affect the Navy’s sea-basing
capabilities?
SCENARIO AND GAME “FLOW”
The scenario for Global 2000 placed the players in 2010. Between 2000 and 2010,
it posited, a technologically advanced adversary (RED) had become increasingly
willing to use military force to resolve its national security concerns. One such
concern was a border dispute with BROWN, an ally of BLUE. BROWN’s vigorous
economy and self-confident society made it a potential regional competitor,
from the viewpoint of RED, which had ultimately decided to head off this even-
tuality through military aggression. RED’s primary objective was to disrupt the
treaty obligations between BLUE and BROWN, eliminate the basing of BLUE forces
within BROWN’s territory, and remove BLUE’s military presence from the region.
As diplomatic relations with BROWN grew contentious, RED adopted a mili-
tary strategy that included a series of annual “active defense” training exercises,
beginning in 2007. RED intended to use these exercises to cover the logistical and
operational preparations for an attack on BROWN. A BLUE-led coalition, along
with BROWN and GREEN (a neighboring island nation), responded, beginning in
2008, by monitoring RED’s exercises. For two years, these exercises and monitor-
ing deployments were conducted without incident. In 2010, however, RED in-
tended to initiate its long-planned assault upon BROWN, under the cover of its
usual exercise. Its plan was to launch a limited but swift surprise attack with air
and ground forces. RED intended, after the speedy seizure of secure enclaves in-
side BROWN, to halt and call for negotiations leading to mutual RED and BLUE
withdrawals from BROWN and termination of BLUE-BROWN treaty arrange-
ments. RED calculated that it could deter BLUE intervention, or make it exces-
sively costly, by controlling sea and air access to BROWN and by destroying
valuable and politically salient portions of BLUE’s forces, such as capital ships.
BLUE had developed a three-phase campaign plan against such a contingency. Its
first element was Operation OVERWATCH, which would emplace (as part of a BLUE
coalition exercise) an “expeditionary sensor grid,” a sophisticated netted collection
of sensors, and then use it, when ordered, to gather targeting information on
RED invasion forces. BLUE thus placed early priority on gaining the information
advantage it would need to employ a network-centric strategy successfully. In
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OVERWATCH, BLUE planned to establish and operate a robust C4ISR* architec-
ture to help create and maintain a common operating picture of the key move-
ments of RED forces. BLUE forces could then “network” to share information and
collaborate in real time.
The second phase of the BLUE campaign plan was OVERKILL, operations
against RED offensive capabilities—even if that meant firing first. In the event of
hostilities, BLUE commanders were also, under this heading, to defend BROWN
and to take appropriate force-protection and power-projection actions.4 More-
over, BLUE would try to ensure
access to the operating area by
eliminating havens or sanctuaries
from which RED might operate.
The third element was Operation
OVERWITH—counteroffensive
operations to eject RED forces, should they invade BROWN territory; to restore
the previous border between RED and BROWN; and to reestablish freedom of
navigation in territorial waters.
When the game began, OVERWATCH had been initiated; in the course of game
play that phase was carried out successfully, in spite of early attempts by RED to
attack the expeditionary sensor grid and inhibit BLUE’s ability to profit from the
information gathered. That information pointed increasingly to the imminence
of RED offensive incursions into BROWN; in response, the BLUE National
Command Authority approved a transition to Operation OVERKILL—large-scale
operations against RED’s offensive forces and infrastructure—before RED had
attacked BROWN or even seriously contested BLUE’s presence in the area. The
BLUE political leadership based this decision on its judgment that there existed
“unambiguous warning” of RED’S intent to strike BROWN.
OVERKILL severely disrupted RED’s planned actions and greatly weakened its
assault but did not, in the event, prevent it from occupying a portion of BROWN
or from delivering serious attacks on BLUE sea and air forces. Still, BLUE losses
were not large enough to diminish significantly its ability to protect BROWN.
BLUE accordingly began Operation OVERWITH, ground operations supported
by joint and coalition air, maritime, and special operations forces. The counter-
offensive incorporated high-speed maritime logistics ships and other advanced
sea-basing concepts. Game controllers halted play when it was clear that RED’s
enclaves within BROWN were about to be eliminated.
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OBSERVATIONS MERITING DEVELOPMENT
Traditionally, the Global series has served both training and research objectives.
With respect to the former, it has provided senior officers, particularly those of
the Navy, opportunities to become familiar with futuristic systems and opera-
tional concepts, as well as with likely aspects of potential political-military cri-
ses. The participants reported that Global 2000 performed this function well,
through its focus on network-centric operations and the four supporting pillars
of that concept.
We must be cautious, however, in evaluating the performance of Global 2000
as a research tool. So elaborate a war game can be held only once per year. We
must be especially careful not to generalize from a single game—the behavior of
one set of players in the context of one scenario—to broad conclusions about
the value of particular systems or concepts. War games seldom produce firm
“findings,” and that is particularly true of large, elaborate, infrequently played
games like the Global series. Instead, Global 2000 can best be viewed as a source
of observations about systems and concepts, observations that should be tested
and assessed by careful and detailed analysis.
Information/Knowledge Advantage: Obtaining Information
The expeditionary sensor grid was the single most important “force multiplier”
possessed by the BLUE players. That complex system of netted sensors provided
them with plentiful, targeting-quality data about RED’s order of battle, disposi-
tions, and movements. In fact, the grid was largely responsible for the fact that
the BLUE strikes against RED’s preparations for invasion of BROWN inflicted dis-
ruption from which RED never recovered. Both RED and BLUE understood, if not
fully, the advantage conferred by the grid’s capabilities. As a result, the first salvo
of the game involved RED attacks on the grid and BLUE operations to defend it. It
can be truly said, therefore, that the first battle of the campaign was fought over
information. That battle lasted throughout the campaign, concluding only
when the game itself did.
The important issue that arises is how best to conduct this battle, and a gen-
eral observation upon it seems in order. The process by which information is
gained, used, defended, and denied has grown increasingly important and com-
plex. We can expect this trend to continue as the information-related military
capabilities of the United States grow and its operational concepts become con-
comitantly dependent on information superiority. This suggests that the fight to
obtain and protect information superiority cannot be consigned to an annex or
tab of a military campaign’s operational plan, as it so often is today. Rather, it
will have to be viewed as a distinct aspect of the campaign, needing doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures of its own. These are now very rudimentary,
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if they exist at all. The details of the “fight for information” represent an excel-
lent candidate for intensive follow-on research.
Information/Knowledge Advantage: Managing Information
Information, once collected and defended, must be exploited properly if it is to
be of value. “Exploitation” is the process of assessing information and dissemi-
nating it in usable form to the entities requiring it, all within appropriate time
limits. Global 2000 experimented
with this command-and-control
process, in part by providing play-
ers with computers (linked in a
“game internet”) and software by
which information could be readily shared and moved. Players were free to post
on-line whatever they felt was useful and were similarly free to retrieve anything
that had been posted. Their actual use of this capability was interesting and re-
vealing in several ways.
First, players very quickly began using the game internet with great intensity.
Within one hour of the game’s start, the available bandwidth was being regularly
saturated, causing the technical performance of the network to deteriorate.
Analysis showed that players posted information virtually without restraint,
even large data files and graphics-rich briefings and articles. Usage rules soon
had to be imposed to prevent the system from becoming unusable. Second, the
players were unable to assess the validity of posted information. Communica-
tions, messages, and information could be edited freely, by anyone, and then
reposted; amended versions quickly proliferated. Postings intended to be
directive—as commander’s intent, rules of engagement, and even direct or-
ders—quickly became ineffectual, as players lost the ability to determine which
version was authoritative. Third, players were able to use effectively compara-
tively little of the power of the software provided to search the net, display in-
formation in revealing ways, and process data. This was particularly true of
commanders, who had difficulty moving quickly from one item of important
information about the battle to another as the campaign progressed.
Many discussions of network-centric warfare have conveyed visions of a
command-and-control structure akin to the civilian Internet. They presume
that the natural creativity, spontaneity, and adaptability of war fighters can be
unleashed by freedom from constraint analogous to that of the civilian Internet
in commercial settings. No such vision was realized in Global 2000. The difficul-
ties the players encountered may well not have been artifacts of this particular
game; it should not be surprising that the civilian model of a network may not
be transplantable directly into the military domain. The World Wide Web leaves
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it to individual users to form their own opinions as to the accuracy of informa-
tion they find there; military users have neither the time nor the resources to do
so—yet the stakes for military users are quite high. The Web contains search en-
gines; the Global game net, at least, did not. World Wide Web users often are not
under time pressure; military users generally are.
For these reasons, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that whatever form a mili-
tary operational net might take, the information it contains is likely to require
considerable structure and “predigestion.” Doctrine will also be necessary to
impose constraints on who can use the military net, where, when, and for what.
The rights to post and edit will have to be limited to prevent the loss of “config-
uration control” observed in Global 2000. In sum, Global 2000 suggests that
command and control using information networking will require a new body of
doctrine, akin to that developed for traditional command and control. If so, it
will be no trivial matter to balance the power of netted collaboration against the
need to impose more traditional discipline.
In a similar vein, the difficulties encountered by commanders in managing
and focusing the flow of information to and from themselves suggest the need
for a new staff function—the knowledge manager. In Global 2000, individuals
were placed in each game cell to help players, especially commanders, cope with
the command and control network. These individuals, all civilians, succeeded to
varying degrees; it became quite clear, however, that the knowledge-manage-
ment function was much needed. Precisely how that service should be provided
is an open question. Should the individuals be military staff officers or civilians?
Should they be primarily war fighters or technical specialists? Should they be
simply “consultants” or the commanders’ alter egos? These issues are already be-
ing grappled with today by the new and growing knowledge-management
community.
Information/Knowledge Advantage: Sharing Information
Part of the command and control capability supplied to BLUE was the “common
operating picture.” In physical terms, the common operating picture was repre-
sented in Global 2000 by a collection of video monitors, known as “the Knowl-
edge Wall,” displaying the status of different military functional areas—logistics,
theater air and missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
the like. At the center of this display were two large monitors showing the entire
theater and the locations of various BLUE and RED units. Icons on all displays
could be “clicked” upon for more detailed information. In principle, the BLUE
commander and staff members could use the Knowledge Wall simultaneously
and independently, as dictated by each individual’s needs.
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In actual utility the Knowledge Wall fell short of the ideal, for reasons consis-
tent with the information-related problems already discussed. The BLUE players
did not need all the information the Wall provided, and they had difficulty
weighing its validity. The forms in
which information was conveyed
were often not transparent or in-
tuitive. The players did not have
the time, training, or patience to
sift the wealth of information on
the Knowledge Wall to find “nuggets” of value to them. Like other facets of
network-centric command and control, the Knowledge Wall seems to have
called for structure, constraint, and discipline. Again, the problem is how to pro-
vide those things without destroying the collaborative, horizontal, and largely
unimpeded transfer of information that lends such revolutionary power to
modern information technology.
Assured Access: Exploiting Information
The value of knowledge can be a function of time. Some knowledge may seem
virtually eternal—for example, philosophic truths. But information about a
military adversary has value only so long as the information is current and rele-
vant. For example, a vulnerability is not likely to exist indefinitely. The enemy
may become aware of it and correct it. Also, a vulnerability may be the transient
result of a particular sequence of events—when that sequence ends, the vulner-
ability disappears. Specifically, adversaries preparing attacks often incur the
vulnerabilities of concentration as their forces mass together; this vulnerability
is alleviated when the forces disperse, perhaps during the attack itself.
Precisely this vulnerability presented itself to BLUE as RED built up forces for
the incursion into BROWN. RED accepted this vulnerability in part because hos-
tilities had not begun; it did not believe that BLUE could detect and target the
massing forces.5 RED’s calculations proved incorrect on both counts. The expe-
ditionary sensor grid enabled BLUE to detect and target RED’s forces, to a consid-
erable extent. It allowed BLUE to perceive not only that an attack was imminent
but also that some elements of the RED force would disperse prior to the attack,
thereby becoming less vulnerable. It was for this reason that BLUE attacked when
it did, while the RED forces were still concentrated. Strictly speaking, therefore, it
is correct to say that BLUE was the first to attack massively the military capabili-
ties of its adversary—though RED was in the process of “pulling the trigger.”
The larger issue raised here is straightforward: Will U.S. forces have the free-
dom of action to exploit their information advantages? The easy answer, of
course, would be, “It depends.” Is the nation in the midst of a conflict, or does
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exploiting the information advantage entail preemption? How great are the ben-
efits of acting first? How durable are those benefits? What responses are avail-
able to the adversary? What opportunities are open to the adversary to escalate?
And, of course, what are the political implications?
Though the specifics depend on the situation, it is reasonable to suspect that
the broad pressures to act early felt by BLUE in Global 2000 were “real” and not
game artifacts. Information tends to be a wasting asset: the greater one’s infor-
mation advantages, the greater the incentive to exploit them before they dimin-
ish, then vanish. Not to act would waste the investment made to obtain the
information advantage in the first place—and that investment is likely to have
been considerable.
Yet the operating environments of U.S. military forces often include restric-
tive rules of engagement and formidable reluctance by the national command
authority to permit early or independent action, and that state of affairs is likely
to continue. Precisely that sort of tension developed in Global 2000 between the
game political leadership and the theater military commanders, even with the
artificially relaxed political constraints. The dimensions and details of this prob-
lem represent a fertile area for further research. In particular, ways of developing
more flexible rules of engagement are being actively explored and will be part of
Global 2001. The stakes are high; much of the operational advantage gained by
network-centric operations could be thrown away by strategic-level caution, de-
lay, or inaction. Yet such “friction” at the strategic level may be the unavoidable
result of coalition or alliance influence. Coalition partners frequently find the
United States too eager to act quickly and decisively, and they typically require
restraint as a condition for participation in coalition operations. In such a case
network-centric warfare could never achieve full expression. There may be no
real solution to this problem, but we must thoroughly explore it before accept-
ing that pessimistic conclusion.
Effects-Based Operations
Analysts of effects-based operations often assert that massive physical attacks
are not a particularly potent way of creating effects with respect to an adversary’s
perceptions. Whether that is true or not, effects-based operations do involve the
precise control, direction, and focus of force in time and space. Frequently the
concept is contrasted with “attrition-based warfare,” which conjures up images
of massive, indiscriminate, industrial-style onslaughts.
In Global 2000, the players were made aware at the outset that effects-based
operations constituted a focus of the game. The extent to which players actually
undertook them, however, is unclear. Certainly the language of effects-based op-
erations was spoken often by commanders and staff members; planners were
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ordered to design campaigns with the aim of producing specific effects. There
was, however, no common understanding of what effects-based operations
entail and how to go about them. Some players envisioned influencing the ad-
versary’s highest leadership—a strategic-level definition; others applied it to the
RED operational commanders; some used the term to connote information op-
erations; yet others conflated the concept with “signaling,” using force for sym-
bolic and demonstrative purposes. This diversity of views was aggravated by
time pressure and the absence of straightforward ways to link BLUE options with
specific effects on RED.
In the event, though BLUE’s operations were not indiscriminate, they were
massive and directed to the physical destruction of RED; it would be difficult to
distinguish the aim points of BLUE weapons in Global 2000 from those of the
weap ons ac tua l ly launched
against Iraq a decade earlier. In
sum, simple knowledge of a con-
cept called “effects-based opera-
tions” was widely shared among
the players. Much less widely
shared was an understanding of what the concept entails. Finally, on the basis
of Global 2000, it would be hard to claim that effects-based operations look ap-
preciably different from current U.S. military practice.
The research implications of this experience may be hard to implement. First,
greater effort is required to clarify what effects-based operations are intended to
be and how they differ from past practice. Second, research is badly needed to
evaluate whether or not the theory of effects-based operations can be concretely
applied in a campaign. In other words, do effects-based operations actually exist
in a way that can be reliably operationalized? There is no doubt that some mili-
tary operations have had effects on the enemy well beyond the physical destruc-
tion inflicted—the 1942 Doolittle raid on Japan is an example; the 1968 Tet
offensive of the Vietnam War is another; so are the 1983 Beirut bombing and the
events of 1993 in Somalia. The problem facing American planners is how to con-
vert knowledge that such operations are possible into a reliable, predictable, and
controllable tool for directing U.S. military force.
Sea Basing
Global 2000 was not designed to generate information sufficiently detailed to
bear on platform design or choices among alternative platforms. That said, the
game included a notional platform, the Theater Logistics Support Vessel (TLSV).
This ship was defined only in a general way, as a large catamaran of advanced de-
sign capable of high speeds (forty to fifty knots) in the open sea and of very
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quick loading and unloading. Like the expeditionary sensor grid, the Theater
Logistics Support Vessel had a considerable effect on BLUE’s ability to respond
quickly to RED’s attack on BROWN.
Specifically, the TLSV permitted BLUE to implement what is described in
Joint Vision 2020 as “focused logistics.” Its speed and capacity allowed it to make
numerous round trips between logistical centers and deployed ground and air
forces in the same time a conventional logistics ship needs to make just one. As
a result, BLUE was relieved of the necessity to project logistics requirements far
ahead, and in turn, logistical stocks in the field could be substantially reduced
or eliminated. The players described the approach as close to a “just-in-time”
supply organization.
The speed of the TLSVs was also used to offset the problems arising when
events caught a maritime prepositioning ship out of position. The BLUE com-
mander was able to offload the prepositioning material to TLSVs, which quickly
delivered it. As a result, ground operations could begin sooner than would have
been the case had BLUE been compelled to wait until the maritime
prepositioning ship could steam to the theater.6
Finally the speed of the Theater Logistics Support Vessels provided greater
protection from submarine attack, in two ways. First, submarines had difficulty
achieving good positions for torpedo shots (though, of course, speed was no de-
fense against antiship missiles). Second, BLUE antisubmarine warfare forces
could sweep submarine-free channels more effectively, because the TLSVs could
traverse them so quickly thereafter; with slower-moving ships, submarines
might have been able to reenter the cleared lanes in time. For the same reason,
the swept zones could be narrower.
Much research remains to be done, however, before a Theater Logistics Sup-
port Vessel as hypothesized by Global 2000 can be seriously contemplated by
the Navy. Initial assessments will focus on how Navy and Marine Corps force
structure and deployments could be affected by them. If these studies and rough
order-of-magnitude costing prove encouraging, more detailed analysis could be
undertaken.
BALANCING CONSTRAINTS AND OPERATIONAL FREEDOM
To begin, we must again emphasize the limits of any single war game: these
observations arising from Global 2000 must be viewed as tentative, fragile, the
merest beginnings of further investigation. But they are nonetheless important
and interesting. They all address major dimensions of network-centric operations;
they are all plausible; and none can be easily explained away as a game artifact.
If a theme connects most of the observations, it is that modern information
technology and current concepts for its use did not free the Global 2000
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participants from the need for certain traditional constraints, at least not to the
extent envisioned in theoretical discussions of network-centric operations. If a
single challenge emerges, it is how to capture the predicted advantages of
information-rich environments while avoiding the problems observed in Global
2000. Specifically, netted command and control still seems to require a doctrine
that limits the ways the net can be used, what can be introduced into it, and
who can alter what is already circulating. Further, a common operational picture
does not in itself enable the parts of a force or staff to regulate themselves; some
shaping and filtering of the data in that common operating picture is still re-
quired. (These are substantial problems, but certain allowances must be made at
this early stage for “experimental technique.” First, the Global 2000 players may
not have fully understood how to exploit the command-and-control capabilities
at their disposal. They received instruction in the use of the netted command-
and-control system, but one cannot expect that to offset twenty-plus years of
experience in traditional modes. Second, the netted command and control
provided in Global 2000 may have been poorly designed. Third, the predicted
advantages of netted command and control may be overoptimistic, however ef-
fective a system and proficient its users. Global 2001 will focus on sorting out
these factors.)
In addition to command-and-control issues, Global 2000 exposed tensions
between the desires of theater war fighters to exploit information superiority
rapidly and decisively, and those of the national command authorities and their
coalition partners to proceed more cautiously. Further research will have to focus
on when and how information superiority can and should be converted to oper-
ational advantage in politically complex environments. It seems likely that po-
tential benefits of information superiority may not be exploitable under certain
circumstances. In any case, how can such advantages be measured?
Finally, though it is not an issue directly related to the use of information, the
concept of the high-speed logistics ship deserves further examination. It is un-
usual for the very existence of a single platform to have such a tangible impact on
so large an exercise; this fact alone justifies more detailed study.
N O T E S
1. The Navy Warfare Development Command
in Newport—which prepared the document
adopted as the Global 2000 conceptual
framework—uses the term “network-centric
operations” to subsume the more familiar
“network-centric warfare” as well as settings
other than warfighting. For both concepts,
see George Kasten [Capt., USN], “Building a
Beehive: Observations on the Transition to
Network-centric Operations,” Naval War
College Review, Autumn 2000, pp. 127–40;
Edward A. Smith, Jr., “Network-centric War-
fare: What’s the Point?” Naval War College
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Review, Winter 2001, pp. 59–75; and the ref-
erences of both these articles.
2. Bud Hay and Bob Gile, Global War Game:
The First Five Years, Newport Paper 4 (New-
port, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. vii.
3. Ibid. Global War Game, by two figures prom-
inent in the history of the series, examines the
purposes, courses, outcomes, and lessons of its
earliest games. Throughout the Cold War the
series was known as the “Global War Game.”
4. This is a good example of the liberties that
were taken with political realism in order to
test the full range of phenomena associated
with network-centric operations.
5. Note again the political unreality. The point
is not whether BLUE would or would not ac-
tually “go first” but rather the nature of the
incentives to exploit information superiority
that may be created by network-centric
operations.
6. There is some question as to whether this
transfer of material could in actuality have
been effected so quickly and easily.
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“GOOD GAMES”
Challenges for the War-Gaming Community
Stuart H. Starr
In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a technical report lay-ing out a “Code of Best Practice” for command and control assessment.1 Al-
though specifically aimed at command and control, this document offers a
framework for thinking about the changing nature of war gaming. In the
opinion of numerous practitioners and observers, war gaming has reached a
turning point: the changing basis of international security at the dawn of the
twenty-first century makes gaming an especially valuable tool, but a fundamen-
tal reformation of gaming is required for it to achieve its potential.
The Code of Best Practice, as a unifying and overarching framework, allows
us to take stock of the present state of war gaming, to highlight the primary chal-
lenges that the war-gaming community faces, and to propose steps to improve
every aspect of war gaming. It makes four central points.
First, as shown in figure 1, the framework of a good war game should be
broadly based on the principles of sound operational analysis. Thus the corner-
stone of any game must be a clear and unambiguous formulation of the problem
to be addressed—the reason the game is to be played. A game’s sponsors need to
articulate very clearly the real issues of interest so that designers may develop
(for the sponsors’ approval) a conceptual framework within which these issues
can be suitably analyzed.
Second, as the Nato document instructs, the game’s designers should identify
and address organizational and cultural issues that
emerge from the conceptual framework. What as-
sumptions are to be accepted, for example, about
the values, behavior, and decision processes of the
various players?
Dr. Starr is Director of Plans at the MITRE Corporation
in McLean, Virginia. An earlier version of this paper was
prepared for delivery at a war-gaming conference at the
Naval War College in March 2000.
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Third, the war game must devise relevant scenarios. As is widely understood,
no single scenario is adequate for the full range of issues found in a major game.
Sponsors should expect to be presented with “families” of scenarios; a systematic
and efficient mechanism
to generate appropriate al-
ternative scenarios allows
a game to focus on the
most interesting aspects of
the problem being studied.
Fourth, Nato’s Code of
Best Practice envisions
the use of “measures of
merit” to draw out insights
about the game’s results;
for contemporary scenar-
ios, hierarchies of interre-
lated—and, increasingly,
nontraditional—measures
are necessary. These mea-
sures, in turn, require the
collection of appropriate data and the application of suitable analytical tools to
be useful. For instance, ancillary tools can be used to perform analyses before a
game (perhaps to define fruitful parts of “scenario space”), during it (to assess
“moves”), and after it, especially to relate outcomes to measures of merit. The
Nato Code considers it vital to perform risk analyses to illuminate the uncertain-
ties associated with the issues of interest to the sponsor; many a game partici-
pant (and sponsor) has drawn a misleading inference from the idiosyncratic
outcome of a single game. Finally, the results of the assessments must be doc-
umented, so there can be both peer reviews and a foundation upon which future
analyses can be built.
Although figure 1 does not formally specify it, the Code of Best Practice em-
phasizes that an extensive feedback arrangement is needed to share insights
among individuals carrying out these successive processes as game planning
progresses. Further, the overall team must be an interdisciplinary one—com-
prising operations analysts, war-game designers, experimental designers, com-
puter scientists, social scientists, and so on—if it is to address all of the issues of
concern to a sponsor. A “good game,” then, blends clear problem formula-
tion, technical virtuosity, accurate data, scenario creativity, appropriate decision
rules, and credible evaluation procedures. The rest of this article treats some of
these points in greater depth.
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PROBLEM FORMULATION
There is no shortage of problems amenable to useful analysis by war-gaming
techniques. In fact, policy makers are likely to find war gaming the most effective
tool for clarifying many issues and sets of issues that can be expected to come to
the foreground in the near and middle term. Let us here consider a few problems
for which war gaming could be particularly appropriate.
Strategic Visions. An indication of the variety of problems to which gaming
might be applied as an analytical tool is the set of three lists of strategic prob-
lems assembled recently by former secretary of defense William J. Perry and for-
mer assistant secretary of defense Ashton B. Carter, in their book Preventive
Defense.2 Their “A list” comprises potential (and possibly preventable) future
matters that could threaten the
survival, way of life, and position
in the world of the United States
(such as a resurgent and hostile
Russia, uncontrolled prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, or catastrophic terrorism). The “B list” contains direct threats (deterrable
through ready forces) to vital American interests (for instance, major theater
wars). The “C list” cites problems (like Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia) that “indi-
rectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests.”3 Many of
these issues, particularly those on the “A list,” have yet to be explored adequately
in war games.
Homeland Defense. In its recent report, “Seeking a National Strategy: A Concept
for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,” the congressionally estab-
lished Hart-Rudman Commission emphasizes the need to enhance what it calls
“homeland security” to deal with emerging world threats.4 A third and final
phase of that study will address a variety of associated questions: Are responsi-
bilities, authorities, and accountabilities clear? Do integrating mechanisms ex-
ist? What capabilities will be needed? Is the overall capacity sufficient, and if so,
will it continue to be?5 A suitably designed set of war games would be a promis-
ing way to illuminate these issues.6
Operational Tempo. One of the driving issues in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review was the necessity to devise “architectures” and personnel policies to al-
low U.S. forces to respond to operational demands that were expected to be high
enough to put pressure on unit training and maintenance, as well as morale and
retention. The “Dynamic Commitment” war game was developed and played to
address that issue; it is being revised to serve the same need for the Quadrennial
Defense Review of 2001.7 That game—which is to play a single scenario, drawn
randomly from a list of sixty-one “vignettes”—is itself a case in point, showing
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that contemporary gaming does not reflect sufficient understanding of risks and
uncertainties. The consequences of a particular vignette being played out in a
single game, and of drawing conclusions therefrom about levels of demands that
can be placed on U.S. equipment and personnel, are worrisome.
Service Transformation. Each of the military services is in the midst of sweeping
modernization designed to take advantage of opportunities offered by the infor-
mation age. Specific initiatives include the Navy’s network-centric warfare, the
Army’s “Future Combat System for Smaller Scale Contingencies,” the air expedi-
tionary forces of the Air Force,
and “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea” of the Marine Corps. War
games have contributed to pre-
liminary assessments of each of
these concepts singly, but there has been no attempt to game the totality of their
effects. Doing so would appear to be a high-priority matter.
Joint Vision 2020. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the recent doc-
trinal white paper Joint Vision 2020, conceives “a joint force capable of full spec-
trum dominance, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any
form of conflict.”8 The document reaffirms as the prerequisite of full-spectrum
dominance four operational concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engage-
ment, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—identified in an ear-
lier white paper, Joint Vision 2010. These four operational concepts in turn
depend on three factors: interoperability (joint force, interagency, and multina-
tional), innovation leading to transformation, and “decision superiority” (to al-
low commanders to “make better and faster decisions than their opponents”).
All of these factors, as well as their relationship to the central operational con-
cepts of Joint Vision 2020, are very attractive subjects for gaming.
ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE
In games played by coalition allies prior to Operation DESERT STORM, differences
in cultures were sometimes recognized as a major factor. For instance, British
analyses reflected a particular appreciation of Iraqi characteristics that pro-
foundly affected the planning and operational concepts of the British forces in
the theater.9
Cultural differences were again acknowledged as central strategic factors in
1999, during Nato’s coercive air campaign to terminate internecine hostilities
in Kosovo. The subsequent debate about what actually prompted Slobodan
Milosevic’s acquiescence to Nato’s demands has produced at least one analysis of
the cultural and political dynamics of the Serbian leadership.10
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It has been widely appreciated that war games require a much better theoreti-
cal basis than is now available for treating these matters in future conflict situ-
ations. One potential source of some necessary insight may emerge from work
being done in the Office of Naval Research on “Adaptive Architectures for Com-
mand and Control.” It examines the command-and-control staffs of various na-
tions for pertinent “cultural artifacts” and their potential influence on decision
making. In addition, the war-gaming community would do well to draw on the
efforts of sociologists and political scientists, who could analyze the underlying
cultural forces at work in such recent operations as Somalia and Kosovo, and
who can be consulted in planning games for prospective involvement in foresee-
able crises.
SCENARIOS
Today, basic issues in the selection and development of scenarios are being ex-
amined. Can a baseline scenario be used for a series (or “cluster”) of games?
How can scenarios be kept (in Albert Einstein’s formulation) as simple as neces-
sary—but no simpler? Can “excursions” into important issues be accommo-
dated, and if so, in what ways?
Clearly, no simple answers to these questions exist, but there is a fundamental
principle that game designers today should acknowledge—that no single sce-
nario can adequately illuminate risk and uncertainty. The challenge is to develop
an efficient mechanism for finding and exploring regions of “scenario space”
where key factors play in significant ways. The Nato Code of Best Practice offers
one approach to the problem, a scenario framework that subsumes three major
categories—external factors (the political, military, and cultural situation), the
capabilities of actors (friendly and adversary forces, noncombatants), and the
environment (geography, terrain, and weather).
As an illustration of how such a framework might be used to develop a base-
line scenario (and possibly scenario excursions), consider a methodology that
enumerates the factors applicable to a given game.11 For each of those factors, a
number of values (specific geographies, particular orders of battle, etc.) can be
assigned, each making a scenario more or less challenging in some respect that is
significant in terms of a game’s objectives. Between the bounding (“easy,” “very
difficult”) values for each factor lie the elements of a potentially interesting base-
line scenario; alternative scenarios can be readily produced for sensitivity analy-
ses by selecting different values for particular factors. In effect, this approach
generates a very large experimental-design matrix, each cell of which corre-
sponds to a specific scenario. In traditional scientific experimentation, a num-
ber of iterations would be run for selected matrix cells in order to achieve
statistically meaningful results; statistical uncertainty would be a function of
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the number of cells examined and the number of independent trials of each. In
war games, of course, a “full factorial experiment” would be impossible; still, it
would be prudent to play at least a sampling of variants—a “sparse, fractional
factorial experiment.”
Closely related to scenarios is consideration of risk and uncertainty. As the
Code notes, a useful way to display and characterize areas of uncertainty in a
game is to play variations of the
scenario. In doing so, however, it
is important to take account of,
and offset, the effects of learning
that occurs in the play of a game.
For instance, the sequence of vari-
ations should anticipate and min-
imize the “carry forward” insights obtained in each variation; one way to do this
is to make the new problem appear different to the participants but have it con-
tain the same essential stimuli. It will almost certainly not be possible to run
enough iterations to bound measures of merit as tightly as a physical scientist
would wish; nevertheless, to some extent well designed pre- and postgame anal-
yses can refine those estimates.
A more basic issue is the estimation of risk. Risk analysis as a discipline is well
developed in a number of fields, such as the insurance industry and stock bro-
kerages, but in the context of national security there is little agreement even
about the definition of risk itself. This is becoming a pressing issue, because the
congressional mandate of the Quadrennial Defense Review specifically requires
“a comprehensive discussion of [the] national defense strategy of the United
States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low to
moderate level of risk.”12 To meet this requirement the national security com-
munity will need to agree on definitions of risk, definitions that are amenable to
evaluation in future war games.
MEASURES OF MERIT
For decades gamers have employed the familiar operations-analysis device of
“measures of effectiveness” to structure game outcomes and relate them to
sponsors’ concerns. In recent years, however, the concept of measures of effec-
tiveness has been broadened, resulting in the idea of “measures of merit.”13 As
discussed in the Nato document, this conception not only embraces the conven-
tional measures of effectiveness but allows a linked hierarchy of increasingly
specific metrics to be considered as well. For example, the evaluation measures
of a game might employ measures each of which “nests” within the next to pro-
vide both broad and detailed attention as appropriate. An example follows:
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• Measures of policy effectiveness, assessing the extent to which the
participants in an operation are able to achieve national or international
security objectives;
• Measures of force effectiveness, examining the purely military effectiveness of
a force in terms of its primary task (such as the time required to halt an
attack);
• Measures of mission effectiveness, appraising the ability of the military force
to perform key subordinate or subsidiary missions;
• Measures of functional performance, evaluating the success of a particular
weapon system or command-and-control organization in important tasks,
such as target engagement;
• Dimensional parameters, the properties or characteristics (such as
bandwidth and resistance to jamming) of a specific system, such as a
communications network.
Game designers might usefully devise measures for each level of this hierar-
chy, and analysts might explore their relationships during the course of the
game. At the lower end of the hierarchy, extensive analyses have been performed
for traditional warfare; that literature is being expanded upon to embrace
information superiority.14 It would be necessary, however, to formulate mean-
ingful measures of merit for the top of the hierarchy. In one promising effort in
this direction, economic measures were used to reflect the societal impact of
military operations.15 Participants were asked to estimate the effect that postu-
lated crises might have on such indicators as the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
the price of a barrel of crude oil, or the exchange rate between the dollar and the
deutsche mark.
As the Nato Code of Best Practice concludes, games are not suitable for every
analytical question. Indeed, no single assessment technique is likely to be suffi-
cient (see table 1). Since games are increasingly likely to address such concepts as
information superiority and information dominance, assessment tools must ac-
count for both friendly and adversary information processes. In addition, disci-
pline is necessary; formal experimental-design matrices may be advisable, or
multiple iterations of increasingly fine-grained analytical routines may have to
be done (for instance, in successive attempts before a game to identify fruitful
aspects of the scenario environment, clarify assumptions, assign values for key
parameters, and model details).
Newly developed sophisticated collaboration tools may revolutionize war
games by allowing geographically dispersed individuals to participate fully in
deliberations and decisions. Today’s state-of-practice technology simply
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collects stand-alone collaboration tools—like video teleconferencing, shared
whiteboards, and Internet chat rooms. However, the state of the art has ad-
vanced to the point of integrating those capabilities into “virtual buildings” in
which participants interact in real time. Efforts are under way to improve
“scalability” (usefulness for various numbers of players and complexities of sce-
nario) and to deal with security issues regarding the transmission of game data.
One of the major advantages that these emerging collaborative gaming tools
offer is the possibility that principals—commanders, heads of agencies, senior
executives—will be able to participate personally. The demands on the time of
such individuals normally make it difficult for them to get involved in war
games, especially if travel is involved; typically they must delegate such matters
to subordinates. Distributed, collaborative war-gaming technologies will make
it possible for actual decision makers to play, increasing both the fidelity of the
games and the real value of the entire activity by educating the principals di-
rectly about the intricacies and nuances of the problems being considered.
N O T E S
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Code of
Best Practice (COBP) on the Assessment of C2,
RTO Technical Report 9, AC/323(SAS)TP/4
(Hull, Que.: Communication Group, Inc.,
March 1999).
2. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Pre-
ventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for
America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution Press, 1999).
3. Ibid., p. 11.







































































SPECTRUM OF CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:53 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
4. Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, Seeking a
National Strategy: A Concept for Preserving Se-
curity and Promoting Freedom, Phase II Re-
port (Washington, D.C.: Commission on
National Security/21st Century, 2000), avail-
able on the World Wide Web:
http://www.nssg.gov (15 April 2000).
5. “Hart-Rudman Panel to Focus on Homeland
Security in Final Phase,” Inside the Pentagon,
25 May 2000, pp. 1, 19–20.
6. The Hart-Rudman Commission’s final re-
port, “Road Map for National Security: Im-
perative for Change,” was released on 15
February 2001 (available on the World Wide
Web: http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf).
It concluded that protecting the homeland
against twenty-first-century threats “should
be the primary national security mission of
the United States.” The report proposes an-
swers for the institutional and organizational
issues cited above, but it does not obviate the
need for war games to assess critically the via-
bility and desirability of the proposed
solutions.
7. “Services Meet Snags in Readying Dynamic
Commitment War Games,” Inside the Penta-
gon, 27 April 2000, pp. 1, 17–8. In March
2001 the Pentagon announced that Dynamic
Commitment had been postponed
indefinitely.
8. Henry H. Shelton [Gen., USA], Joint Vision
2020 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff;
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 2000).
9. Discussions with Jim Moffat of the Defence
Evaluation and Research Agency, U.K. Minis-
try of Defence, 4 April 2000.
10. Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo, Ser-
bia’s Political-Military Strategy,” Interna-
tional Security, Spring 2000, pp. 39–84.
11. See the author’s “Developing Scenarios to
Support C3I Analysis,” in Analytic Ap-
proaches to the Study of Future Conflict, ed.
Alexander Woodcock and David Davis
(Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping
Press of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian In-
ternational Peacekeeping Training Centre,
1996), pp. 291–300.
12. Public Law 106-65-Oct. 5, 1999, Statutes at
Large 113: 716.
13. For a discussion, see North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Code of Best Practice.
14. IS Metrics Workshops sponsored by David
Alberts (Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communi-
cations, and Intelligence [OASD (C3I)]) and
by John Garstka (Office of the Director for
Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers [J6], Joint Staff).
15. Jeffrey Sands, The Critical Link: Financial Im-
plications of Threats to National Security (a re-
port on the Economic Security Exercise,
cosponsored by the U.S. Naval War College
and Cantor Fitzgerald, Newport, R.I., Decem-
ber 1997).
S T A R R 9 7
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:53 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
101
Naval War College: Full Spring 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
PUEBLO
A Retrospective
Commander Richard Mobley, U.S. Navy
North Korea’s seizure of the U.S. Navy intelligence-collection—officially,“environmental research”—ship USS Pueblo (AGER 2) on 23 January
1968 set the stage for a painful year of negotiations. Diplomacy ultimately freed
the crew; Pyongyang finally released the men in December 1968. However, in the
first days of the crisis—the focus of this article—it was the military that was
called upon to respond. Naval power would have played an important role in any
immediate attempts to force the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea to re-
lease the crew and ship. Failing that, the Seventh Fleet would have been on the
forefront of any retaliation.
Many works published over the last thirty-three years support this view.1
However, hundreds of formerly classified documents released to the public in
the late 1990s offer new insight into many aspects of the crisis. They provide an
unprecedentedly comprehensive documentary record of intelligence, planning,
and operational issues dominating the first two weeks of the crisis, after which
the Seventh Fleet began to withdraw from the Sea of Japan and the diplomatic
track assumed preeminence.
The release of these archival sources makes it
worthwhile to revisit a very useful case study in crisis
decision making involving naval forces. The newly
available documents make plain the imperfection of
the intelligence available to the operational com-
manders involved; caught by surprise, they had to
plan and move forces quickly to respond to a wide
range of contingencies. Also, the record exhibits the
dynamics in Washington and establishes what
Commander Mobley is a career naval intelligence officer
assigned to the Defense Intelligence Liaison Office in Lon-
don. He was Chief of Indications and Warning at U.S.
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options the decision makers there thought were available to them. Finally, it
shows how military forces were in fact employed once the national strategy for
the crisis was settled upon.
The newly accessible material documents four main points about the early
part of the crisis. First, the U.S. intelligence community provided uneven
support. Analysts supplied detailed infor-
mation about Pueblo’s location and on the
capabilities and dispositions of the (North)
Korean People’s Army. They also assessed
how the potential allies of the North Korean
regime would react to the crisis, particularly
if the United States resorted to force. How-
ever, the intelligence community found the
North Korean motivations and intentions—
which were, of course, central to the crisis—
far more difficult to discern, as a result of its superficial understanding of
Pyongyang’s decision-making process.
Second, it is clear that within hours of the seizure, military staffs down to
fleet level, whose forces had been unsuitably deployed and otherwise unpre-
pared to protect Pueblo, devised and prepared to execute several options: to re-
take the ship, to prevent North Korea from salvaging it, to make a show of force
off Wonsan, and to seize a North Korean merchant vessel. Superiors in the chain
of command tempered these proposals but by no means discarded them.
Third, the released archives show that by 29 January the national command
authority—the president and secretary of defense, advised and supported by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff—had explored even more extensive military courses of ac-
tion. The importance of the roles naval forces would have played in a number of
them is striking. Although the national leadership shelved most of these propos-
als, some remained under consideration well into the crisis. Additionally, the
staffs of the Joint Chiefs and of the commander in chief of U.S. forces in the
Pacific reviewed conventional and nuclear contingency plans for Korea in case
retaliation supplanted deterrence as the preeminent objective.
Fourth, the newly accessible documents trace how national strategy and
theater posture effectively merged on 25 January with the implementation of
Seventh Fleet’s Operation FORMATION STAR. Over the next ten days, the U.S.
Navy and U.S. Air Force “surged” more than three hundred aircraft into the
theater to offset the unfavorable balance of air power between the two Koreas.
U.S. forces in Korea itself substantially upgraded their readiness, although they
did not raise their defense readiness condition. Forces of the Republic of Korea
(ROK), already on heightened alert following a North Korean attempt to
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assassinate President Park Chung Hee on 21 January, redeployed to contain any
further North Korean provocations along the demilitarized zone.
THE INTELLIGENCE EQUATION
During the first days of the crisis, intelligence analysts supporting tactical and
strategic commanders tried to answer a number of wide-ranging and funda-
mental questions. Their answers significantly influenced decision makers at all
levels of the U.S. command structure.
What were the North’s capabilities against the South? The Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, concluded that North Korea could launch a sur-
prise attack across the demilitarized zone with the twelve divisions and one bri-
gade then deployed near the zone. A larger attack, employing between twenty
and twenty-two of the total twenty-five North Korean divisions (or equivalents)
supported by about five hundred combat jet aircraft, could be delivered with
little warning. The North Korean air force enjoyed substantial superiority over
its Republic of Korea counterpart. All of its fighters (MiG-21s, MiG-19s, and
MiG-17s) and some of its Il-28 bombers were dispersed in caves and revetments;
its fuel storage facilities were dispersed and “hardened” (strengthened to resist
damage, as by concrete bunkers). In contrast, the air forces in the South com-
prised 203 Korean fighters and 151 American fighters, at unhardened bases.
Aircraft, fuel stocks and terminals, radar sites, communications centers, and
surface-to-air missile sites were all vulnerable to low-altitude surprise attack.
This airpower imbalance and the exposed nature of the airfields in South Korea
became a major concern to U.S. decision makers.2 The commander in chief of
Pacific Command subsequently concluded that seventy aircraft would be lost to the
first wave of a North Korean air campaign against aircraft on the ground, and 110
to the second wave.3 As for the North Korean navy, however, the Central Intelligence
Agency characterized it as a small defensive force, limited to coastal operations.4
What was the North Korean army’s posture? Following the seizure of Pueblo,
North Korean military units assumed a heightened state of alert and maintained
it throughout the early days of the crisis. Analysts believed that the alert was
defensive; there were “no signs of significant preparations for offensive action.”5
For example, the CIA reported that as of 28 January, North Korean naval patrol
activity remained heavy, particularly off Wonsan on the east coast, where it
extended thirty miles into the Sea of Japan.6
What had been Pyongyang’s objective? The CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the State Department rapidly concluded that North Korea had
acted independently.7 Pueblo’s seizure had grown out of the regime’s desire for
unification; Pyongyang’s public statements had become more militant since Oc-
tober 1966. On top of this, the CIA noted, North Korea had been “uniformly
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hostile” toward all vessels in nearby waters since the Korean War. In fact, few South
Korean or U.S. ships ever approached North Korea’s coast; the exceptions were
ROK Navy patrol boats escorting fishing vessels. The North had sunk one of
these patrol boats in 1967 and in November 1967 had resumed accusations
about “spy boats” (which had begun around 1964).8 Detecting Pueblo off its
coast at least by 22 January, the North would have been sorely tempted to harass
it, at least; two North Korean fishing trawlers had circled and approached to
within thirty yards of Pueblo on that day.9 The CIA assessed that the “report
which the trawlers probably made would have been enough to justify making
plans to deal with the Pueblo and sending a naval vessel out on patrol.”10 The CIA
concluded that the ship
was almost certainly taken as a result of a decision at the highest levels of the North
Korean government. . . . It seems likely . . . that the North Koreans had identified the
ship and her mission at least a day in advance. It is possible that the original intent
was only to harass and drive off the Pueblo; the final decision to take the ship into
Wonsan may have only been taken when it eventually appeared that U.S. forces were
not coming to assist the Pueblo.11
In any event, the CIA quickly warned senior U.S. officials that the North
Korean regime was prepared for a “period of sharply heightened tensions.”
It assessed that Pyongyang would seek
to extract propaganda value from the
crisis “for some days at least.” Interest-
ingly, the initial CIA assessment implied
a role for U.S. military pressure, arguing
that the North Koreans would release
neither ship nor crew “unless they judge
the U.S. will resort to retaliatory action,
such as an air attack against the patrol
craft that seized the Pueblo.”12
Where was Pueblo? The United States
had tracked the newly captured ship
into Wonsan. A photo-reconnaissance
mission flown on 25 January confirmed
it was still there, along with seven Komar
missile patrol boats and several patrol
craft.13 The imagery revealed no damage
to the ship.14 On 12 February, human
intelligence reporting indicated that the
North Koreans had moved Pueblo from
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Changjahwan-man (Chojikan) to Munp’yong-ni (Wonsan), a naval facility
nearby.15 On 29 April, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Pueblo had
moved from Munp’yong-ni to Najin, a port near the Soviet border.16
What were North Korea’s economic and political vulnerabilities? North Korea’s
predominantly overland trade patterns and communist trading partners were
not susceptible to naval action or diplomacy. The CIA quickly reported that ap-
proximately 87 percent of North Korea’s trade in 1966 was with the communist
world, 75 percent with the Soviet Union and China. With the exception of bulk
commodities, almost all of this trade with its two bordering neighbors was
overland. Japan accounted for nearly half of Pyongyang’s noncommunist trade.
Therefore, a maritime blockade could reduce North Korea’s trade by no more
than 25 percent, representing that with the noncommunist world and with
communist countries other than China and the Soviet Union. Japanese and
Soviet-flag ships would be primarily affected; they represented roughly two-thirds
of all merchant ships entering North Korean ports. The remainder were Polish
and British (8 percent each), Greek (5 percent), and an assortment of other ships
flying free world and communist flags.17
North Korea had only five merchant ships of its own (a sixth was being fitted
out in Nampo) that could be seized in retaliation; the locations of those not
believed to be in port were unknown. Four were attached to the fishing fleet.
All were under two thousand gross registered tons, except Paektu-San (7,218
tons). The status of three Polish-flag dry-cargo ships operated by the Joint
Korean-Polish Ship Broker’s Company was continually monitored.18
The Central Intelligence Agency painted a picture of a North Korea with sim-
ilarly few political vulnerabilities. All communist states would wish the affair to
“inflict the maximum feasible damage on the U.S. position, particularly with
reference to Vietnam.” Still, while these allies would want to hinder U.S. efforts
in Vietnam, the CIA believed, none sought hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
Moscow, accordingly, would seek propaganda points but would counsel Pyong-
yang to avoid further provocations that might trigger U.S. retaliation. Nonethe-
less, the agency warned, Moscow might not be able to restrain Pyongyang
should the latter pursue a more belligerent course. China would probably offer
ambiguous advice but counsel against “any course of undue risk.” Both states
were aware that South Korea could also take actions, with or without U.S. con-
currence, that could “balloon the crisis out of control.” This factor, the CIA be-
lieved, gave Moscow and Beijing an additional incentive to moderate their
advice to Pyongyang.19
What if the United States attacked? By 26 January, the intelligence community
had begun to assess likely North Korean responses to several possible U.S.
actions. The State Department judged that there was “a fair chance” that the
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communist regime would release at least part of the crew in response to a combi-
nation of warnings, visible military preparations, and a U.S. show of force.
Pyongyang would probably see little to be gained from holding the entire crew
after exploiting the incident for propaganda value. This outcome could not be
guaranteed. Moreover, the assessment observed, shows of force and the like
could be “damaging” to South Korea. Further, the communists might regard
some low-level military action (such as a blockade, attacks against a limited set
of North Korean targets, etc.) as meant only to assuage American public opin-
ion; they might doubt U.S. determination to go farther. In such a case, the North
Koreans would probably “punish” the crew immediately. They might retaliate by
launching air strikes against South Korean airfields or even U.S. aircraft carriers,
though such acts seemed unlikely,
because of the high risk of escala-
tion and ground war. In fact, a
State Department memorandum
suggested, were the United States
to strike North Korea, the Soviets would probably go “quite far in private pres-
sures” on Pyongyang to end the crisis—regardless of their public stance. Still, no
foreseeable scenario guaranteed the crew’s release, let alone that of the ship.20
What were the Soviets doing? The Soviet Union apparently acted quickly to
harvest the intelligence windfall that had been brought into Wonsan Harbor. On
28 January, the CIA reported that a Soviet Pacific Fleet aircraft had made a highly
unusual flight into North Korea. The agency believed that the aircraft might
have carried Soviet personnel to examine Pueblo and its surviving equipment.21
The Soviet Pacific Fleet also deployed several units to monitor the growing
U.S. task force. By 1 February, U.S. naval intelligence was tracking a Kildin
guided-missile destroyer, a Kotlin destroyer, a Riga destroyer escort, and four
auxiliaries in the Sea of Japan. On 5 February (after some of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet ships had departed), six Soviet destroyers steamed into the Sea of Japan.
By then, thirteen Soviet vessels—including two missile cruisers, three missile
destroyers, two tankers, and two intelligence collectors—were in those waters.
However, some of these were probably reliefs for ships that had arrived previously.22
What more could be determined? Surprised by the ship’s seizure, national
decision makers were starved for information. On 24 January the senior Pueblo
crisis group met for the first time; its members included Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and certain of his principal
assistants; Walt Rostow, the national security advisor; Richard Helms, the direc-
tor of central intelligence; and General Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The president was to attend several of its meetings but was
not present for the first.) General Wheeler felt that the first thing to do, before
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any of the military actions under discussion could be implemented, was to col-
lect more photo intelligence.23 McNamara agreed that the intelligence gaps had
to be filled; he hoped to have a reconnaissance plan from Helms by day’s end.
Planners considered both drones and BLACK SHIELD (probably involving the
SR-71 Blackbird, the only aircraft capable of safely flying a reconnaissance
mission against Wonsan). At a cabinet-level meeting on the evening of 24 Janu-
ary, Helms pushed for three reconnaissance passes (presumably by BLACK SHIELD)
in one day over Wonsan. McNamara endorsed a three-pass mission, arguing that
the loss rate would be low. The first useful imagery was obtained the next day; af-
ter preliminary interpretation, it was to be shipped to Washington by Sunday, 28
January. The United States also continued to fly BUMBLE BUG drone reconnais-
sance missions. The drone, which was launched from a C-130 aircraft, was
scheduled to fly on 29 January. On the 29th, however, the advisory group agreed
to suspend reconnaissance against North Korea for several days.24
THE INITIAL RESPONSE IN THE THEATER
The documentary record shows that as the national command authorities began
in the first twenty-four hours to formulate a strategy for dealing with the sei-
zure of Pueblo, forces in the theater were already preparing to carry out any of
several retaliatory contingencies. The commander of U.S. naval forces in Japan
notified the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (a component of the
Pacific Command) of the seizure at 1420 (2:20 P.M.) Korean time, within an
hour of the event.* For the commanders and staffs of the Pacific Fleet and its
subordinate Seventh Fleet, preparations entailed rapid planning and redeploy-
ing of units. The Air Force also began moving the first of several hundred air-
craft toward or into the Republic of Korea. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea,
with headquarters in Seoul, heightened his forces’ alert and surveillance status
and considered increasing readiness from the normal Defense Condition Four
to DEFCON Three.
The Pacific Fleet staff considered many options, some of which anticipated
the more deliberate assessment process that would occur in Washington over
the next six days. These options included requesting permission to conduct
land-based or naval air strikes against “a suitable target”; steaming a carrier task
group into the Sea of Japan and conducting photo reconnaissance; seizing a
North Korean ship on the high seas; positioning Pueblo’s sister ship, USS Banner
(AGER 1), off Wonsan; disposing naval forces in such a way that the U.S. govern-
ment could credibly demand compensation, apologies, and guarantees from
North Korea; and blockading Wonsan.25
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Many naval messages, several of them later revised, resulted from the plan-
ning in the theater. At 1506 on the afternoon of the seizure, the commander of
the Seventh Fleet directed the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise
(CVN 65), the nuclear-powered
guided missile cruiser Truxtun
(CGN 35), and three destroyers
to proceed “at best speed” to the
southern end of the Tsushima
Strait.26 Between six and seven
that evening, Pacific Command ordered its forces to prepare for photo recon-
naissance of Wonsan to determine Pueblo’s position; at about the same time, the
commander in chief of the Pacific Command requested the Joint Chiefs to au-
thorize this reconnaissance if North Korea remained silent as to the ship’s loca-
tion.27 As a precaution, USS Banner was ordered to discontinue surveillance
operations off the east coast of Honshu and return to Yokosuka.28
At 1921 (7:21 P.M.), the commander of the Pacific Fleet directed the com-
mander of the Seventh Fleet to “take steps to place and support [a] destroyer
ASAP [as soon as possible] off Wonsan immediately outside 12-mile limit. Be
prepared to engage in operations that may include towing Pueblo and or re-
trieval of Pueblo crew/provide air cover as appropriate. Make sitreps [situation
reports] as appropriate and at least hourly.”29 The Seventh Fleet staff amplified
this order seventy-five minutes later, directing Enterprise into the Sea of Japan
and sending the destroyer USS Higbee (DD 806) toward Wonsan; a second de-
stroyer would follow.30 At about the same time the Pacific Fleet commander also
directed the Seventh Fleet commander to conduct photo reconnaissance missions
over Wonsan.31 The commander of the Seventh Fleet relayed this order at 2334
but advised his subordinates that since Pueblo was believed to be inside North
Korean territorial waters, no offensive military action was authorized unless di-
rected by higher authority.32 Shortly after midnight, the task group commander
onboard Enterprise responded that he planned flight operations during daylight
from a position east of Pusan to rearrange the air wing for future operations.33
Evidently, the national command authorities suddenly put the brakes on this
planning, preparation, and northward surging of naval forces. At 0138 in the
morning of the 24th, the Pacific Fleet commander directed all U.S. naval forces
to remain south of thirty-six degrees north latitude and to make no show of
force in the area of the incident; no destroyer would be positioned off Wonsan.34
Furthermore, by seven o’clock the Pacific Fleet commander had also directed the
cessation of signals-intelligence flights over the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea.
Further, no antisubmarine warfare flights were allowed near the incident site,
with the exception of a two-plane barrier near the battle group.35
M O B L E Y 1 0 5
Within hours of the seizure, military staffs,
whose forces had been unsuitably deployed and
otherwise unprepared to protect Pueblo,
devised and prepared to execute several options.
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:32:56 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
109
Naval War College: Full Spring 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Half an hour later, the commander in chief of Pacific Command confirmed
that the Joint Staff had prohibited shows of force. He explicitly directed the com-
mander of the Pacific Fleet not to position Higbee off Wonsan; other fleet units
repositioned as a result of the incident were to steam no farther north than their
present locations.36 Enterprise had advanced as far as the northeast end of the
Korea Strait, south of Pusan; by noon, to gain sea room, the carrier had with-
drawn southwesterly into the East China Sea. Higbee and three other destroyers,
Osbourn (DD 846), Collett (DD 730), and O’Bannon (DD 450), were to rendez-
vous with Enterprise there between the 24th and 26th of January.37
By midday on 24 January, the commander in chief, Pacific Command, took
further steps to reduce the risk of war, ordering his subordinate commanders to
“initiate no show of force along the Korean demilitarized zone or elsewhere ad-
jacent to North Korea. . . . U.S. naval and air forces will remain outside repeat
outside of the area within 80 NM [nautical miles] of the coast of North Korea
north of a line extending east from the DMZ [demilitarized zone]. This instruc-
tion does not alter your existing authorities and responsibilities for the security
of your forces.”38
Meanwhile, the U.S. Fifth Air Force had ordered all available F-105 fighter
bombers from Okinawa to Kunsan and Osan in Korea. Twelve F-105s deployed to
Osan by the 24th, and the Air Force began planning for a massive augmentation.39
The commanding general of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea notified his
forces of the Pueblo seizure and directed I Corps to bring its command posts to
operating strength. He instructed subordinate commands to heighten their alert
states and to review Defense Condition Three procedures. (In the event, the de-
fense condition was not raised from four to three for U.S. forces.) Meanwhile,
major elements of American and South Korean forces remained engaged in
counterinfiltration operations, which had accelerated after the North Korean at-
tempt to assassinate President Park on the 21st.40
General Charles H. Bonesteel III, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, was
particularly concerned about the active infiltration threat to the security of sur-
face-to-air missile and nuclear weapons sites. On the 24th he reported that he
was considering deploying another battalion from the U.S. 7th Division to rein-
force local defenses of these sites. Bonesteel also recommended an “expeditious
decision” to augment the Eighth Army, particularly for local security. Con-
cerned with the maritime borders, he indicated that he might soon recommend
that two U.S. destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft reinforce the South Korean
naval and air force units then conducting maritime patrol and interdiction.41
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REVIEWING THE MILITARY OPTIONS
Although diplomacy was quickly to become paramount, during the early phase
of the crisis the national command authorities devoted much time to military
options. Between 24 and 27 January, a series of meetings of the Pueblo crisis
group, the National Security Council, and the cabinet occurred. The early meet-
ings were wide-ranging brainstorming sessions in which the participants strove
to understand the facts of the case, ascertain North Korean motives, and then
identify and evaluate military and diplomatic options. The policy makers were
conservative; they sought to bound the crisis, and their paramount goal became
the crew’s return. But they also wanted to consider ways to pressure Pyongyang.
On Friday, 26 January, the State Department established an interagency Korea
Working Group, comprising representatives from the State and Defense Depart-
ments, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, the White House, and the U.S. Information Agency. The group was to
flesh out ten options in “think papers” addressing purpose, feasibility, risk, and
North Korean response. A high-level advisory group met on Monday, 29 Janu-
ary, to weigh these ten possible courses of action and the working group’s evalu-
ations of them.42
Selected air strikes on North Korea: As a retaliation for Pueblo’s seizure,
ninety-two Navy, U.S. Air Force, and South Korean air force aircraft could strike
the Wonsan air base and the naval base at Munp’yong-ni.43 The Korea Working
Group cautioned that the strikes would not free the crew or substantially reduce,
let alone disrupt, North Korean military capabilities. Attacks would be difficult
to defend legally; they would put the United States on the diplomatic defensive;
and they would risk escalation. In its report, the working group noted that the
Joint Chiefs preferred to attack all North Korean military airfields and neutral-
ize the entire North Korean air force in this course of action. Otherwise, losses of
strike aircraft would be high, since the North Korean air defense system could
concentrate on defending one or two targets.
Naval blockade of Wonsan: Given air cover, U.S. and possibly South Korean
naval units could impose a blockade within Wonsan’s twelve-mile limit. To
achieve air superiority, strikes against North Korean air force fields would “quite
possibly” be required. However, the Korea Working Group assessed that a block-
ade would pose only a minor inconvenience to the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic. Moreover, if the North Korean regime did not respond in the desired way, the
United States might be committed to an “indefinite, inconclusive, and politically
awkward” military option. World reaction would be adverse. Nevertheless, the
working group concluded that a blockade might eventually be useful.
Mine Wonsan Harbor: Enterprise-based A-6 attack aircraft could, by flying
seventeen sorties, drop eighty-three mines in one night; thereafter they could
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“reseed” the minefield as necessary. The working group projected the aircraft
loss rate at less than 2 percent. On the other hand, it argued, mining would pose
only a “minor inconvenience,” given the availability of other North Korean ports
and the possibility of Soviet mine countermeasures assistance.
Seize North Korean vessels: The purpose would be to retaliate in kind and then
trade the seized craft, either a merchant vessel or a warship, for Pueblo and its
crew. This option, the Korea Working Group believed, would be difficult to im-
plement because the North’s five
primary merchant ships and most
of its naval units were unlikely to
be under way. While not deemed
risky, this option seemed to have
little chance of securing release of
the Pueblo and, more importantly, the crew; it might, though, be “advantageous”
as a step in a “sequence of events.”
Sail USS Banner into the area where Pueblo had been seized: This complex op-
eration would demonstrate U.S. determination to exercise freedom of the seas.
The idea was to position Banner a minimum of thirteen miles from the North
Korean coast for eight days. Two destroyers, a cruiser, and possibly a South Ko-
rean unit would escort the AGER, and carrier aircraft would fly cover overhead.
U.S. Air Force aircraft in South Korea would assume “strip alert” (immediate
readiness to take off). The working group felt that the action would involve low
risk but would reduce the likelihood of the release of Pueblo and its crew. None-
theless, the group recommended that a plan be prepared for this option, in case
Washington decided to carry out a “relatively unprovocative” operation.
Recover cryptographic material jettisoned by Pueblo: An attempt would be
made to recover highly sensitive gear while exercising freedom of the seas. The
recovery would require a tug and mine warfare vessels from Sasebo, Japan, along
with special detection gear from the United States, and probably a midget
submarine (to be flown from Nassau). Enterprise and U.S. Air Force aircraft
would provide air cover. The salvage unit would operate during daylight only
and terminate the attempt after ten days. The working group stated no opinion
on the prospects of recovery but in general concluded that a recovery effort
would constitute “a legitimate display of U.S. activity and concern for U.S. rights
with little risk of provocation.” Supporting the course of action was a draft oper-
ation order. However, the letter from Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chief of Na-
val Operations, forwarding the draft plan commented that its “disadvantages far
outweigh its advantages” and recommended against it unless the recovery units
were assured of adequate air cover.44
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Conduct airborne reconnaissance: This proposal entailed flying reconnais-
sance missions in an attempt to convince Pyongyang that the United States was
preparing for military operations. High-performance tactical aircraft or drones
would cross the demilitarized
zone and North Korean coasts
and penetrate up to fifty miles
inland. Electronic warfare air-
craft would jam air defense and
surveillance radars. North Korea would likely down several drones, but the risk
to BLACK SHIELD missions was calculated at less than 1 percent, even against ex-
perienced surface-to-air missile crews. The working group concluded that re-
connaissance had some value as a pressure tactic.
Inform the Soviets of actual or possible military moves: Officially, the Soviets
would be advised that ongoing military movements were meant to deter further
North Korean provocations; in addition, however, “we might pointedly warn the
Soviets of actions we may be compelled to take.” In this scenario, Washington
would use an unofficial channel to warn Moscow of the “gravity of the situation”
and the need for “some action by the North Koreans to avoid further deteriora-
tion.”45 The State Department was to develop this option in greater detail as the
crisis progressed.
Raid across the Demilitarized Zone: A punitive raid across the demilitarized
zone could be staged against a significant installation, such as the North Korean
6th Division command post. Relying on surprise, an armor-heavy combined
U.S.–South Korean force would seize and destroy the facility. The working
group, however, warned that the raiders would sustain high casualties and that
the North Korean military should be expected to mount rapid “counter activi-
ties.” Moreover, if the operation went poorly, it could result in escalation to ma-
jor ground action; even if successful, it would be merely punitive.
Economic pressure on North Korea: This proposal entailed a total embargo on
trade by the United States and its allies, particularly a cessation of Japanese im-
ports from North Korea and elimination of wheat exports to it. (Japan was the
largest free-world importer of goods from North Korea, and wheat accounted
for half of the free world’s exports to that nation.) The Korea Working Group
saw little prospect for success: communist shipping lines and overland routes
would compensate for the loss of free-world vessels, and in any case key U.S. al-
lies trading with Pyongyang were unlikely to cooperate.
On 29 January, a senior advisory group including Rusk and several
high-ranking State Department officials, Helms, Rostow, and General Maxwell
Taylor (then acting as a special military consultant to the president) met to re-
view the operational alternatives offered by the Korea Working Group. The
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advisory group rapidly and “universally” agreed that the United States should
make no further military or diplomatic moves until it could ascertain whether
U.S.–North Korean contacts at Panmunjom might be fruitful. The panel quickly
eliminated several possible courses of action: in its view, selective air strikes were
solely retaliatory and would diminish prospects for early release of Pueblo;
blockade was inconclusive and potentially escalatory; and mining risked air
combat and escalation. The panel
further ruled out putting Banner
on station, at least in the manner
proposed, and concluded that re-
covery of the Pueblo’s crypto-
graphic material was “almost an
impossible task”—the attempt could lead to “unsought sustained hostilities.”
The meeting found free-world economic pressure unattractive, because of its
limited impact and the difficulties of implementing it, especially since opposi-
tion from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany was likely.46
The other options were received more favorably. In particular, if the crew and
the ship—or even just the ship—were not returned, seizure of a North Korean
vessel seemed to be a “punishment that fitted the crime.” The panel recom-
mended further staff work to locate North Korean vessels that might be suscep-
tible to seizure in international waters.
The senior advisory group, however, recommended suspension of reconnais-
sance for several days. If these flights were to be resumed, the panel recom-
mended they be BLACK SHIELD missions. The group also recommended that the
United States consider bombing exercises in South Korea, for their demonstra-
tion value.47
After its deliberations, the panel met with President Lyndon Johnson. It ad-
vised him that “[we] should keep our eyes on the major objectives in this crisis:
get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship returned; keep the confidence
of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment
of force in South Vietnam; and avoid a second front in Asia.”48 Meeting privately
with Democratic congressional leaders the following week, President Johnson
echoed the theme: “We are trying to keep them [the North Koreans] talking. The
Joint Chiefs have shown me twenty military plans, but none of them would get
our men back alive.”49
Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
made the same observation, but with a weather eye out for the possibility of
things going amiss. In a “personal for” message to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, he summarized the planning:
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Our chances to get the crew back seem greatest if we do not make a show of force off
Wonsan. . . . I have told CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF [Commanders in Chief,
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air Forces] to caution their people that we want no belliger-
ent statements from anyone at this juncture and that they should caution their peo-
ple to remain quiet. . . . I don’t believe there is any military move that we can make
that will assist us in getting the Pueblo crew returned. . . . If diplomatic efforts for re-
turn of the Pueblo crew are not successful then we should consider moving Banner
and escorts off Wonsan in accordance with the plan I have submitted. We could eas-
ily stir up a hornet’s nest with this move and we must be prepared to take such steps
as necessary to come out on top. The conventional weapons strike plan we have sub-
mitted gives various options for this contingency. We must also be prepared for re-
taliatory strikes against South Korea. Mining of Wonsan and/or Hungnam and the
harbor on the west coast [Nampo?] can be accomplished without great difficulty. It
should have a salutary effect on North Korea if a move of this severity is required. We
also will be ready with various nuclear options. . . . I am not sure any of these military
moves will assist in getting the Pueblo crew back but they would teach North Korea a
lesson.50
The national command authorities thus at least temporarily ruled out most
forcible options, although they had already taken steps to prepare for a wide
range of military contingencies. Some measures were visible immediately. On 25
January, some reserve units had been called up, terms of military service had
been extended, and 361 aircraft had been ordered into the western Pacific. The
White House had approved moving additional carriers into the Sea of Japan, sta-
tioning more aircraft in South Korea, and alerting thirty-six B-52s for move-
ment to Okinawa and Guam. The Joint Staff had also taken unpublicized steps
to enhance readiness for war on the Korean Peninsula.51
PREPARING FOR MANY CONTINGENCIES
On 25 January, upon Washington’s commitment to augment the U.S. presence
in the Sea of Japan, the Seventh Fleet implemented operation FORMATION STAR.
The operation order directed the Enterprise task group to prepare for a number
of operations: assuming custody of and towing Pueblo; receiving returned U.S.
personnel; conducting photo reconnaissance of Wonsan; and executing retalia-
tory air strikes or “other offensive actions as directed.” The task group was to
remain, and conduct flight operations, south of the thirty-eighth parallel; how-
ever, immediate (“hot”) pursuit was authorized north of that line, and ships and
aircraft could operate north of it to protect friendly forces. U.S. units were not
authorized to penetrate the territorial sea/air space of the People’s Democratic
Republic.52 Shows of force were prohibited; if attacked, however, the task group
was to take “immediate and aggressive protective measures.” In addition to the
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Seventh Fleet measures, the South Korean navy had placed nineteen ships and
two fast patrol boats in sixteen patrol sectors around the Republic of Korea.53
By 1 February, the task groups of the carriers Enterprise, USS Ranger (CV 61),
and USS Yorktown (CVS 10) had arrived in the Sea of Japan and formed a task
force.54 The Joint Chiefs had also directed the Pacific Command to deploy up to
nine diesel and nuclear attack submarines to Korea “as soon as practicable.”55
The Banner was to augment the force; Pacific Command directed the Seventh
Fleet to get the intelligence collector under way to join the task force as soon as
feasible. The move was symbolic: “Technical collection capability is secondary
to this mission and should not repeat not delay sailing.”56 Banner rendezvoused
with the force on 31 January but remained clear of North Korea’s claimed terri-
torial waters.57
During the first two weeks of the crisis, the Air Force had deployed aircraft
from the United States into the region, and from within the western Pacific to Korea
itself. Relatively few had been available in Korea at the outset; on 26 January,
there were 214 U.S. and South Korean aircraft in Korea, of which 187 were on alert.58
But on the 27th, the chief of staff of the Air Force released a flash-precedence op-
eration order for the rapid deployment of elements of nine fighter and intercep-
tor squadrons, along with B-52s and support aircraft (see the table). Supported
by sixty-six KC-135 tankers, the tactical units were to arrive in Korea within five
days of receiving orders to move to one of
five bases: Kimpo (just northwest of Seoul),
Osan, Kunsan, Suwon (south of Seoul), or
Kwangju. Twenty-six B-52Ds would then de-
ploy to Guam.59 By 7 February, 395 Ameri-
can and South Korean aircraft were in Korea,
and 308 of these were combat ready.60
As for U.S. ground forces in Korea, plan-
ners were immediately concerned about
personnel and logistical shortfalls. Because
of the demands of the Vietnam War, the two
U.S. divisions were at approximately 70
percent of authorized strength.61 They were
now to be reinforced by 8,500 troops.62 Even by late February, however, ammu-
nition was available for only forty-five combat days for these two divisions, and
eighteen combat days for the South Korean units.63 Eighth Army had on hand
23,300 tons of its war-reserve requirement of 39,400 tons.64 A sharp increase in
air munitions was also needed. The Joint Staff assessed that Pacific Command’s
Air Force component (which had only four thousand tons in Korea) would im-
mediately require 12,700 tons of munitions, and Pacific Fleet naval aviation
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(which had 2,800 tons of munitions in Sasebo) needed 11,400 tons. However,
over twelve thousand tons of ammunition were en route and would be available
to both by 10 February.65
As General Bonesteel had foreseen, the vulnerability of sensitive installations
proved worrisome both immediately and in the long term. U.S. planners were
particularly concerned about the security of the unhardened South Korean air-
fields, Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile sites, and nuclear weapons facilities.
Several steps were taken to augment the protection of all these sites. By 30 Janu-
ary, the ROK First Army had been directed to provide two infantry battalions
for airfield protection, one for Osan and the other for Kunsan.66 By 7 February,
construction of semipermanent shelters and other forms of physical protection
for the Nike-Hercules sites and their missiles was under way.67 The Joint Staff
recommended that the Defense Department assign additional personnel to pro-
vide more security for nuclear weapons sites, and it initiated a longer-term study
on physical security improvements to these facilities.68
Thus the United States girded for war while seeking to avoid it. The Pueblo
buildup was costly, particularly because it diverted assets needed in Vietnam.
Faced with a hostage situation on a large scale in 1968, decision makers in Wash-
ington were generally inclined to diplomacy from the first day of the crisis. So-
viet pressure was also a factor; in response to U.S. requests for its “good offices,”
Moscow had argued repeatedly that the naval and air buildup was counter-
productive. Premier Alexei Kosygin warned President Johnson on 3 February
that the buildup only raised tensions and had no chance of resolving the crisis.
Johnson responded on 5 February that “on the assumption that . . . we [Wash-
ington and Moscow] want peace in that area and that we will both work to that
end,” there would be no further air and naval buildup; further, he would order
one carrier task group to move “somewhat southward.” Accordingly, the Enter-
prise group sailed through the Tsushima Strait to a point approximately twelve
hours’ steaming time from its original position in the Sea of Japan. The national
command authorities, however, would not release all naval assets committed to
the contingency for several more weeks.69
The United States, then, never abandoned the option of force, but the most
visible and frenetic military efforts were over. In more ways than were then pub-
licly apparent, the U.S. military had handled a daunting array of planning, de-
ployment, and logistical tasks smoothly and in a remarkably short period. The
incident remains painful to recall, even so long after the fact. The material now
available, however, makes much clearer how military commanders and national
decision makers responded to an unprecedented and challenging situation.
Analogous problems would later arise in Tehran and Lebanon, when concern for
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American lives and the limitations of military force would compel U.S. leaders
to use diplomatic means to free Americans held hostage.
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Briefings by service representatives at recent conferences on military innova-tion suggest a great deal about what is wrong with the current efforts in the
U.S. Department of Defense to foster innovation. One clearly evoked a mass
Stakhanovite-like* operation at that service’s doctrine center, a program in
which the entire staff, from the commander to the lowliest enlisted person, are
working twelve hours a day, six days a week, to realize the service chief ’s vision of
innovation.1 That is unfortunate; it is inconceivable that any valuable thinking,
much less progress toward substantial innovation, could be taking place under
such conditions.
It is all too easy, in fact, to form the impression that none of the services are
deeply serious about transformation, that little real thinking is occurring within
the labyrinthine corridors of the Pentagon or the various agencies that make up
the Defense Department’s nervous system.2 There is a great deal of talk in the
Washington, D.C., area about transformation, innovation, and “revolutions in
military affairs,” but there is unfortunately little focus on the attributes of mili-
tary (and other) organizations that have actually fostered significant, successful
innovation over the past century.
Instead, even the most sympathetic onlooker is likely to sense that the Penta-
gon lives in a sea of slogans, briefings using elaborate electronic graphics, and a
* The (state-sponsored) Stakhanovite labor movement in the Soviet Union in the 1930s was charac-
terized by centralized organization and very large individual work assignments.
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self-satisfied belief that new platforms will solve the tactical and operational
problems of the future. Unfortunately, slick presentations do not equate to seri-
ous military thought. Nor does the procurement of sophisticated—and there-
fore exceedingly expensive—weapons systems necessarily lead to a “revolution
in military affairs.” In fact, technology has rarely been more than an enabler of
revolutions in military affairs in the past, and there is no reason to believe that
things will be different in the future.3
From the perspective of a military historian, there is no particular cause for
surprise in that state of affairs—or, at least for the coming decade, for worry.
What is troubling is the set of attitudes and cultures that characterizes U.S. mili-
tary services at the beginning of what appears to be an extended period of peace.
These are attitudes and cultures of a sort that may make real innovation, when it
counts, impossible.
Ironically, the United States has been all too successful in its efforts to elimi-
nate the threats that arose in the twentieth century to its national security inter-
ests. Entering World War I near the end of the conflict, it helped to bring victory
on the Western Front in 1918 and thereby to prevent Kaiser Wilhelm’s Reich
from establishing a general hegemony over Europe. Two decades later America’s
military and industrial might wrecked both Nazi Germany (with the help of the
Soviet Union) and imperial Japan in a successful two-front war.4 Then, over the
course of a cold war of nearly sixty years (for the Cold War really began in the
late 1930s), the United States outlasted its ideologically motivated communist
opponents; their economic systems finally collapsed. The difficulty is that the
current framework of international politics is unlikely to last until the end of the
twenty-first century, and the threats to American interests are likely to grow
rather than diminish.5
THE HISTORICAL PARAMETERS OF REVOLUTIONS IN
MILITARY AFFAIRS
One of the factors that emerged in the last interwar period as a significant
enabler of revolutions in military affairs was the fact that military organiza-
tions—which then had real, discernible threats against which to develop new ca-
pabilities and doctrine—invariably innovated more coherently and effectively
than other entities. A case in point is the development of combined-arms tactics
by the Germans. The German army spent much of the interwar period confront-
ing threats in both the east and west represented by Polish, Czech, and French
military forces.6 Mobility and a careful refinement of the lessons of the last war
eventually allowed the Germans to handle the immediate threats on their fron-
tiers. However, the development of combined-arms warfare in a Central Euro-
pean setting was not sufficient for the worldwide war that was unleashed; the
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Germans possessed neither the logistical or intelligence resources nor the strate-
gic grasp necessary to wage war from the North Cape to the Mediterranean and
from Stalingrad to the Caribbean.
Similarly, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps confronted in the 1920s
and 1930s formidable problems in developing capabilities to fight a war over
the distances involved in the Pa-
cific Ocean.7 For the Navy, the
eventual result was the develop-
ment of carrier aviation in a way
that would significantly extend
the reach of the fleet.8 In the case
of the Marines, the need to capture logistical bases to support the projection of
naval and air power across the ocean led to the development of amphibious tac-
tics and capabilities. The Navy, which required island bases to support its own
advance across the Pacific, recognized the need to assist the Marines.
The problem that the U.S. services confront today is that they cannot assess
when, where, or against whom a future war might occur, or even how long it
might last.9 There is simply no discernible threat, even on the distant horizon,
against which the United States can now measure its forces or its capabilities.
The implications are profound, because they make real innovation especially
difficult. In the interwar period, those military organizations, like the Royal Air
Force and the U.S. Army Air Corps, that developed “generic” capabilities—that
is, not focused upon specific projected missions—created doctrinal and opera-
tional concepts that were fundamentally flawed. The evidence suggests that am-
biguity resulted in dangerous assumptions—for example, about the ability of
strategic bomber formations to defend themselves.
But it is not only the uncertainties of the future strategic environment that
raise problems for the American military. One of the major advantages that the
services enjoyed in the 1920s and 1930s was the fact that that period of peace
lasted no longer. Thus, the senior leaders who went to war in 1939 were all expe-
rienced combat officers who had studied definable tactical, and in some cases
operational, problems on the basis of real-world combat experience. Today’s
American military confronts a peace that could last well into the century. The
last significant war that the U.S. military fought was the Vietnam conflict; al-
ready, few even in the flag and general-officer ranks served in that traumatic
war.10 A long peace, one that lasts forty or fifty years, could well create military
cultures that no longer understand the fundamental nature of war, in which
planners assume that there will be little friction or that opponents will be unable
to interfere with the conduct of operations.11
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Certainly, the Royal Navy’s history in the period from 1815 through 1914 sug-
gests some of the professional pitfalls of a prolonged period of peace.12 That mil-
itary organization, primed by the decades of naval war against the fleets of the
French revolutionaries and Napoleon, had come to rely on the willingness and
ability of subordinate commanders—exemplified by Admiral Horatio Nelson’s
“band of brothers”—to discern and respond independently to the dictates of a
situation. But in the decades after 1815 the Royal Navy, facing few demands
more pressing than polishing brass and making a good impression, gradually
changed into a service whose senior officers at Jutland refused to fire on German
ships at virtually point-blank range because they had received no orders from
their superiors—and neglected to inform those superiors that they had the en-
emy in sight.
The basic problem is that military organizations can rarely replicate in times
of peace the actual conditions of war. It becomes increasingly easy, as the com-
plexities, ambiguities, and frictions of combat recede into the past, for militaries
to develop concepts, doctrines, and practices that meet the standards of
peacetime efficiency rather than those of wartime effectiveness. There is no
other profession in the world whose peacetime efforts represent only a pale
shadow of the harsh realities in which its men and women must carry out their
true functions—not least that their opponents are trying to kill them. That is
why the profession of arms is the most demanding calling not only physically
but intellectually. It is also why professional military education has been so pro-
foundly important to armed services in preparing for and waging war. Here lies
perhaps the greatest weakness in the current culture of the American military.
With perhaps a single exception, the colleges of professional military educa-
tion, charged with educating the officer corps for the complexities and ambigu-
ities of the future, are not especially distinguished. In 2000, a very senior officer
told an assemblage at a war college that he hoped its students were getting to
know their families and playing plenty of softball and golf, as he had himself
when he attended that same institution. At least some of the better students were
outraged. It is well to remember, as a contrast, that in the interwar period indi-
viduals who were to rise to the highest levels in the coming war had been on the
faculties of the war colleges; examples include Raymond Spruance (who served
two tours on the faculty of the Naval War College at Newport and returned after
the war to become its president), Richmond Kelly Turner, J. Lawton Collins, W.
H. Simpson, and Alexander Patch.
Exacerbating the problem of successful innovation over the past century has
been the harsh reality that military organizations have rarely been willing to
learn from the past. It is a myth that military organizations tend to do badly in
each new war because they have studied too closely the last one; nothing could
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be farther from the truth. The fact is that military organizations, for the most
part, study what makes them feel comfortable about themselves, not the uncon-
genial lessons of past conflicts. The result is that more often than not, militaries
have to relearn in combat—and usually at a heavy cost—lessons that were
readily apparent at the end of the last conflict.
To take an example from the British: by summer of 1918 the Royal Navy had
evolved a complex set of technologies and tactics that allowed its antisubmarine
forces to respond effectively to the
threat of the U-boats. Convoys,
air support (including night-flying
aircraft equipped with search-
lights), trained escort groups, and
technological support had all become available. When the next war began in
September 1939, however, the Royal Navy had virtually none of these capabili-
ties. The result was the nightmarish Battle of the Atlantic, wherein the British
had to struggle desperately to keep up with a U-boat force that was inflicting ter-
rible losses on the merchant shipping that was the lifeline of their island nation.13
We have already noted the flawed concepts and doctrine developed between
the wars by the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Corps. Interestingly, both
had rejected the lessons of the last war in their thinking. Yet in retrospect, World
War I had clearly underlined two basic facts about air war: first, air superiority is
essential to the successful employment of aircraft for any other mission; second,
it is very difficult for aircraft to hit targets accurately, even under the conditions
of daylight and good weather.14 In the case of the Royal Air Force, the rejection of
recent experience was explicit; for the Army Air Corps, it was implicit.15 Certain-
ly, the rapidity of technological change confronted airmen with troublesome
ambiguities. But the far more impressive level of innovation that the Luftwaffe
achieved in preparing for World War II—innovation that rested on a careful
analysis of the past—suggests that many of the problems that confronted Amer-
ican and British air forces were self-inflicted, arising from contempt for the les-
sons of the past (even the immediate past) in a rush to get on with the future.16
The unwillingness to learn from the past carried on into the next war. The
RAF spent much of the first two years of the war killing German cows and blow-
ing up trees, because of its lack of blind-bombing aids. Not until late summer
1941 did the Butt Report make clear that barely one-third of Bomber Com-
mand’s aircraft were capable of hitting within five miles of their targets (that is,
an area of seventy-five square miles).17 For their part, U.S. airmen dismissed the
warnings implicit in the Battle of Britain about the vulnerabilities of bomber
formations; it took not one but two Schweinfurt raids and the loss of hundreds
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of bombers before Eighth Air Force’s leadership gave long-range escort fighters
top priority.
There were, however, organizations that did learn from the past. Unfortu-
nately, the foremost of these was the Reichsheer, the successor to the German
army of the First World War. The Reichsheer’s first chief, General Hans von
Seeckt, noted soon after assuming command, “It is absolutely necessary to put
the experiences of the war in a broad light and collect this experience while the
impressions won on the battlefield are still fresh and a major proportion of the
experienced officers are still in leading positions.”18 As one of his first steps
Seeckt ordered a sweeping examination of the lessons of the last war, establish-
ing fifty-seven committees to carry out that task. Seeckt gave these committees
explicit terms of reference; they were to produce
short concise studies on the newly gained experiences of the war and consider the
following points: a) What new situations arose in the war that had not been consid-
ered before the war? b) How effective were our prewar views in dealing with the
above situations? c) What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new
weaponry in the war? d) Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet
found a solution?19
The result was that the Germans developed a thorough understanding of the
combined arms–related implications of the war. That historical understanding
infused both their 1923 Field Service Regulations and the 1932 basic doctrinal
manual Die Truppenführung, the finest exposition of the nature of war at the op-
erational level ever written.
It is well worth underscoring the contrast here between the British and Ger-
man armies: the British failed to establish a committee to study the lessons of
World War I until 1932. At that time, the chief of the Imperial General Staff gave it
a toughly worded task: the committee was to “study the lessons of the late war, as
shown by the various official accounts, and to report whether these lessons are
being correctly and adequately applied in our manuals and in our training general-
ly.”20 Unfortunately, the committee produced a report that was highly critical of the
army’s performance in the war, and a new chief of the Imperial General Staff,
General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, quashed it; he ordered that a far
more favorable study be issued to the officer corps. Thus, the British army never
gained any insight into what had gone wrong in the last war. Three long years of
defeat would ensue before Bernard Law Montgomery assumed command of
Eighth Army in Egypt and began to grapple with the systemic prewar problems
that still were affecting his command’s performance on the field of battle.21
There is another crucial element in the innovation equation—the culture of
military organizations. By and large, historians devote little attention to the
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subject; yet it may be the most important enabler of military innovation. The
services that innovated with considerable success in the interwar period pos-
sessed internal cultures that encouraged debate, study, and honest experimenta-
tion in their preparations for war. Professional military education was clearly a
part of the process; so was serious
study and writing outside of the
schoolhouse. Erwin Rommel, the
preeminent “muddy-boots” soldier
in the German army, not only
read books but wrote them.22 Fur-
ther, military cultures that inno-
vated well cultivated substantive exchanges about the significant military issues
of the day. The German army particularly encouraged its officers to engage in se-
rious debate, and in print. In contrast, its future opponent across the Rhine was
elevating doctrine to the stature of dogma. In the mid-1930s General Maurice
Gamelin, the French army’s commander in chief, established the high command
as the sole arbiter for doctrinal matters; all lectures, articles, and books by serv-
ing officers had to receive its prior approval. As the French general André
Beaufre later noted in his memoirs, “Everyone got the message, and a profound
silence reigned until the awakening of May 1940.”23
Still, history as measure of the parameters of innovation can be quite mis-
leading; the impression historians form can depend on the cases they select and
the contemporary sources they consult. The devastating victory of German
forces in the campaign against France in 1940 would seem as clear a “revolution
in military affairs” as any in the twentieth century. Yet virtually none of the Ger-
man generals responsible felt there was anything revolutionary in that victory.
In fact, one of the most perceptive General Staff officers, General Erich
Marcks—soon to be selected by the army’s chief of staff, Franz Halder, to draw
up the initial plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union—noted in his diary in late
June 1940 as the major explanation of the success in France the ideological moti-
vation of German soldiers.24 On the other side of the hill, however, his counter-
parts in the British and French armies clearly believed that something
revolutionary had occurred.
Why the difference in perception? To German officers the changes that had
taken place between 1920 and 1940 appeared to be evolutionary; many of these
individuals had been part of the process, step by step. British and French officers,
on the other hand, their own armies having evolved at a slower pace or in en-
tirely different directions, saw in 1940 what seemed a victory of revolutionary
magnitude.
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The only truly sudden, discontinuous change in the interwar period on what
would be the Allied side appears to have been the creation of Fighter Command,
under the leadership of Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding from 1937 through
1940.25 Still, in technological matters Dowding drew on decisions he had
made earlier in the thirties, when he had directed the RAF’s research and devel-
opment efforts. In that position he had set the specification for the sin-
gle-engine, high-performance fighter designs that became the Spitfire and the
Hurricane, and he had backed experiments in radio direction finding that would
produce radar. Furthermore, the British had created in World War I, by summer
1918, an effective air defense system to oppose German strategic bombers; the
concept of a system of air defense remained embedded in RAF thinking in the
late 1930s and provided a mental framework for creating a counter to the new
threats.
PROSPECTS FOR INNOVATION IN THE NEXT CENTURY
What does all this history have to do with the current state of innovation in the
U.S. military? In effect, it is a benchmark against which one can measure the
trends and the attitudes of its officer corps and senior leadership as to their likely
receptiveness to innovation and the major conceptual changes to come in the
next decades. In some respects such a report card on the present state of the U.S.
military would be quite positive, particularly in regard to current threats. Its
marks would not be so good on long-range prospects for innovations on the or-
der of those of the 1920s and thirties.
In the day-to-day business of training and preparing military forces to face
current and immediately foreseen threats, the American armed services re-
main far ahead of any conceivable opponent. Such facilities and programs as
“Red Flag,” “Top Gun,” the National Training Center, and fleet battle experi-
ments all provide realistic, tough challenges for assessing the readiness of units
and the suitability of new concepts. While these facilities cannot replicate the
conditions of combat, they do provide a framework for preparing for combat
in a way that is superior by an order of magnitude to anything available in
previous decades. This state of affairs is encouraging, because the historical re-
cord suggests that at the heart of innovation lie discrete, specific problems.
Only by beginning with such issues have military organizations been able to
realize their larger visions and exploit the capabilities inherent in technologi-
cal change.26
Yet there are also worrisome trends. The military services, with the exception
of the Marine Corps, reflect the attitudes of the American people in being pro-
foundly ahistorical.27 The “revolution in military affairs” has been to some ex-
tent advocated by people who are disturbingly ignorant of history.28 The
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emphasis within the services has been, more often than not, on technology and
platforms, as embodying in themselves the necessary direction of innovation. But
even more distressing has been the reemergence of the mechanistic, engineering,
systems-analysis approach to thinking about future war that so characterized
Robert Strange McNamara’s Pentagon in the 1960s. The catastrophic result of that
secretary of defense’s approach was the waging of the Vietnam War by an Ameri-
can military that consistently refused to recognize the human factor in warfare.29
However, most of the lower-ranking and mid-level officers who fought (and
survived) in Vietnam returned with the uncertainties and ambiguities of war
burned into their souls.30 Accordingly, much of the development of the U.S. mil-
itary between 1975 and 1990, as it
adapted to an increasing pace of
technological change, reflected
the lessons learned at such cost in
Southeast Asia. It is not that those
seared by the experience of Vietnam rejected technological change; the new
weapons systems and technological capabilities introduced in the years of their
ascendancy reflect their understanding that technology would provide impor-
tant leverage against the Soviets. But they also understood that technology was
only an enabler: what really mattered in combat, they were convinced, were the
doctrine and conceptualizations within which technology was to be employed.
One result was a series of doctrinal publications that were the best ever pro-
duced by the American military. The 1986 edition of the Army’s Field Manual
100-5, as well as the Marine Corps’s Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting,
represented a deep understanding of the fundamental nature of war.
Today, that understanding appears in danger of dissipating, notwithstanding
the even more Clausewitzian statement issued by the Marines under General
Charles C. Krulak. In 1992 the Army published a considerably watered-down
version of FM 100-5, and its concurrent efforts to draft a post–Cold War view of
the operational level of war floundered in the late 1990s. The 1998 revision of
Air Force Manual 1-1 was extraordinarily weak, a jumble of assertions, pictures,
and dogma—a manual more concerned with style than substance, a pale shadow
of the far more substantive manual published in the early 1990s.
In the larger sense, it is the cultures of the services that constitute the greatest
cause for alarm. The American armed services remain alone among “First
World”militaries in not making intellectual, along with operational and tactical,
accomplishments prerequisites for senior command.31 As one senior officer has
suggested, American officers with substantial academic attainment have to prove
that they are “muddy-boots” soldiers or “blue-water” seamen, etc., but the latter
do not have to prove they have brains.
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Part of the problem is that the service personnel systems are so constrained by
laws drawn up in the late 1940s, as well as by more recent service practices and
congressional mandates, that it is virtually impossible for young officers to find
time and opportunity to attain the broad spectrum of historical knowledge, lan-
guage training, and cultural awareness that the twenty-first century is going to
demand. The officer corps of the U.S. armed services are therefore likely become
ever more narrowly technological and less capable of adapting and innovating
in the face of diverse threats and emerging challenges.32 For successful innova-
tion in the coming decades, as in the past, it will be the ability to conceptualize
that matters.
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tive is the method which the lessons of
military history seem to recommend, but the
Air Staff are convinced that the former is the
correct one.” Public Records Office, AIR
20/40, Air Staff Memorandum 11A, March
1924.
16. For Luftwaffe preparations see Williamson
Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical and
Aviation, 1985), chap. 1.
17. For the Butt Report see Sir Charles Webster
and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offen-
sive against Germany, vol. 4, Appendices (Lon-
don: H.M. Stationery Off., 1962), app. 13,
p. 205.
18. Quoted in James S. Corum, The Roots of
Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Mili-
tary Reform (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
1992), p. 37.
19. Ibid.
20. Quoted in Harold R. Winton, To Change an
Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and
British Armored Doctrine, 1927–1938 (Law-
rence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1988), p. 127.
21. The appalling defeat in the Gazalla battles in
May–June 1942 against Rommel underlined
these defects clearly.
22. For the best biography of Rommel, as the
thinking soldier as well as the man of action,
see Sir David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (New York:
HarperCollins, 1993).
23. André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France (Lon-
don: Cassell, 1967), pp. 36–7, 45.
24. Marcks commented, “The change in men
weighs more heavily than that in technology.
The French we met in battle were no longer
those of [the years] 14/18. The relationship
was like that between the revolutionary
armies of 1796 and those of the [First] Coali-
tion—only this time we are the revolutionaries
and Sans-Culottes.” Quoted in MacGregor
Knox, Common Destiny, Dictatorship, Foreign
Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Ger-
many (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2000), p. 186.
25. See Alan Beyerchen, “From Radio to Radar:
Interwar Military Adaptation to Technologic
Change in Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States,” in Murray and
Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Inter-
war Period, chap. 7. For Dowding’s prewar
view of the threat, see Sir Hugh Dowding,
“Employment of Fighter Command in Home
Defence,” intro. and annotations by John
Monsarrat and Robert S. Staley II, Naval War
College Review, Spring 1992, pp. 35–50.
26. I am indebted to Colonel Rick Sinnreich,
USA (Ret.), for this point.
27. See MacGregor Knox and Williamson
Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution,
1300–2050 (forthcoming from Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2001).
28. See William A. Owens and Edward Offley,
Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 2000), pp. 73–9, 102–15, for
astonishing misstatements of historical
fact—including the first names of generals.
29. The best critique of the American conduct of
the war remains Andrew Krepinevich, The
Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986).
30. See Murray, “Clausewitz Out, Computer In.”
31. On professional military education see Leon-
ard Holder [Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)] and Wil-
liamson Murray, “Prospects for Military
Education,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring
1998.
32. This trend increasingly affected the General
Staff in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries and caused the Germans signifi-
cant difficulties in the first years of World
War I.
M U R R A Y 1 2 9
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:02 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
133
Naval War College: Full Spring 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Looking toward Luce Hall from the Mahan Rotunda
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:04 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
134
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
IN MY VIEW
THE HARVARD BOYS DO RUSSIA
Sir:
I can’t believe that the Naval War College actually gave Harvard’s Jeffrey Sachs
space in your publication [“The Geography of Economic Development,” Naval
War College Review, Autumn 2000, pp. 93–106]. Where are your heads? You
should have published Anne Williamson’s or Janine Waddell’s articles on Sachs,
Summers, Hays, Rubin, and the rest of Harvard’s one-world crowd. You need to
get hold of Waddell’s article “The Harvard Boys Do Russia” in the Nation—not
exactly a right-wing tome—and also Anne Williamson’s excellent testimony
before Congress on Harvard University and their part in the rise of the Russian
oligarchy.
A George Washington University expert on the Soviet economy, Dr. Waddell
has stated that “Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs and other Western economists
participated in meetings . . . to promote a plan of ‘shock therapy,’ eliminate
price controls, subsidies[,] . . . [but produced] instead hyperinflation that hit
2,500 percent.” One of the results was that investment capital evaporated, as did
the savings of the Russian people. As a result, Professor Sachs suggested that
Western aid in the form of money allocated by Congress should be offered in or-
der to stabilize the Russian economy.
It was in an alliance with Anatoly Chubais and the Harvard Institute for
International Development—including Sachs, Andrei Schliefer, David Lipton,
and Jonathan Hay—that the current Russian monstrosity began to take shape.
With the unequivocal support offered by former Harvard professor (now presi-
dent) Lawrence Summers, the monster had the form of capitalism without the
basics necessary for democracy and a free market.
Jonathan Hay’s influence on the development of the Russian economy began
during the George H. W. Bush administration. He received a grant from USAID
to help form a new free-market Russian economy. In this effort the Harvard
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Institute raked in $57.7 million to aid in establishing a “new” Russian economy.
But what developed instead was a creature without direction or a hope of
success.
The Harvard coterie—including Sachs—encouraged Chubais’s deceit and
pilfering of massive amounts of Western aid. They did this by circumventing
various Russian agencies and the Duma, standing by while Chubais used a form
of “executive order,” or presidential decree, to get around the Russian governing
bodies. To the delight of the American experts involved in economic policy
decisions, Russian economic policy setters took a page from the Clinton admin-
istration. This “stroke of a pen, law of the land”—a fatal and corrupt blend of
American policy generated by its “experts”—did nothing to establish even the
barest form of free-market capitalism in Russia.
Loans were granted with less than sensible oversight, as billions of U.S. and
foreign dollars went to what Dr. Waddell calls “tycoon capitalism.” After 1991
approximately $3.65 billion had been given to Russia in the effort to develop a
free market economy. In 1996, the IMF, backed by the United States, gave an-
other $10.2 billion. In July of 1998 Russia received $11.2 billion, with more to
follow. According to Waddell and Anne Williamson, Venyamin Sokolov, head of
the Russian equivalent of the U.S. General Accounting Office, has stated: “All
loans made to Russia go to speculative financial markets and have no effect
whatsoever on the national economy. And it is the Russian people who are respon-
sible for repaying these loans.” Again, as in other cases of economic interference
by large financial institutions, U.S. government experts, and really short-sighted
economic policy, the average Russian is very little better off than before.
Dr. Frankenstein, as embodied by the Harvard experts, has merely allowed
the enrichment of the experts and a slide toward economic and political chaos
in greater Russia.
The bright spots in Russian-American economic cooperation have come
from the private sector. Dr. Tucker Hart Adams, president and CEO of the Ad-
ams Group in Denver and head of the American-Russian Collaborative Enter-
prise, has a long history of economic relations with the Russians. However, her
experience is not with the Chubais crowd or the Harvard experts; it is with the
new class of entrepreneurs in Russia who are involved in the “economy off the
books.” She maintains that a significant middle class is growing in Russia. While
oligarchs grow rich and a significant number of Russians are impoverished, a
multipart economy has developed. The old state sector still exists, with several
layers, along with the new, mostly off-the-books, economy. With respect to
American expert help, she states, “Most of our foreign aid went to American ac-
counting firms and consulting groups, not to Russian businesses. Russia desperately
needs foreign capital.” She insists that Russians are investing in Russia but that
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:04 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
136
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
because of the onerous tax structure, businessmen route profits to offshore enti-
ties, which then return them to Russia as foreign investment. Some Russians are
merely investing through an offshore back door.
In an exclusive interview, Dr. Adams stated, “We assumed that things like ba-
sic honesty in business transactions with strangers, respect for law, seeing others’
success as validation that you too can succeed, are human nature. They aren’t.
I’ve learned over the past ten years, ‘Give me liberty or give me death’ is part of
our American culture. The average Russian just scratches his head if you talk
about that.”
To give Sachs space in your publication, aside from his free speech rights,
shows a want of understanding; I wonder what is up with your editors. Sachs is
the last one who should be designing our globalist future.
So seek the services of Anne Williamson or Janine Waddell or Jude Wanniski
(a former Reagan advisor), who have a better grasp on the way of the world and
the direction it is headed.
DIANE ALDEN
Holly Springs, Mississippi
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Alexander S. Cochran is currently a visiting professor at
the National War College. From 1998 through 2000,
Dr. Cochran held the Major General Matthew C. Horner
Chair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University.
From 1990 to 1998, he was a professor of military history
at the Air War College and was awarded the status of
professor emeritus. Prior to that he served with the U.S.
Army Center for Military History and taught at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame. Dr. Cochran received his Ph.D.
from the University of Kansas. He has published several
books and numerous articles about World War II, the
Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War. He is a gradu-
ate of the U.S. Army Command and Staff College and the
Air War College, and he served active-duty tours in Viet-
nam and Europe.
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REVIEW ESSAY
OFFICIAL HISTORY, NOT “INSTANT ANALYSIS”
Alexander S. Cochran
Marolda, Edward J., and Robert J. Schneller, Jr. Shield and
Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001. 544pp. $36.95
Over the past decade, there has been an unfortunate trend in the publications by
service historical offices—a rush to historical judgment that rivals CNN’s insis-
tence on, and the public’s appetite for, “instant analysis.” The Persian Gulf War
has been subjected to this with such books as Air Force historian Richard
Hallion’s unofficial Storm over Iraq and Army general Robert H. Scales’s Certain
Victory. At best, these “instant histories” are self-serving (with Quadrennial De-
fense Review overtones); at worst, they are flawed by their single-service focus.
Lest the U.S. Navy feel free of this, Norman Friedman’s Desert Victory, published
within months of the conflict’s termination, led the parade.
Fortunately for all, Dr. Dean C. Allard and Dr. William S. Dudley, successive
directors of the Naval Historical Center, eschewed this approach, opting for time
to ensure detached analysis, adequate documentation, and historical perspec-
tive. Their wise decision has been richly rewarded by this book, the work of two
of the Center’s historians, Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller, Jr. In the tradi-
tion of the official histories of World War II, which allowed a “decent interval”
before writing, Shield and Sword will be the starting place for all who are inter-
ested in the U.S. Navy’s role in the Gulf conflict.
The U.S. Navy’s role in the Persian Gulf (renamed the “Arabian Gulf ” by
U.S. spokespersons during the war) over the past fifty years eclipsed those of the
other services in both time and function. (For a wide-angle view, see Michael
Palmer’s Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the
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Persian Gulf, 1833–1992. Palmer, now a historian at East Carolina University,
had earlier worked at the Naval Historical Center.) Although the modern U.S.
military first entered the Gulf during World War II, in conjunction with Lend-Lease
arrangements to assist the Soviet Union, American military presence there after
1945 rested solely upon the presence of a few U.S. Navy ships. The Middle East
Force, established in 1948 and for decades comprising a small seaplane tender as
flagship and usually a pair of destroyers rotating into the Persian Gulf assign-
ment, was the sole visible agent of American policy.
Seaborne command and control capabilities remained throughout the Cold
War—indeed it was these platforms that provided the initial base when the
Tampa, Florida, headquarters of Central Command was projected forward in
the fall of 1990. Two carriers, a battleship, and their escorts had surged into the
area after the invasion of Kuwait, and the maritime prepositioning ships began
to arrive at al-Jubayl to equip two Marine expeditionary brigades on 15 August
1990. Then, during DESERT SHIELD, the U.S. Navy led the coalition in enforce-
ment of economic sanctions—an essential backdrop to U.S. maneuvering for
world backing as well as to UN nonmilitary alternatives. For offensive DESERT
STORM planning, aircraft from the three carriers of Battle Force Yankee in the
Red Sea and the three carriers of Battle Force Zulu in the Gulf, and Tomahawk
cruise missiles fired from battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,
formed collectively a critical part of the air campaign. Once the air and ground
wars were launched in early 1991, naval contributions more than adequately
met expectations. Equally important were naval presence in the Gulf and Ara-
bian Sea, and maritime support to the final ground operations. Overlooked by
much of the public and news organizations throughout both DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM was the sea lift that provided the critical logistical support.
While some writers are quick to note that 90 percent of the personnel who
moved in and out of theater were transported by aircraft, far more important
were the equal percentages of vastly greater tonnages of equipment and supplies
that moved over sea-lanes secured by the U.S. Navy.
Marolda and Schneller handle these myriad elements of the Navy “Gulf War
story” in superb fashion. One has grown to expect such scholarly thoroughness
and professional detachment from Dr. Marolda, a longtime member of the Na-
val Historical Center, author or editor of five official histories about the Navy in
Vietnam, and currently the Center’s senior historian. Coauthor Dr. Robert J.
Schneller, Jr., has been with the Center since 1991. Their book’s four-page ac-
knowledgment section is essentially a list of names of key participants and other
researchers; Marolda and Schneller are good historians.
Focusing on the theater level in general, and on its naval component spe-
cifically, Shield and Sword argues a clear thesis: the Persian Gulf War was an
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enormously complex undertaking, and the U.S. Navy contributed to every as-
pect, from diplomacy and sanctions to combat and logistics. To highlight spe-
cific contributions, the authors have organized their book in both functional
and chronological fashion. The opening chapter deals with Cold War presence
in the Gulf and on the early buildup phases after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The second and third chapters focus upon Operation DESERT SHIELD, and the
fourth, fifth, and sixth discuss DESERT STORM. The seventh chapter examines
postwar events, such as mineclearing, redeployment of forces and equipment,
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the homecoming receptions, maritime intercep-
tion and sanctions enforcement operations, the establishment and conduct of
no-fly zones north of the thirty-sixth parallel and south of the thirty-second,
and punitive Tomahawk strikes through 1993. Chapter 8 is a thirty-page summary,
concluding with the 1995 establishment of the U.S. Fifth Fleet.
While their emphasis is upon U.S. Navy and Marine planning and operations,
Marolda and Schneller have done a masterful job of integrating not only the
Army and Air Force aspects of the war but also maritime contributions by sev-
eral members of the coalition. They have moved beyond other official service
histories, demonstrating sensitivity to mutually supporting functions and capa-
bilities. Further, by waiting for the publication of earlier official histories, they
were able to mine their sources and integrate their interpretations.
The text is complemented by fourteen maps and six tables, as well as a judi-
cious collection of photographs and artwork—almost all of it by the Navy’s
leading combat artist, John Charles Roach—providing a visual portrayal of the
varied naval contributions to the war. Such an approach suggests new directions
for future official histories, as an increasing number of readers will come from a
background of MTV. One cannot review these photographs without being con-
scious of the cultural and gender mix of today’s deployed naval forces.
Marolda and Schneller’s bibliography reveals an extensive list of primary
sources—documents and oral histories accumulated during the Naval Historical
Center’s research effort. Just as impressive is the authors’ list of secondary
sources. Anyone who has attempted to survey the massive amount of published
material on the Gulf War will welcome their brief annotations on each entry.
To be sure, there were glitches in the U.S. Navy’s performance. To mention a
few, lack of mine-warfare resources, as well as outdated doctrine, proved
embarrassing. Traditional U.S. naval testiness at tight command and control
procedures ran counter to Central Command’s demands at both the joint and
combined levels. Also, the Navy’s tradition of rotating commanders of units
and organizations led to at least one difficult episode—during the relief of Vice
Admiral Henry H. Mauz by Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur as commander of the
Seventh Fleet and Naval Forces, Central Command, late in the planning phase.
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Dissemination of intelligence, particularly satellite imagery, to forces afloat was
abysmal due to the ships’ lack of communications and processing capability, as
well as to bureaucratic problems due to “an Army general and an Army J-2 [in-
telligence staff head] fighting an Army war.” Service rivalries affected air opera-
tions as well, particularly with the notorious air tasking order and the Air Force
control of the joint force air component commander role, although Battle Force
Yankee and Battle Force Zulu had different levels of friction with Air Force prac-
tices. Likewise, the Navy’s insistence on holding back air assets from the overall
campaign for carrier protection took its toll on joint and combined relation-
ships. The authors explain these issues, and others, in light of the Cold War focus
upon the Soviet Union and its navy.
The Persian Gulf War may have been the last conflict of the Cold War. Others,
however, have suggested that it was the first of the post–Cold War period. Pro-
fessional officers concerned about insights with future implications would do
well to dwell upon the concluding chapter, blandly entitled “Summary.” Here
Marolda and Schneller highlight major insights, yet in the manner of consum-
mate historians, laying out past issues without presuming future solutions. Even
the busiest naval professional should find an hour to read this chapter of Shield
and Sword.
In sum, Shield and Sword is first-rate history—solid in research, comprehen-
sive in coverage, and insightful in analysis. It will be useful to academic and serv-
ing professionals alike. Those who wish to research and write in greater depth on
specifics of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf War must begin with this book. More im-
portantly, as the authors conclude, “the Gulf War stimulated the U.S. Navy to
make the transition . . . from the Cold War to a new era of regional conflict.” If
they are correct, every professional naval officer, and all others who expect to
command, employ, or work with U.S. naval forces in the future, also need to start
here.
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Hore, Peter, ed. The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War. Maritime Strategic Studies
Institute Paper 2, March 1999. 109pp.
Over the past decade, the U.S. Navy has
undergone a profound shift in its strategy
and thinking. This collection of thought-
ful essays written by senior Royal Navy
officers between 1992 and 1998 makes it
clear that soul-searching by naval think-
ers has not been confined to the United
States. Eric Grove’s foreword, tracing the
evolution of British naval thought over
this period, and Captain Edwin Atkinson’s
essay, “The Influence of Sea Power upon
Peace,” demonstrate how closely the
thinking, assessments, and recommenda-
tions being made in the United Kingdom
paralleled those made in the U.S. Navy’s
“. . . From the Sea” process. It is certainly
an interesting commentary on the eternal
verities of naval thinking that what Grove
calls an “intellectual revolution” occurred
without any formal exchange between
these two very different groups, each of
which was engaged in an “in house” effort.
The real value of these essays, however,
lies not in the history of post–Cold War
naval thought but in what they say about
a continuing revolution in naval thinking
on both sides of the Atlantic—especially
the efforts to stretch declining force levels
to deal with extended commitments. A
particularly salient essay in this regard is
Vice Admiral Alan West’s “1919–1991:
The Need for a United Kingdom Grand
Strategy.” West’s forthright analysis of
Britain’s failed attempt to adapt to a new
strategic environment after World War I
points to the lack of a coherent national
“grand” strategy, to destructive
interservice rivalries, and to military
planning driven by costs alone. The lack
of a grand strategy in particular left Brit-
ain unable to make any meaningful
trade-off between the limited means ac-
corded the military in the interwar years
and the far-reaching commitments that
British forces were directed to meet.
Compounding the problem was the pol-
icy makers’ assumption that Britain “will
not be engaged in any great war during
the next ten years,” a fiscally convenient
dictum that persisted well into the 1930s
despite evidence to the contrary and that
ultimately left Britain unprepared for
war. All of this should have a familiar
ring to today’s readers. Indeed, it is the
currency of these problems that gives this
essay its greatest impact.
Of equal, if different, significance is a se-
ries of essays by Brigadier Robert Fry,
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Vice Admiral J. J. Blackham, and Admiral
Sir Peter Abbott, written between 1995
and 1998. These provide perceptive Brit-
ish insights on the changing maritime
dimension of our post–Cold War world
and the increased roles for maneuvers
and forward presence in shaping a new
strategic environment. These are exactly
the kinds of issues with which the U.S.
armed forces are now struggling.
The essays’ chief drawbacks are their
brevity and what they do not say. The in-
sights presented are clearly worthwhile
and for that very reason deserve expan-
sion. For example, what were the work-
ing-level debates that undergirded the
flag officers’ presentations? The fact that
the essays cover the seven-year period up
to only three years ago would indicate
that the issues raised with regard to the
changing role of naval forces in the new
century are still as far from being fully re-
solved in the Royal Navy as they are in
the U.S. naval service. This suggests room
for both an equivalent American publica-
tion and another Maritime Strategic
Studies Institute paper, as both navies
continue the process of rethinking naval
power that collectively began in 1991.
EDWARD A. SMITH, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Washington Studies and Analysis
The Boeing Company
Arlington, Virginia
Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. Best
Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2000. 203pp. $22.50
The U.S. intelligence community, as it
currently exists, is fundamentally flawed
and must be remade. With this opening
premise, Bruce Berkowitz, a senior con-
sultant at RAND Corporation, and Allan
Goodman, former dean of the
Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service, present their blue-
print for the future of Ameri-
can intelligence.
According to the authors, a
trio of factors threatens to
leave the intelligence commu-
nity ineffective and irrelevant.
First, it is no revelation that
the end of the Cold War has
left the intelligence commu-
nity without a single clear threat as a fo-
cus for its analytic efforts. The past
emphasis on the Soviet Union offered in-
telligence analysts historical continuity.
Change tended to be evolutionary; for
example, one generation of Soviet sub-
marines offered insights into the next.
Today, however, nations and nonstate
actors have unprecedented access to
technology and information and with it a
new capability to organize and operate
rapidly across borders. These develop-
ments create the prospect of an “instan-
taneous threat” against the United States
from entirely unexpected sources.
Second, if Carl von Clausewitz was cor-
rect in defining intelligence as “every sort
of information about the enemy and his
country,” fundamental changes in infor-
mation management must create funda-
mental changes in intelligence. Berkowitz
and Goodman observe that the intelli-
gence community was created on an
1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
A book reviewer occupies a position of special re-
sponsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in
context, describe strengths, and point out weak-
nesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a
heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge
with reason and consistency.
ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER
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industrial model designed for the effi-
cient production of standardized prod-
ucts. But today, consumers receive
customized, on-demand information
from their stockbrokers, news services,
and on-line retailers; they expect nothing
less from their intelligence suppliers.
Further, intelligence products have be-
come just one of the numerous data
streams used by decision makers—and
not necessarily the most important one.
Americans are increasingly skeptical of
“received wisdom” from authority (insti-
tutional or individual) and will “channel
surf” for the intelligence support they
expect.
Finally, the authors discuss the challenges
posed by changes in American political
attitudes toward intelligence. Where
Americans once allowed intelligence
agencies to be accountable to but a hand-
ful of elected officials, today they increas-
ingly expect much more transparency to
the public. Further, political realities sug-
gest that for the foreseeable future intelli-
gence agencies will receive no additional
funding.
The likely bureaucratic answer to these
challenges is to reorganize, seek efficien-
cies, and work more closely with the cus-
tomer. However, the authors believe that
seeking greater efficiency within the cur-
rent intelligence model is not an effective
answer. While they give the intelligence
community high marks for satisfying
identified customer requirements, they
believe that today’s world of “instanta-
neous threats” and operations other than
war makes it impossible for most cus-
tomers to identify intelligence require-
ments early enough to permit the
intelligence bureaucracy to respond. Sim-
ply put, today’s structure is a recipe for
always being a step behind.
The solution proposed in Best Truth is a
transition to what Berkowitz and Good-
man dub an “adaptable intelligence orga-
nization.” Ad hoc groups would address
specific customer problems. Expanded
use of contractors or part-time employ-
ees with specialized skills would provide
expertise for unanticipated threats. Fur-
ther, the authors suggest the establish-
ment of what they call a “virtual
economy” to fund the intelligence com-
munity. Major intelligence consumers
would control funding dedicated to their
intelligence requirements and would
have the option of spending it on any in-
telligence organization or discipline they
believe could satisfy their needs. Intelli-
gence agencies would cease to have “lanes
in the road”; any agency could propose a
solution to a customer problem. One in-
tended effect of this virtual economy
would be to force government agencies
out of tasks that can be performed more
efficiently by the private sector. Intelli-
gence organizations would focus on
emerging technologies not yet profitable
for private industry, and on unique,
high-risk espionage operations that only
government organs can perform.
The bottom line of this work—a design
for the future U.S. intelligence commu-
nity—is not particularly satisfying. The
broad outline presented leaves the reader
looking for more—more specifics, more
examples, more justifications. In its de-
fense, however, the book is offered as a
“manifesto” and not an exhaustive study.
Its value lies in the clear and insightful
statement of the challenges facing the in-
telligence community and the questions
that they raise. Although it falls short of
what its title promises, Best Truth is
thought-provoking reading for intelli-
gence professionals and naval officers
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who are interested in the challenges of
the information age.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Norfolk, Virginia
Peters, Ralph. Fighting for the Future: Will America
Triumph? Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole Books,
1999. 210pp. $19.95
The introductory pages of this book are
suffused with a disagreeable arrogance
and condescension. Speaking of the U.S.
Army in which he spent his career, Ralph
Peters states that he is “loyal to it still,
much as one might care for an old lover
felled by drink and bad decisions.” With
a metaphorical sad shake of the head but
his face set nobly toward a higher truth,
he sets out on a twelve-essay description
of his vision of the future and the blind-
ness of today’s military leaders. This re-
viewer was quite prepared for an annoying
slog through a tendentious book.
Yet Fighting for the Future turned out to
be a provocative, if strident, collection of
essays (published separately between 1994
and 1999). Although Peters’s intellectual
arrogance does not lessen throughout, he
offers many cogent arguments and obser-
vations on a variety of themes that ought
not to be dismissed out of hand, even if
some ultimately are not persuasive. They
directly address core issues underlying
many of the most difficult problems
facing today’s civilian and military
leadership.
Peters depicts a dark and violent future.
In the opening essay, “The Culture of
Future Conflict,” he argues that “future
wars and violent conflicts will be shaped
by the inabilities [sic] of governments to
function as effective systems of resource
distribution and control, and by the
failure of entire cultures to compete in
the postmodern age. . . . Basic resources
will prove inadequate for populations ex-
ploding beyond natural limits. . . . There
will be fewer classic wars but more vio-
lence. . . . Intercultural struggles, with
their unbridled savagery, are the great
nightmare of the next century.”
The post–Cold War U.S. military is sin-
gularly unprepared to deal with this fu-
ture. Politicians and military leaders alike
fundamentally misunderstand this brave
new world. As a result, we will “face a
dangerous temptation to seek purely
technological responses to behavioral
challenges” and will “need to struggle
against our American tendency to focus
on hardware and bean counting to attack
the more difficult and subtle problems
posed by human behavior and regional
history.” The forces we are buying today
at exorbitant cost may prove unusable
against actual future threats. Peters argues
that against a broad range of emerging
threats, new rules of engagement rather
than new weapons are needed, since no
nation or other entity can face us head to
head in conventional terms. “We are
constrained by a past century’s model of
what armies do, what police do, and what
governments legally can do. Our oppo-
nents have none of this baggage.”
One essay takes issue with the notion of a
technologically based revolution in mili-
tary affairs (RMA). Though to a degree
he argues against straw men, Peters’s
main point is that technological issues
are secondary to understanding the hu-
man nature of future foes—no argument
there. On the other hand, in another es-
say he claims that “current and impend-
ing technologies could permit us to
reinvent warfare,” allowing us to attack
instigators of violence rather than their
populations. Ironically, two other essays
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deal with future urban combat and ar-
mored warfare in futuristic terms that
some leading RMA proponents would
endorse gladly.
The essay “A Revolution in Military Eth-
ics?” is perhaps the best in the book. It is
a hard-nosed look at “ethics” as a crutch:
“Ethics in war on the part of a Western
society do not so much protect the ob-
jects of our violence as they shield us
from the verity of our actions.” Peters ar-
gues that current Western “ethics” have
separated combatants from directly see-
ing the consequences of their actions, in
essence “dehumanizing” warfare through
stand-off precision. There are other per-
verse “ethics.” We are unwilling to assas-
sinate Saddam, but we are willing to
strangle the Iraqi population in vain hopes
of undoing him. “We might discover that
our current military ethics are the least
humane thing about us.”
Peters makes a compelling argument that
Americans are psychologically unpre-
pared to understand the nature of their
future foes. The United States will face
implacable forces in nationalism and
fundamentalism. Americans cannot
imagine the level of brutality required to
deal with “warriors,” as opposed to sol-
diers. Peters’s warriors are “erratic primi-
tives of shifting allegiance, habituated to
violence, with no stake in civil order,”
and their defeat will require a toughness
and seriousness of purpose that may be
inconsistent with the moral values for
which we claim to fight. Part of the prob-
lem is a feckless multicultural relativism.
“What of all that self-hobbling rhetoric
about the moral equivalency of all cul-
tures? Isn’t it possible that a culture (or
religion or form of government) that
provides a functional combination of in-
dividual and collective security with per-
sonal liberties really does deserve to be
taken more seriously than and emulated
above a culture that glorifies corruption,
persecutes nonbelievers, lets gunmen
rule, and enslaves women? Is all human
life truly sacred, no matter what crimes
the individual or his collective may com-
mit?” Unless the United States stops fool-
ing itself about the nature of its foes, it
risks defeat, or at best military
ineffectiveness.
Fighting for the Future, for all its provoca-
tive arguments and pithy language,
sometimes borders on the apocalyptic. Its
culminating essay is positively messianic.
Peters argues for a “Strategic Enforce-
ment Initiative” to assure American
global dominance. “The goal, initially, is
not to interfere in the affairs of foreign
states, as long as they behave humanely
toward their populations. The first . . .
step is to force an end to interstate war-
fare. We alone will have the wealth and
power to do it—plus, we could collect
defense taxes from states that benefit
from our actions. As the world’s only ex-
tant empire of law and justice, we also
have the right and responsibility to do it.
We need have no moral reservations
about outlawing aggression and then en-
forcing that prohibition.” In short, the
United States should “dominate the earth
for the good of humankind.” Notwith-
standing the fun of making French (and
Chinese) readers hyperventilate, advocat-
ing aggression in pursuit of a “higher
good” is unacceptable; the world has had
enough recent experience with utopian-
ism. Peters might better have reserved
this essay for his novels.
For all its stridency, however, Fighting for
the Future offers thought-provoking ar-
guments and is well worth reading. If Pe-
ters is too convinced he knows the
future, that is still a lesser sin than smug,
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Luddite, self-assurance that tomorrow
will look just like today.
JAN VAN TOL
Captain, U.S. Navy
Osiel, Mark J. Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military
Discipline & the Law of War. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction, 1999. 398pp. $39.95
It is a fundamental belief of thoughtful
military personnel that what they do,
even in the heat of battle, remains a
moral enterprise. This important and
careful volume critically assesses an im-
portant legal pillar of that belief: that
moral soldiers are to obey only lawful
orders. It is often said that soldiers are
expected to disobey unlawful orders,
especially those ordering atrocities or
violations of the laws of war. Since
Nuremberg, it is held that “superior or-
ders” do not constitute a defense against
charges of war crimes. Osiel makes it
abundantly clear that these nostrums are
far from certain or legally reliable as
presently understood.
Mark J. Osiel is a professor of law at the
University of Iowa and the author of
Mass Atrocity: Collective Memory and the
Law (Transaction, 1999). He knows
whereof he speaks: he has interviewed ex-
tensively the perpetrators and the victims
of Argentina’s “dirty war,” and his grasp
of the relevant literature (legal, philo-
sophical, and military) on the subject of
obedience is capacious.
With care and precision, the author chal-
lenges the present standard, which requires
soldiers to disobey orders that are “mani-
festly” illegal. This standard, he argues, is
fraught with unclarity and is far too per-
missive of illegal acts in war.
The book is much more than a dry legal
treatise about a point of law. Osiel writes
with real passion and breadth. He includes
important chapters on the psychology of
small military units and the requisites for
their cohesion and combat effectiveness.
He is careful throughout to acknowledge
the limitations of law as a constraint on
combat behavior. He argues with zeal for
the legal and practical possibility of doing
better than the present legal standard in
encouraging moral responsibility in offi-
cers and soldiers. In the end, Osiel tran-
scends the genre of legal analysis entirely,
grounding his ethical appeal in the very
nature and basis of the military profes-
sion itself. He is Aristotelian when he
closely links moral conduct in war with
the virtues that define excellence in the
profession of arms itself.
In addition, Osiel is helpful in a practical
sense. He suggests how best to use Judge
Advocate General advisers on military
staffs, and he offers concrete examples of
subordinates who, faced with unclear or-
ders (deliberate or otherwise), managed
by means of requests for clarification to
avoid committing war crimes.
Osiel dissects the various ways in which
atrocities are committed: “(1) by stimu-
lating violent passions among the troops
(‘from below’); (2) through organized,
directed campaigns of terror (‘from
above’); (3) by tacit connivance between
higher and lower echelons, each with its
own motives; and (4) by brutalization of
subordinates to foster their aggressive-
ness in combat.” Since the causes are di-
verse, each type will require its own
unique approach to control it; but Osiel’s
overall point is profound: “The evidence
examined here suggests that effective
prohibitions against atrocity depend
much less on the foreseeability to soldiers
of criminal prosecution after the fact
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than on the way soldiers are organized
before and during combat.” In other
words, post-facto law enforcement is only
one tool, and not a powerful one at that,
in the struggle to prevent atrocities and
war crimes.
It is this breadth of treatment that lifts
Osiel’s discussion far above stereotypical
legal analysis and makes it a truly signifi-
cant contribution to the literature of mil-
itary professionalism and military ethics.
Obeying Orders connects the moral argu-
ment deeply to the professional commit-
ments of soldiering. Members of the
military profession should be encouraged
to exercise their ethical judgment over as
wide a scope as possible within the func-
tional requirements of military effective-
ness and efficiency.
It would be a shame and a mistake if only
military and civilian lawyers chose to
read this profound meditation on the
moral foundations of soldiering itself. In-
formed by military practicality, and re-
spectful of the possibilities of deepening
and widening the highest senses of mili-
tary professionalism, Obeying Orders is
the first book on professional ethics that a
seasoned officer ought to read.
MARTIN L. COOK
Professor of Ethics
U.S. Army War College
Smith, George W. The Siege at Hue. Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1999. 195pp. $49.95
George W. Smith has provided an excel-
lent historical summary of the battle of
Hue, based on his personal experience as
an information officer assigned to the 1st
Division of the Army of the Republic of
(South) Vietnam (ARVN), and on
after-action reports, articles, and
interviews. The book highlights the com-
plexities and dynamics of conducting
military operations in urban terrain, par-
ticularly in a combat environment.
Hue had been the imperial capital of
Vietnam, and it was the country’s cul-
tural and intellectual center. It was South
Vietnam’s third-largest city, strategically
located in the country’s narrowest part,
near the coast. One of the few cities
where until 1968 there had been no U.S.
combat presence, it was virtually unde-
fended and consequently a lucrative tar-
get for the North Vietnamese army and
the Viet Cong.
The battle of Hue was the largest single
engagement of the Vietnam War. It
lasted from 31 January to 25 February
1968 and (not counting civilian deaths)
claimed 5,713 casualties on both sides.
Smith describes the battle as a classic
joint and combined operation. The city
was divided into two areas of responsibil-
ity, with the South Vietnamese army as-
signed the mission of retaking the
northern portion and the U.S. Marines
that of regaining control south of the
Perfume River.
The urban conditions in Hue were com-
parable to those of Dodge City in the
American “Old West.” Some buildings
had wooden fronts, porches, and side-
walks; the streets were narrow, and build-
ings were densely concentrated. In the
middle of Hue, however, was a virtually
impregnable fortress known as the Cita-
del, with towers, ramparts, moats, con-
crete walls, and bunkers. The walls were
twenty-six feet high and in some sections
forty feet thick. The moat was ninety feet
wide at many points and up to twelve feet
deep. The Imperial Palace, another en-
clave within Hue, was surrounded by a
twenty-foot wall.
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Smith identifies three costly errors made
by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
on the first day of their attack. First, they
failed to overrun the 1st ARVN Division
headquarters. Second, they failed to as-
sault the U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand Vietnam (MACV) compound.
They had sufficient forces to accomplish
both missions. Third, they failed to de-
stroy the An Cuu Bridge, south of the
city, leaving open a route by which the
Marines could reinforce and resupply the
MACV compound. The bridge was de-
stroyed five days later by enemy sappers,
but too late. These errors most likely pre-
vented the enemy from holding Hue for
longer than they did.
The value of this book lies in the lessons
learned by the forces fighting in Hue.
The first lesson was the value of accurate
intelligence. At the operational level, the
allies falsely believed that the massive
buildup of enemy troops around Khe
Sanh near the Demilitarized Zone meant
that the enemy did not have enough
manpower for a countrywide offensive.
At the tactical level, commanders rou-
tinely made decisions in the absence of
any specific intelligence about enemy
strength or dispositions in Hue. The im-
portance of intelligence is best illustrated
by the events on the night of 16 February.
The enemy suffered a tremendous set-
back when, on the basis of an intercepted
radio message, allied artillery destroyed a
battalion-sized force trying to infiltrate
through a gate on the southwestern wall.
The second lesson involved the use of air
and artillery fire support. These support-
ing arms greatly facilitate fire and ma-
neuver in any environment, especially in
cities; however, authorization for their
use in cities is normally restricted by
rules of engagement in order to limit col-
lateral damage, and Hue was no
exception. Unfortunately, the buildings
were fortresses, with interlocking lines of
fire from roofs, attics, and windows. The
South Vietnamese government eventually
lifted all restrictions on the use of heavy
weapons south of the Perfume River.
However, another limitation on heavy
firepower is weather. Naval gunfire,
eight-inch howitzer fire, and tactical air-
craft support were frequently not readily
available because of poor conditions.
The third lesson is the complexity of
house-to-house fighting. Heavy weapons,
such as tanks, 106 mm recoilless rifles,
mortars, and 3.5-inch bazookas, were
used in Hue for street fighting. Objec-
tives could be reached only by going
through buildings. The Marines dug
holes in walls through which they rushed,
clearing the rooms on the other side and
establishing sniper positions in prepara-
tion to take the next buildings. Streets
could be crossed only under a barrage of
covering fire. Mortars provided local in-
direct fire support that could be used in
lieu of larger weapons that were either
unauthorized or unavailable. Mortars
helped reduce the personnel-for-building
casualty ratio. The enemy forces in Hue
were well dug in, well supplied, and pre-
pared in some cases to fight to the finish.
None of the Marines had had any train-
ing in street fighting prior to Hue.
Today’s efforts by the Joint Staff to de-
velop urban-combat doctrine and by the
Marine Corps and Army to produce tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures are
meant to ensure that the United States
does not face the same dilemma in the
future. Seventy-five percent of the
world’s population now resides in cities.
This will equate to eight to ten billion
people by the year 2025. The U.S. mili-
tary used to fight for cities; now it is re-
quired to fight in them—cities similar to
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Hue. George W. Smith offers a very good
perspective on what such street fighting
is all about.
Joseph Anderson
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Secret War against Ha-
noi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs,
and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York:
HarperCollins, 1999. 408pp. $27.50
At its core, this is a remarkably well told
story of failure—heartbreaking failure to
be sure, and failure despite the heroic
efforts of some remarkable men to
achieve success, but still failure. The U.S.
covert war against Hanoi was, as this
book makes clear, patently unsuccessful.
That it could have been otherwise makes
the story all the more compelling.
A leading expert on low-intensity conflict
and covert warfare, Shultz has filled a gap
that has troubled those who for decades
have been trying to understand the Viet-
nam War. Using meticulously documented
research, and writing in a reader-friendly
style, Shultz lays out the history of the
U.S. Military Assistance Command Viet-
nam Studies and Observations Group
(usually referred to simply as “SOG”)
from 1964 to 1972. Such a book is argu-
ably long overdue, but classification of
material and the lack of documented in-
terviews with former SOG members crip-
pled previous attempts. At worst, the
operations of SOG have suffered gross
distortions, turning one of the war’s most
interesting features into farce and pulp
fiction. Happily, this is no longer the
case. Now, using newly declassified docu-
ments, Shultz lays to rest many of the
myths—including the now-infamous
CNN claim that Operation TAILWIND in-
volved killing U.S. deserters and the use
of the nerve agent Sarin.
Shultz begins his tale by explaining how
an aggressive Kennedy administration,
angered and humiliated by the Bay of
Pigs, formally placed CIA-controlled co-
vert operations against North Vietnam
under military leadership. President Ken-
nedy, his brother Robert, and other key
advisors wanted immediate results, and
they ignored the fact that a covert opera-
tion takes time to achieve its desired ef-
fect. Nor was the military high command
ecstatic about gaining this new responsi-
bility. A generic aversion to special oper-
ations, fear of where Kennedy might be
taking the Army, and distrust of many
involved in Special Operations, resulted
in a bureaucratic struggle of rare inten-
sity and duration. One of the tragic iro-
nies emerging from Shultz’s research is
that from the beginning, senior U.S. mili-
tary and political leaders effectively pre-
vented SOG, which was charged with the
new covert mission, from achieving its
full potential.
Thus, the cards were stacked against SOG
from the start. One obstacle was an ad-
ministration that, following President
Kennedy’s assassination, seemed hesitant
to take advantage of apparent opportuni-
ties. Nor did SOG ever receive proper
support from the military or CIA leader-
ship. Opposition from senior members of
the State Department was at times fero-
cious. In addition, SOG’s South Viet-
namese counterpart was never fully
trusted, possibly with good reason. As a
result SOG rarely had the right mandate
or qualified people, operated under
byzantine restrictions, and never
achieved a rapport with the one organi-
zation that could have dramatically in-
creased its effectiveness. Shultz also
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points out that from time to time SOG
created its own problems. There was con-
cern over discipline and, more problem-
atic, security vulnerabilities of which the
group seemed unaware.
Nonetheless, SOG managed to carve out
a role for itself, eventually running four
major types of operations against the
forces of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam: cross-border commando oper-
ations in Laos and Cambodia, aimed at
observing and interdicting the Ho Chi
Minh Trail; insertion of South Vietnam-
ese agents into North Vietnam to carry
out resistance operations and deception;
maritime interdiction and commando
operations against the North Vietnamese
coastline; and psychological warfare op-
erations aimed at North Vietnam. While
some of these, such as the insertion of
agents into the North, were carried out
only by Vietnamese personnel, others,
such as actions against the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, also involved Americans. Shultz ex-
tensively covers these operations, and the
reader cannot help but be impressed by
the courage of those who carried them
out. However, because these efforts were
never integrated into the overall strategic
plan (if ever such a plan truly existed), the
results were less effective than they might
have been. Yet despite it all, SOG came
close enough to offer a tantalizing vision
of what could have been done. This is
one of the most depressing and intrigu-
ing aspects of the entire book.
If Washington and Saigon did not take
SOG’s efforts seriously enough, the same
cannot be said of Hanoi. The North was
extremely sensitive to SOG’s actions and
worked hard to counter them. In this the
North Vietnamese were remarkably suc-
cessful. If the United States did not get
covert operations right, the North Viet-
namese certainly got counter-covert
operations right. The book explores the
Vietnamese actions in some detail, much
of it for the first time. This facet of the
book makes fascinating reading.
For students of U.S. national security de-
cision making, this book is a superb case
study. Shultz not only discusses the oper-
ations of USMACVSOG but examines
and describes how these issues were han-
dled in the Pentagon and the White
House. Furthermore, he does not limit
his examination to the actions of cabinet
members, military commanders, or key
presidential advisors but sheds light on
organizational structures, procedures,
and lower-ranking action officers. This
aspect of the process is all too often
overlooked.
There are many familiar names to be
found here. These include such Special
Forces legends as Dick Meadows, who was
to be responsible for advance ground re-
connaissance during the failed Iranian
hostage rescue attempt; and Colonel “Bull”
Simmons, who led the brilliantly executed
but unproductive prisoner-rescue raid
against the Son Tay prison. Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara and General
William C. Westmoreland both have
their say, as do the general’s Navy and
Marine Corps counterparts. Some read-
ers might feel that presenting these dispa-
rate viewpoints is enough, but given the
failure of SOG to live up to its potential
and its losses in lives and treasure, rea-
soned judgments of responsibility and
accountability should be made. Shultz
does not shirk from this task, and his
conclusions are convincing.
Richard Shultz wraps up with a masterful
summation and analysis of the longest
U.S. covert campaign in wartime. He
also provides a brief overview of the
status of the Special Operations com-
munity today. In doing so he poses
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interesting questions for covert opera-
tions of the future.
If this were all The Secret War against
Hanoi accomplished, it would be a signif-
icant contribution to our understanding of
the Vietnam conflict, thereby earning a
place on our bookshelves. But Shultz has
also performed a long overdue and badly
needed service in recognizing the tre-
mendous human cost associated with
SOG’s operations. The casualty figures
are simply staggering. For example, of
approximately five hundred agents placed
in North Vietnam, apparently all were
killed or captured; some were “doubled.”
Only slightly less appalling are the casu-
alty rates suffered by the U.S.-led recon-
naissance teams that operated against the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. The worst year was
1969, in which counter-trail operations
in Laos experienced a 50 percent casualty
rate. It is only fitting that the danger
these soldiers faced and the sacrifices
they made be part of the public record
of the Vietnam War.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Bradley, James, with Ron Powers. Flags of Our
Fathers. New York: Bantam, 2000. 353pp. $24.95
On the northern perimeter of the
Arlington National Cemetery, clearly vis-
ible from the adjacent highway, stands a
huge bronze monument embodying per-
haps the world’s most famous war
photograph: the flag-raising on Mount
Suribachi during the seizure of Iwo Jima
in February 1945. Flags of Our Fathers,
told by the son of one of the men repre-
sented by the figures, is an intensely per-
sonal history surrounding this event, a
riveting story guaranteed to evoke emo-
tion in any reader interested in what
Tom Brokaw has called “the greatest
generation.”
Although Bradley is neither a strategist
nor a military historian, he understands
the significance of Iwo Jima and places it
properly in the context of World War II.
This is not revisionist historiography.
Bradley solidly affirms Truman’s deci-
sion to drop the atomic bomb to save
American—and Japanese—lives, because
the alternative would have been even
more horrific. The author’s depiction of
the training regimen, camaraderie, and
exploits of the U.S. Marine Corps will
make all Marines proud. However, he is
not so kind to other services, often por-
traying them as weak willed, unprofes-
sional, even incompetent.
James Bradley is the son of John “Doc”
Bradley, a Navy corpsman who joined
five Marine brothers-in-arms during the
Herculean struggle to wrest “Sulfur Is-
land” from the Japanese. In the course of
the battle, these six members of “Easy”
Company were memorialized for raising
the American flag, an image captured by
Joe Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize–winning
photograph. Three of the six never re-
turned home—a testimony to the overall
casualty rate of 84 percent for E Com-
pany in the thirty-six day conquest of an
island a third the size of Manhattan.
The complete story of the flag raising was
never told, because the principals consid-
ered the photograph insignificant when
compared to the sacrifice of those who
did not return. Like many of their fellow
veterans, the three survivors adamantly
refused to discuss the details of their war
experiences, even keeping secret their
awards for heroism under fire. Following
his father’s death in 1994, Bradley inter-
viewed the friends and loved ones of all
the men to tell the “real story” behind the
photograph.
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The author delights in the pure integrity
and patriotism of his protagonists. None-
theless, Bradley’s anecdotal evidence
makes a strong case that the principal
source of battlefield bravery has little to
do with national allegiance—it’s your
buddies who count. He wrestles with the
term “heroes”—a title of honor strenu-
ously rejected by all the flag raisers.
There is little doubt, however, where the
author places these men who stood atop
Suribachi, beneath their flag.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Jablonsky, David, ed. Roots of Strategy, Book 4
(Four Military Classics). Mechanicsburg, Penna.:
Stackpole Books, 1999. 533pp. $19.95
In this useful fourth installment of
Stackpole’s “Roots of Strategy” series,
David Jablonsky of the Army War Col-
lege presents substantial selections from
four classics of strategy: The Influence of
Sea Power upon History, by Alfred Thayer
Mahan; Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy, by Julian S. Corbett; The Com-
mand of the Air, by Giulio Douhet; and
Winged Defense, by William Mitchell.
The editor provocatively pairs American
authors with non-Americans writing on
the same subjects and bonds them with
two unifying arguments. Jablonsky con-
tends that all four writers were coping
with monumental technological changes
in warfare and were struggling to recon-
cile continuity with change, while peer-
ing into the future.
The two naval theorists, Mahan of the
United States and Corbett of Great Brit-
ain, sought inspiration and guidance for
future warfare in the putatively unchang-
ing principles of the age of sail. The
airpower innovators, Brigadier General
Mitchell of the U.S. Army and Brigadier
General Douhet of Italy, concluded that
the heavy bomber rendered the study of
past warfare antiquarian and irrelevant to
those planning for future combat.
As an American born in 1879 (one year
before Douglas MacArthur and eleven
years before the “closing of the frontier”),
“Billy” Mitchell remained convinced that
the vastness of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans gave the United States a security
from land invasion unique among great
powers. In the editor’s opinion, Mitchell
consequently was slow to confront
Douhet’s truly horrifying prescription for
mass bombing of cities to pulverize “the
material and moral resources of a peo-
ple” in order to achieve “the final col-
lapse of all social organization.” For most
of his contentious career, Mitchell envi-
sioned large land-based American bomb-
ers primarily as instruments for sinking
enemy warships advancing toward the
American coastline, with fighter aircraft
indispensable for downing long-range
bombers headed for inland U.S. cities,
which were now “as subject to attack as
those along the coast.”
Defense also plays a large role in Sir
Julian Corbett’s 1911 masterwork, Some
Principles of Maritime Strategy, the distil-
lation of a lifetime of careful reflection
upon the age of fighting sail from Drake
to Nelson. A lawyer by training and a mi-
nor novelist by avocation, Corbett is the
only author in this volume who never
served in the military. He was, however,
an intimate of Admiral Sir John Fisher,
who presided over the dawn of the age of
the dreadnought.
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
shows a linguist’s familiarity with the fig-
ure considered today the Zeus of strategic
thinkers, Carl von Clausewitz. It contains
the best short summary of Clausewitz’s
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principal ideas currently in print in the
United States. Equally riveting to anyone
formulating realistic strategy is Corbett’s
disenchantment with supposedly “deci-
sive” grand battles, his concept of geo-
graphically shifting and limited command
of the seas, and his praise for interservice
cooperation and amphibious operations.
He was the first English-speaking writer
indissolubly to link the military-naval,
diplomatic, and economic elements of
strategy.
As Jablonsky notes, Captain A. T. Mahan’s
scope is narrower than Corbett’s. The
American naval officer was writing in
1890 to further the technological and
strategic revolution unleashed by the re-
cent advent of the steam-driven, heavily
gunned, thickly armored battleship.
Jablonsky reprints only the first sections
of Mahan’s opus, those in which Mahan
makes his “political-economic argument
for sea power.” The editor has omitted
entirely the great bulk of the book, the
thirteen historical chapters concerning
both grand strategy and “the art and
science of command,” as derived from
Anglo-French naval battles in the age of
square-rigged ships of the line. This is a
regrettable exclusion, because Jablonsky
has adopted and emphasized the imagi-
native thesis of Jon Tetsuro Sumida that
Mahan was as interested in “teaching
command” as in the strategy of sea power.
The limited excerpt from The Influence of
Sea Power is insufficient to permit the
reader to judge the validity of Sumida’s
proposition or to assess the utility of
Mahan’s ponderous dissections of sea
battles, which were fought with a technol-
ogy that had already disappeared when the
naval officer wrote more than a century ago.
Half a loaf is nonetheless better than
none, and Jablonsky’s balanced arrange-
ment of Corbett, Douhet, and Mitchell
alongside Mahan should earn this volume
a place on the bookshelves of all students
of strategy who are sated with the current
deification of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.
KENNETH J. HAGAN
Adjunct Professor of Strategy
Naval War College
Smith, Gene A. Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commo-
dore of Manifest Destiny. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2000. 223pp. $34.95
Thomas ap Catesby Jones is best known
for his mistaken seizure of Monterey,
California, on 20 October 1842, believing
that the United States and Mexico had
gone to war. The occupation lasted
barely overnight before the American flag
had to be ceremoniously lowered and the
Mexican flag rehoisted. Locally, the event
was an occasion for many banquets and
dances, but on the national level more se-
rious repercussions caused a crisis in re-
lations between Mexico and the United
States.
Living in Monterey, I had often won-
dered about this incident, which is men-
tioned only briefly as a footnote in local
histories. Now, with this biography of
Thomas ap Catesby Jones, I have a much
better understanding of a colorful part of
Monterey history.
But this book offers much more. It ex-
plores the life of a controversial and
complicated man whose naval career
lasted half a century, from 1805 to 1855.
In this period the United States went
through a transformation from a young
coastal nation on the Atlantic seaboard to
a power that spanned the continent, a
nation pursuing a “Manifest Destiny,”
with interests stretching well beyond its
borders.
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While Jones made no truly significant,
long-lasting contribution to the U.S.
Navy, his career personified the times.
He was a contemporary of better-known
Isaac Hull, Oliver Hazard Perry, Matthew
F. Maury, and John Dahlgren, and like
them he contributed to the evolution of
the American navy. He was a hero of the
War of 1812, introduced innovations as
an inspector and superintendent of ord-
nance, carried the Stars and Stripes to
Hawaii in the 1820s, and helped to incor-
porate California into the United States.
Yet Jones was not an atypical commander
of his day; he was a striking personality
in an age in which individual tempera-
ments helped shape the Navy.
Gene A. Smith does a masterful job in
chronicling the life of Thomas ap Catesby
Jones, from his appointment as a mid-
shipman in 1805 to his court-martial in
1850 on charges that included fraud
against the United States, libel, neglect of
duty, and oppression. The court found him
guilty and suspended him for five years.
Today’s standards for court-martial were
not applied to the Jones case; it is doubt-
ful that due process and rules of evidence
were followed. Attitudes about naval dis-
cipline were changing, but unfortunately,
Jones had not changed with them. He
was probably convicted because of his
past behavior as an old-fashioned tyrant,
making him a useful example with which
to enforce new attitudes concerning
shipboard discipline. Richard Henry
Dana’s Two Years before the Mast and
Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, among
others, had so changed public perception
that attitudes such as those of Jones were
no longer acceptable. In a sense, one
might liken the 1840s and 1850s to the
1980s and 1990s, where attitudes of ac-
ceptable behavior changed, and those
who did not change along with them
eventually paid the consequences. The
earlier era dealt with naval disciplinary
methods such as flogging, while the more
recent attitude change concerned male
behavior and sexual harassment.
Although the book is well researched and
documented, it may be somewhat diffi-
cult to follow for those unfamiliar with
the geography. For example, the actions
of Jones in the War of 1812 and around
New Orleans and the Hawaiian Islands in
the 1820s would have been easier to fol-
low if maps had been provided. I could
easily follow the discussion concerning
Monterey and California only because I
live there.
Beyond the life of Jones, the book describes
well the mores, attitudes, and practices of
the era. For example, career patterns of
naval officers; the relationship between
private, financial, and military affairs;
ambivalence toward slavery; the chaos
created by the California gold rush; and
many other apparently disconnected top-





Padfield, Peter. Maritime Supremacy and the Open-
ing of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns That
Shaped the Modern World, 1588–1782. New York:
Overlook Press, 2000. 340pp. $35
“Maritime supremacy is the key which
unlocks most, if not all, large questions
of modern history, certainly the puzzle of
how and why we—the Western democra-
cies—are as we are. We are the heirs of
maritime supremacy.” So begins the ar-
gument of naval historian Peter
Padfield’s latest work. Like Nelson,
Padfield is prone to bold acts, and in this
1 5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:14 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
156
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/1
case, it is his thesis. Beginning with a
look at the Spanish Armada of 1588,
Padfield leads the reader through several
pivotal naval battles, including The
Downs (1639), Beachy Head (1690),
Quiberon Bay (1759), and the American
Revolution’s naval campaigns. He con-
tends that these battles not only were
critical from a tactical or strategic stand-
point but played a long-term role in the
development and political, economic,
and social lives of the countries involved.
Put simply, maritime power and success
lead to such liberty as has been enjoyed
by the Western democracies over the re-
cent centuries. “Our faith in democracy,
personal freedoms and human ‘rights,’
and other comforting prescriptions of the
humanist liberal credo, stem from the su-
premacy of maritime over territorial
power.”
Drawing primarily upon published mate-
rials, the author builds a strong argument
for the relationship between naval and
maritime power and the success of such
liberal democratic states as the Dutch
United Provinces, England, and the
United States.
The success of these maritime nations
was and is based on the principles so well
outlined by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Con-
trol of the sea is a two-stage issue—con-
trol of trade, and naval protection of that
trade. Padfield reminds the reader that
during the period of royal absolutism
only a state with a strong merchant class
could be a true maritime power, and only
a strong merchant class could enable a
kingdom or state to finance and operate
successfully naval fleets—“by far the
greatest industrial-bureaucratic organiza-
tions of the time.” The result of the mer-
chant influence was a decline in royal
prerogative. Fleets cost money, and the
merchants had the money; as a result,
merchants gained an increasing role in
official decision-making circles. Along
with the rise of the merchant class in the
early modern states came a rise in the be-
lief of political and social freedoms. Ac-
cording to Padfield, “Liberty has always
been the pride and rallying cry of powers
enjoying maritime supremacy.”
Beginning with the United Provinces,
Padfield contends that their maritime
power, along with their fairly urban na-
ture, created “the first mass market in
intellectual and artistic properties.”
Padfield states further that in essence the
seventeenth-century Dutch burghers
“produced a prototype of late-twentieth-
century Western civilization.” In short,
the Dutch were the “harbingers of the
modern West.” With the “Glorious Rev-
olution” of 1688, the mantle of maritime
greatness passed to England.
These are strong assertions. However, as
Padfield outlines it in Maritime Suprem-
acy, his thesis that maritime supremacy
and the “opening of the western mind”
are inseparably linked is convincing.
If there is a shortcoming to Maritime Su-
premacy, it is in the naval history used to
illustrate Padfield’s points. Although his
descriptions of these famous naval en-
gagements are interesting, there is en-
tirely too much detail. This section of the
work could be an entire book by itself,
without the discussion of Western free-
doms and democracy. The naval battles
within the work represent simply the au-
thor’s canvas, whereas his focal point is
the thesis concerning the relationship be-
tween maritime power and the develop-
ment of the liberal democratic state. This
reviewer’s suggestion is to ignore the bat-
tle minutiae and enjoy the argument.
With its brief glossary of nautical termi-
nology, bibliography of the leading sec-
ondary literature concerning the subject,
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and decent annotation, this work will
make a welcome addition to the library
of the naval specialist, professor, and
armchair admiral alike.
Today’s naval powers operate in a global
theater. Padfield’s research not only
demonstrates the origins of this global
maritime arena but reinforces the impor-
tance of maintaining a nation’s maritime
heritage, diversity, and power. The
book’s dust jacket calls the United States
of America the “ultimate successor” to
this maritime past. If the United States is
to maintain the position Padfield claims
its maritime history has granted it, then
its naval leadership—if not its citi-
zenry—should be reading this work, to
understand the past and prepare for the
future.
ANDREW G. WILSON
The George Washington University
Gibson, Andrew, and Arthur Donovan. The Aban-
doned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime
Policy. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press,
2000. 362pp. $39.95
The Abandoned Ocean has been published
at an opportune time in the history of the
U.S. merchant marine. The latter half of
the twentieth century has seen the flags
of the traditional maritime nations of
Europe and the United States almost dis-
appear from the sea. The fleets of devel-
oped nations operated under national
regulation. Competing with shipping
lines under foreign registry that paid
minimal registry fees in lieu of national
taxes, employed cheaper crews, and ob-
tained and maintained their ships at fluc-
tuating world market prices rather than
in conformance to engineering and safety
standards, the merchant fleets of devel-
oped nations were increasingly at a
disadvantage. When the Western Euro-
pean shipping lines found they were un-
able to operate their vessels under
existing national regulations, many legis-
latures eased those standards by allowing
the formation of international registries
that established conditions similar to
those of their competitors. Some coun-
tries, such as France and Great Britain,
established ship registries in their colo-
nies that provided similar competitive
conditions.
The Abandoned Ocean is a historical
study of American shipping policy over
the past two hundred years. It was
drafted in the hope that it would help fu-
ture maritime policy makers to under-
stand better the competitive environment
that exists today.
As might be expected, given the academic
background of its authors, the book will
be equally valuable to students of mari-
time affairs. It is a case study of the stra-
tegic, economic, and political issues that
have influenced American policy makers
at the highest level from the colonial pe-
riod. Readers are provided with the es-
sential facts about what has, and what
has not, been beneficial to U.S. maritime
industry. They may draw their own
conclusions.
The book is divided into three parts. The
first, “Free Trade and American Enter-
prise,” addresses the years 1600 to 1914,
the period of the greatest growth of the
American merchant marine, and of its
steep decline following the Civil War.
The second part, “War-Impelled Indus-
tries,” guides the reader from 1914 to
1960, discussing the issues that gave rise
to the great merchant fleets of both world
wars, and the New Deal legislation culmi-
nating in the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. The third part, “The Approaching
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End,” covering 1960 to 1990, will be of
greatest interest to the serious student.
The senior author, Andrew Gibson,
sailed as master of a Liberty ship in
World War II and rose in the maritime
industry to become the senior vice presi-
dent of the Grace Line and president of
the Delta Line. In government, he served
as administrator of the U.S. Maritime
Administration and assistant secretary of
commerce. Gibson held the Emory S.
Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs
at the Naval War College, in Newport,
Rhode Island, and he continues there as
an Advanced Research Fellow.
Arthur Donovan is a teacher of maritime
history at the U.S. Merchant Marine
Academy in Kings Point, New York. He
has been published widely on the history
of science and technology.
The authors contend that present Ameri-
can maritime policy was designed to solve
specific problems. The policy, beneficial
at the time it was implemented, has since
been manipulated in a contest between
shippers, shipowners, shipbuilders, and
representatives of labor to the detriment
of the whole. As a consequence, the in-
dustry does not speak with one voice; it
rarely has been able to agree upon a com-
mon policy, because proponents and
opposition groups exist in the executive
branch and in both houses of Congress.
All are influenced by an extensive group
of lobbyists and trade associations oper-
ating in the interests of their respective
constituencies.
The authors conclude: “In all maritime
nations except the United States it is ac-
cepted that the sole purpose of a mer-
chant ship is to make a reasonable net
return on invested capital. In the United
States political considerations tend to
dominate because there are many benefi-
ciaries other than investors. The govern-
ment is compelled to continue payments
to make sure that the expectations of
these many other recipients are satisfied.
. . . Anyone familiar with America’s
proud record of maritime preeminence
must be saddened by this prospect of
final decline. . . . But in the absence of a
truly new departure, of strong leadership
and collective commitment to funda-
mental renovation, extinction is the most
likely outcome.”
The Abandoned Ocean should be read by
those who wish to comprehend the issues
facing U.S. maritime policy makers in the
restructuring of an American merchant
marine for the twenty-first century.
ROBERT K. REILLY
Naval War College
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RECENT BOOKS
Reynolds, Clark G. Navies in History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1998. 267pp. $35
Experienced writers know all too well
that a short work about a big subject is
much harder and more demanding to
write than a long one. On the basis of
more than forty years of study and writ-
ing about naval history, Clark Reynolds
has written a very short book that traces
four thousand years of naval history on
all the oceans of the world. It is a remark-
able achievement. Reynolds conceived
this book as a “primer” and a “reconnais-
sance” for readers new to the field of na-
val history.
With ancient history summarized in a
dozen pages, the American Civil War in
fifteen, and World War II in thirty-four,
the book is clearly designed to communi-
cate with an American audience that
ranges in age from teenagers and seaman
apprentices to newly recruited officer
candidates and congressmen from land-
locked states. In this practical day and
age, readers of this journal will find
Reynolds’s volume particularly useful as
something to recommend to beleaguered
souls who need to know something about
naval history but can only accept it
spoon-fed and in as few words as possi-
ble. In this book, Reynolds has made an
admirable effort to reach them.
For those with more time for study and
reflection, Reynolds’s little book is an up-
dated synopsis of what he has written
elsewhere. Serious students of naval his-
tory will benefit more from considering
Reynolds’s detailed arguments. These
may be found in Command of the Sea:
The History and Strategy of Maritime Em-
pires and in a volume of collected essays,
History and the Sea: Essays on Maritime
Strategies.
Tsouras, Peter G., ed. The Greenhill
Dictionary of Military Quotations.
Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole Books,
2000. 574 pp. $75
“It is a good thing for an uneducated
man to read books of quotations”
(Winston Churchill, under “Quotations
and Maxims,” page 395). Lieutenant Col-
onel Tsouras, USAR (Ret.), hopes it will
also be good for “the aspiring soldier, as
well as the military professional and
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enthusiast.” Indeed, Tsouras relates
how General James Wolfe in 1758, hav-
ing adroitly driven the French before
Louisburg into their defenses, was exas-
perated that “our friends here are as-
tonished at what I have done because
they have read nothing”; Wolfe had
found his maneuver in Xenophon.
With this book Tsouras (a senior ana-
lyst at the U.S. Army National Ground
Intelligence Center and the author of
three books on World War II and the
American Civil War) updates his War-
riors’ Words, adding 2,400 quotations
(for a new total of 5,943), as well as in-
dices (now three) and categories (now
485).
Pitch, Anthony S. The Burning of Wash-
ington: The British Invasion of 1814.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1998. 298pp. $32.95
Anthony Pitch has written a flowing,
vivid description of the events sur-
rounding the British assault on Wash-
ington in the final stages of the War of
1812. Residents of the Washington,
D.C., area will particularly enjoy Pitch’s
evocative account of those times, mak-
ing associations with local landmarks as
they follow the British march in Mary-
land from Benedict to Nottingham and
on to Upper Marlboro, Woodyard,
Bladensburg, and the District of Co-
lumbia. As Pitch demonstrates, it was
an exciting, if ignominious, moment in
American history, but one offset by the
events that followed shortly thereafter
at Baltimore’s Fort McHenry. Pitch’s
lively style is buttressed by his assidu-
ous historical research in twenty archi-
val collections in the United States,
where he paid particular attention to
finding new and previously unused per-
sonal accounts.
Marley, David F. Wars of the Americas:
A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the
New World, 1492 to the Present. Santa
Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1998.
722pp. $99
In this handsomely produced reference
work, David F. Marley (who has also
produced other works for the same
publisher) has taken an unusual “slice”
through history: all the conflicts not of
an era but of the Western Hemisphere.
The unfamiliarity of this perspective for
North American readers is brought
home by the fact that the section cover-
ing the American Civil War is (if the
longest) only one entry of eighty-six.
The sections comprise brief overviews
followed by subentries under variously
specific dates (“LATE 1639. A slave revolt
erupts around Mount Misery . . .”). The
sections in turn are grouped chronolog-
ically by era, the first covering the dis-
covery and conquest by the Europeans
(who, as the preface notes, found the
hemisphere “already embroiled in
warfare”).
The book is uniquely valuable as a
source on events that many of its users
might otherwise find difficult to research.
Moreover, readers for whom, say, the
War of the Cakes (1838–9) is obscure
may learn for the first time in consult-
ing Wars of the Americas how great was
the price paid on all sides for the Euro-
pean settlement of Latin America and
for the liberation and consolidation of
the nations that grew up there.
Index, list of sources for further reading,
maps, and numerous period works of art.
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Thomas, David A. Battles and Honours
of the Royal Navy. Conshohocken,
Penna.: Combined Publishers, 1998.
326pp. $46.95.
This very useful reference (in effect
an updating of A Companion to the
Royal Navy, Harrap, 1988) is advis-
edly titled—that is, it aims at a compre-
hensive listing of the Royal Navy’s
battles, not just its formal battle honors,
as acknowledged by the Admiralty. All
the “honours” are here, even some
fought before the navy became officially
“royal” in 1660, as well as a few appar-
ent (to the author) errors. However,
RN battle honors are defined in ways
that exclude a number of actions that
have been important to the service or to
the course of history. For instance, they
are given only for Royal Navy victories,
“well fought” draws, or glorious (if un-
successful) defiances of “overwhelming
odds”; also, while some single-ship and
even boat actions are included, others
are not, and the opponent must have
been another vessel. As the author
points out in his introduction, the loss
in December 1941 of Force Z (HMS
Prince of Wales and Repulse) is disquali-
fied on both of these counts, and yet it
was a crucial event for the Pacific War
and the history of naval warfare.
Accordingly, to this book of alphabet-
ized battle synopses (with personalia,
forces, and brief narrations) Thomas
has added whole chapters of engage-
ments not accorded honors but that are
of historical significance, as well as ac-
tions not properly “battles”—such as
the Dunkirk evacuation and the (Ger-
man) “Channel dash.” He has also cho-
sen single representative examples of
categories whose instances are too
numerous to list (the patrol of the sub-
marine E-11 in June 1915). There are
also sections on single-ship and boat
actions, the Fleet Air Arm, and the
Royal Marines.
David A. Thomas, who served in the
Royal Navy in World War II, is the au-
thor of some sixteen books of naval and
social history. Illustrations, index, and
selected bibliography.
Boatner, Mark M., III. The Biographical
Dictionary of World War II. Novato, Ca-
lif.: Presidio, 1996, repr. 1999. 733pp.
$24.95
Mark Boatner, a graduate of and former
history professor at the U.S. Military
Academy, is the author of two earlier
references, The Civil War Dictionary
and Encyclopedia of the American Revo-
lution. The present work is aimed pri-
marily at professional (that is,
noncasual) users—especially research-
ers, but also editors, librarians, teach-
ers, and students. (The issuance of this
paperback reprint makes clear how
valuable such readers found the original
book.) The main section comprises en-
tries of various lengths (by Boatner,
many vetted by specialists) on a thou-
sand individuals about whom the target
readers are likely to need information;
the entries cross-reference to a support-
ing glossary of specialized terms, and to
a bibliography.
How did he pick the thousand names
his serious users would wish to
find?—largely by a “semantic count,”
that is, of “hits” in the indexes of stan-
dard and specialized histories. To the
resulting list, pared down to a manage-
able length, he added names from
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slighted categories (notably Soviet and
German commanders) as well as a
number urged by specialist consultants.
Chambers, John Whiteclay, II, ed. in
chief. The Oxford Companion to Ameri-
can Military History. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1999. 916pp. $60
The value of an “Oxford Companion”
reference can be essentially taken for
granted, and its self-description can be
accepted at face value: “Drawing on the
most current scholarship in the field
and in a number of cases advancing
that scholarship, The Oxford Compan-
ion to American Military History pro-
vides a comprehensive, one-volume
guide to the study of war, peace, and
the military throughout American his-
tory.” Its entries (over a thousand) are
distributed among the categories of
“Historical Action and Events,” “The
Armed Services,” “Weaponry and Ma-
terial,” “State and Society” (including
rebellions and civil-military relations),
“Law and Ethics,” “Dissent” (including
conscientious objection, antiwar move-
ments and protests), “Popular Culture
and the Military” (with references to
film, music, even oratory and fashion),
and biographies. Dr. Chambers, of
Rutgers University, has been assisted by
a panel of advisers (the likes of James
McPherson), four editors (Fred Ander-
son, Lynn Eden, Joseph T. Glatthaar,
and Ronald H. Spector), a consulting
editor (G. Kurt Piehler), and some five
hundred contributors (many of them
distinguished, even famous) from a
wide variety of disciplines. Maps, tables,
index.
Morris, James M., and Patricia M.
Kearns, comps. Historical Dictionary of
the United States Navy. Lanham, Md.:
Scarecrow Press, 1998. 405pp. $85
The bulk of this look-up work, number
4 of Jon Woronoff’s “Historical Dictio-
naries of War, Revolution, and Civil
Unrest” series, is a reference for U.S.
Navy ship types and classes, and indi-
vidual ships “that played an important
role”; aircraft and airship types; major
weapons; secretaries of the Navy, chiefs
of naval operations, and other individu-
als with “particularly important roles”;
and significant battles—all covering the
entire history of the service. The entries are
brief but supported by cross-references,
an extensive bibliography, glossaries of
abbreviations and ship designations, a
chronology, and a brief overview of
U.S. naval history. Dr. Morris, profes-
sor of history at Christopher Newport
University, is the author of several
books on U.S. military history; Ms.
Kearns is head of bibliographic control
at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at the
College of William and Mary.
Lewis, James A. Neptune’s Militia: The
Frigate South Carolina during the Amer-
ican Revolution. Kent, Ohio: Kent State
Univ. Press, 1999. 235pp. $39
James Lewis, who teaches history at
Western Carolina University, believes
that the frigate South Carolina, in its
two-year career late in the American
Revolution, left a bigger paper trail than
any other warship of the era. That is
probably true, because nothing in its
existence was simple. First, it was not
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even a warship of the federal govern-
ment but of the state of South Carolina.
Even in that sense, it was not “na-
val”—the ship (built in Holland as
L’Indien) had been bought, fitted out,
manned, and commissioned in 1780 es-
sentially as a private speculation, to
generate prize money for its (absentee
European) owner. The logistical and
technical demands of any such
ship—this one was among the largest of
its rate—were massive, constant, and
complex, and South Carolina had no
supporting infrastructure at all. Every-
thing had to be done from scratch or
done without, bought and paid for (or
not), argued about, and generally done
over again. The ship did capture a
number of prizes, but not enough, and
therefore it led a pillar-to-post,
hand-to-mouth existence, always cadg-
ing stores and repairs, always plagued
by dissension and insubordination
among its oversized and undertrained
crew, and threatened in every port by
litigation, bad faith, and manipulation.
It must have been something of a relief
finally to be captured by the Royal Navy
in December 1782, hours out of Phila-
delphia—leaving human and financial
loose ends that fill the last four chapters
of Professor Lewis’s book. It is an as-
tonishing story. Maps, appendices.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST/FROM THE EDITORS
THE EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP
IN NAVAL HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of a thousand
dollars to the researcher who has the greatest need and can make the optimum
use of research materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s
Archives, Naval Historical Collection, and Henry E. Eccles Library. The recipient
will be a Research Fellow in the Naval War College’s Advanced Research Depart-
ment, which will provide administrative support. Submit detailed research pro-
posal, c.v., one letter of recommendation, and relevant background information
to: Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War College Foundation,
686 Cushing Road, Newport R.I., 02841-1207, by 1 August 2001. Employees of
the U.S. Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are
not eligible for consideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.
ERRATUM
In our Winter 2001 issue, on page 147, an editorial insertion in Captain H. F.
Rommel’s letter commenting on “The Military Response to Terrorism,” by Mark
Kosnik, incorrectly located that article in our Summer 2000 issue. In fact,
Captain Kosnik’s article appeared in our Spring 2000 issue.
SOMETHING TO TELL US?
We’ve made it easier to let us know your reactions to the Review—what you like,
what you don’t, what you need. Listed in the front of the journal are telephone
numbers, fax line, e-mail addresses, and regular mailing address. Our Website
lists the same information (on the “How to Contact Us” page) and offers several
convenient “mail-to” features for reader-service queries. For substantive re-
sponses to our articles, there is all the above, and also our new on-line forum,
“The Conference Room.” You can also add comments and queries to your
biennial renewal card. Let us know what you think!
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Dear Sir or Madame,
Your organization, institute, agency, or activity is on the subscription
list of the Naval War College Review. Though the Review is distributed free
of charge, we must periodically revalidate our address list and are now do-
ing so for the following categories:
(1) U.S. Department of Defense activities not listed on the SNDL;
(2) Non-DoD U.S. government activities and agencies not listed on
the CGDL;
(3) Organizations not part of the U.S. government but in the United
States; and
(4) Organizations located outside the U.S. and its territories.
If your organization wishes to continue to receive the Review, either
call us, e-mail us, or fill out, separate, and return the other half of this
mailer (self-addressed). Be sure to ATTACH POSTAGE and indicate the
complete mailing address to which the Review should be sent.
We will be unable to continue your subscription if we have not received
a reply by 28 September 2001.
Circulation Manager
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